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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents an analysis of the relationship between
grammatical agreement and so-called 'non-configurationality'. We
argue that the properties of non-configurational languages should be
made to follow from independently motivated principles of agreement.
We explore the contrast, discussed in Hale (1989), between languages
such as Navaho (Athapaskan) which permit cooccurrence of full noun
phrases and agreement inflection and languages which show
complementary distribution between these categories, such as Dogrib
(Athapaskan) and Irish (Celtic). We argue that the study of these
contrasts supports the analysis of non-configurationality presented in
Jelinek (1984) where agreement morphemes have argumental, theta-
marked status, in non-configurational languages.
We first introduce issues in the study of grammatical configurations
such as word order as induced by Case and thematic-role assignment
(Chapter 1). In Chapter 2, we review the literature on the issue of
non-configurationality and in Chapter 3, we follow Alexander (1986) in
arguing that no bivalent (two-valued) configurationality parameter can
account for observed configurational variance and we propose a four
valued opposition-the Case/Agreement distinction-which obviates
the need for a separate configurationality parameter. In Chapter 4, we
discuss the proper analysis of languages which show complementary
distribution between nominal arguments (NPs) and agreement
morphemes, arguing that the analysis is Hale (1989) cannot be
supported and, further, that this analysis conflicts with the analyses of
configurationality proposed in Jelinek (1984) and Hale (1983). We
argue that features of theta-theory provide a superior analysis of these
languages. In Chapter 5, we discuss two languages, Canela-KrahO and
Hlxkaryana which cannot be subsumed under Hale's analysis.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Kenneth L. Hale
Title: Ferrari P. Ward Professor of Linguistics
"It is in vain to do with more what can be done with less."
William of Ockham
"Suave does what theirs does for less."
Television Ad
Harpo Marx on a visit to New York was plagued by
representatives of charities wanting him to appear at benefits. One
particularly persistent woman called Harpo twelve times in two days
before he agreed to appear for her charity. Worried that Harpo might
fail to show up, she went to his hotel to escort him personally. As they
were leaving the phone began to ring. "Don't you want to go back and
answer it?" the woman asked. "Why bother?" said Harpo, "it's
undoubtedly you again."
I felt like this woman every time I slipped another paper under
Ken Hale's door. What for me was the enjoyment of trying to
understand Hixkaryana agreement, with constant reevaluation and
shifting of theories, must have seemed to him very much like being
caught in an earthquake. He never once said "What happened to the
last theory?" I thank him for his patience and for keeping me so
immersed with trees that I could not see the forest. His knowledge of
languages is legend but his knowledge of language is equally deep. By
bringing me back to the questions "How does English work, how does
Navajo work" he led me to understand at least what I was proposing, if
not Htxkaryana agreement-about which I will soon develop a
completely new theory.
David Pesetsky's dissertation acknowledgements were four
pages long. Because of this insightful contribution to MIT linguistics,
even the verbose can seem ungrateful. This is thus his first
contribution to this work. There are more. I had a class at UMass
with David in my last year in college and now he is at MIT for my last
year here. Both times I am sure that I would be a better linguist if I
had met up with him earlier. Apart from his significant contributions
to the content, any resemblance between the prose here and a
Standard Average European language is due to David.
I have never met Morris Halle without feeling insecure. God
help me if I ever do. I wouldn't say that he made my life a living Hell,
but...he made my life a living Hell. For my first two years I never
walked the halls of Building 20 without dread that Morris would
appear from around a corner and summon me to his office. Two years
later, nothing gave me greater pleasure than sitting in his office.
Whether I learned something, or just built up my tolerance is left for
the judgement of the dispassionate.
When I first started Hampshire College I had never heard the
word linguistics. I went to my first college class which was to be a
course on Homer, I took a seat in a crowded room and the professor
walked in, sat down and said "This is a course modestly entitled
Language, Thought and Reality." Several students, like me budding
Homeric scholars, gathered their belongtngs and left. The student
next to me leaned over and smugly said "God, these people can't even
find the right room." I wasn't leaving. If I knew the name of the
person whose peer pressure kept me in my seat, it's likely I would
thank him. The professor was Steve Weisler and I will thank him
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instead. Steve was the model first (and second, etc.) teacher of
linguistics, patient, gently prodding and almost always encouraging (he
did once tell me that I would never find a job). For eight years now he
has been trying to make me a better linguist, even when I left the
friendly confines of English syntax to do some intellectual traipsing
elsewhere. For three years at Hampshire and five years since, Steve,
Mark Feinstein, Ruth Hammon, Leni Bowen and Rich Muller treated
me to a good time. To Jamie Rucker, Scott Hall and F. Peter Winters-
hey, you gotta' make a livin' somehow.
Among my fellow students, special mention must go to Brian
Sietsema. My first memory of MIT was having Brian cause me to spill
mayonnaise on myself. It took him six months to realize that I wasn't
made about that. So, for 5 years minus six months, he has kept me
from going over the edge. They say that when the blind lead the blind,
both end up in the ditch, but who want to be in a ditch alone?
And in no particular order, but for particular reasons: Jim
Higginbotham, Kate Kearns, Dave Turner, Paul Sheedy, Dave
Chouquette, (CFC Lori Holms, Harry Leder ei, Scott Hall, Bob Wall,
Jesse Gonzales/z, Benny Vines, Betsy Ritter, Scott Lundin, Catherine
Lathwell, Opal and Harry, Ray Vines, Richard Penniman, Moni
Dressler, Robert Wills, Neal Blatt, Pete Winters, Erik J.P. D'Amato and
Arthur Marx.
Thanks Mom.
"Have youj ever seen [a girl]1 for whomj you'd fight for ej,
die for ej, pray to Godk PRk to give et e?"
Jackie Wilson- "Reet Petite (The Finest Girl You'd Ever
Wan[PRO]na' Meet)"
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Chapter 1:
Introduction
A naive question one may ask is 'why do languages generally put
words in a particular order?' We may also ask a question about this
question: 'does the answer differ depending on which languages we
consider?' Only slightly less naive than the above is the question: what
is grammatical agreement? Though naive, these questions have
commanded attention in many grammatical traditions, and this work
is another attempt to provide partial answers to them. The approach
we will be assuming is the Principles and Parameters framework (PPF)
(see esp. Chomsky, 1985, 1989 and references there); §1.3 provides
an introduction to the theoretical assumptions of this work. In § 1.1-
1.2 we informally explore the theoretical background to the questions
posed above and introduce the basic approach to be taken in this
work.
1.1 Where does Word Order Come From?
1.1.1 Some Theoretical Background
Part of any adequate theory of language must be an account of the
mechanisms languages employ in the ordering of words in sentences
and, as appropriate, an account of why certain languages seem largely
unconstrained in their word order. Setting aside these free-word
order cases for now, let us consider a familiar language, English:
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(1) a. John hit Fred.
b. *John Fred hit. (cf. Johni, Fred hit ei)
c. *Fred John hit. (cf. Fredi, John hit ei)
(2) a. John put the car in the garage.
b. *John put in the garage the car.
c. *John the car put in the garage.
It is a basic fact about English that its canonical word order puts
the direct object immediately after the verb (la) and the direct object
is not freely permutable (lb-c).1 This fact about English, and parallel
facts in other languages, has, in many different grammatical traditions,
led researchers to assume that there is a special relation between a
verb and its direct object-often phrased as the claim that verbs
govern their direct objects. Modem reflexes in PPF of this classic
intuition, formalizing the government relation, are the theories of Case
and thematic-role assignment. Briefly, these theories claim that noun
phrases (NPs) are assigned Case (abstract accusative case for English
direct object NPs) and thematic-roles (0-roles), which are relations
such as agent, patient, theme, etc. It is further assumed that Case and
thematic-role assignment are accomplished under a structural relation
of government, which, for now, we can assume to be strict adjacency
between the verb and its direct object (see Stowell, 1981). Hence, to
take one of the sentences above:
1 Excluding topicalization with its characteristic intonation.
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(1) a. John hit Fred.
+Accusative
+Patient 0-role
The direct object Fred receives accusative case and the patient
0-role from the verb hit. As indicated above, these relations are
accomplished under strict adjacency so this theory predicts that it
will be impossible to separate the direct object from the verb. This is
supported by data such as the following:
(3) a. *John hid in the garden Fred.
b. John hid Fred in the garden.
As we have stated them, the theories of Case and thematic-role
assignment do not yet account for the impossibility of (1b), reprinted
below, where the direct object is adjacent to the verb:
(1) b. *John Fred hit.
An obvious way to analyze (1b), and the traditional Principles and
Parameters explanation, is to claim that Case and 0-assignment are
unidirectional, that is in any given language assignment may be to the
left or to the right but not both.
One might wonder why we say that direct objects require both
Case and a 0-role since requiring either would have the desired effect
of forcing the direct object to appear immediately after the verb. Case
and 0-role assigrnent diverge at other points, however. For example,
prepositional phrases (P1's) may receive thematic roles from verbs
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also, but they do not apparently require Case. The data below are
representative of the facts of prepositional phrases in English:
(4) a. John put the carlin thegarage.
b. *John in the garage put the car.
c. *John put in the garage the car.
Prepositional phrases appear to the right of verbs, like direct
objects, but direct objects appear immediately after the verb while
prepositional phrases follow the direct object. Obviously this suggests
that we must abandon the claim that 0-role assignment is under strict
adjacency since the PP is not adjacent to the verb put in (4a). It
remains to be seen whether we may maintain an adjacency
requirement for Case assignment-the facts of English suggest that we
can. This would permit Case and 0-role assignment to diverge on the
nature of the locality required for accomplishment of the assignment.
In English, on the basis of our limited examples, it appears that
Case and 0-role assignment are to the right. This is not strictly
accurate, however, since subject NPs must receive Case and thematic-
roles also and English subjects are leftmost in their clauses; hence
whatever assigns Case and 0-roles to subjects must make these
assignments to the left. We would like to be able to say that English
has a consistent way of assigning Case and thematic roles, either to the
right or to the left, but the facts do not support this conclusion. It
seems to be a fact that languages may assign Case and thematic-roles
1I1
to the right for direct objects, indirect objects and other PPs yet still
assign Case and thematic roles to the left for subjects.
Further, nothing we have said to this point precludes a language
from assigning Case in one direction and 0-roles in a different
direction; in fact it has been claimed by several researchers (see for
example, Travis, 1984, 1987 and Koopman, 1984) that evidence for
such a divergence is found. Travis (1987; 129) makes such an
assumption for the African language Kpelle:2
(5) a galor a [vp psre t3i I
chief AGR house build
'The chief is building a house.'
b. e [vp sez-kdu tee kalou-pel
Aa money sent chief-to
'He sent the money to the chief.'
Subject and direct object noun phrases appear before the verb
but the indirect object prepositional phrase (kilog-pe, 'to the chief in
5b) follows the verb. Simplifying somewhat, Travis argues that in
Kpelle Case is assigned to the left and thematic-roles are assigned to
the right. Since direct objects must receive both Case and 0-roles, it
appears that they must be in two places at once. A natural way to
encode this in the Principles and Parameters framework is to assume
that the direct object begins in a position where it may receive a 0-
role and moves to a position to which Case is assigned:
2 AG R here refers to an agreement morpheme which registers the person of
the subject. It may also be translated as he in both of these examples. In (5a)
it cooccurs with the subject chief but in (5b) it does not cooccur with a subject
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(6) a. e IVP tSQ sez-kiu kiloo-peJ
AGR sent money chief-to
b. e [Vp sej-kAuj We tj kilog-pal
AGR money sent ti chief-to
'He sent the money to the chief.'
We assume that the moved direct object leaves a coindexed trace
(tR) which receives the 0-role from the verb. This trace transfers the
0-role to the moved direct object. The direct object receives Case
from the verb directly in its derived position to the left of the verb.
This simple set of assumptions captures the facts of Kpelle word
order.
To review briefly, we began with the question: what accounts for
the order of words in (English) sentences. We informally elaborated
theories of Case and 0-role assignment which account for the basic
facts of English word order and which extend in an interesting way to
word order in Kpelle. We could move to a consideration of other
languages, but enough of the system is in place for us to see how word
order might be explained in a Principles and Parameters type theory.
We may now turn to another question we asked above, the question
'does the answer to why languages have particular orders differ
depending on what languages we consider?' We would hope not.
Although the principles of Case and 0-role assignment are fairly simple
as articulated here, it would be quite a challenge for a child learning a
language to discover these principles for herself. If, on the other
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hand, the principles of Case and 0-role assignment are applicable in
every language, if they are universal properties of human language, we
may assume that the child does not have to learn these principles at
all, rather we could assume that they are principles which the child is
innately programmed to apply in the task of language learning. If Case
and 0-role assignment are real entities for unrelated languages like
English and Kpelle, we would expect to find them in all languages. If
only a subset of human languages employed these principles, we would
have to account for how otherwise divergent languages such as English
and Kpelle have come to acquire such specialized principles.
In Kpelle we assumed that verbs assign Case to the left and
thematic roles to the right. This accounted for the fact that direct
objects precede verbs while indirect object PPs follow the verb. We
had to assume that the direct object received a 0-role from the verb
and then moved to the left of the verb to receive Case. Recall that in
in English we said that the subject received its 8-role and Case which
are assigned to the left while the direct objects receive its 0-role and
Case assigned to the right. Why, we might ask, could we not simply
state that Kpelle direct objects receive 0-roles assigned to the left
while Kpelle indirect objects receive 0-roles assigned to the right?
The issue here is whether the grammar has to specify (i.) for each type
of Case/B-role receiver (direct object, subject, indirect object, etc)
from which direction it receives Case and 0-role or (ii.) for each
assigner of Case/B-role, in which direction It assigns Case/B-roles.
Since the number of elements which may receive Case/B-roles is
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greater than the number of elements which assign Case/0-roles, the
optimal grammar is one in which the direction is specified for the
assigner rather than for the assigned. This issue is relevant here
because we seem to have to specify direction of Case/O-role
assignment for English subjects. If we assumed a specification of
assignment direction for Kpelle direct objects we would not need to
assume movement. This argument goes through only if English
subjects receive Case/0-roles from assigners which sometimes assign
Case or 0-roles to the left.
Actually, in English we need not say that the verb assigns Case
and 0-roles to the subject. We may be a little mysterious for now on
how this is accomplished but let us make the presently unwarranted
assumption that an abstract element (called inflection or INFL) assigns
Case to English subjects with the Verb Phrase (VP) assigning the 0-
role:
(7) John INFL [Vp gave a book to Mary
This assumption about Case and 0-role assignment to English subjects,
motivated in detail elsewhere (see for example, Chomsky, 1981,
1985b), allows us to distinguish English from Kpelle. In English we
can say that INFL and VP always assigns Case and thematic-roles to the
left while verbs always assign Case and thematic-roles to the right, no
matter what element they assign Case or 0-roles to. In Kpelle, if we
wanted to say that direct objects receive 0-roles assigned to the left,
we would have to say that verbs sometime assign 0-roles to the right
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and sometimes assign them to the left. We avoid this analysis because
it provAes too much power for the system in permitting the verb to
distinguish the elements it is assigning Case and 0-roles to. Further,
it allows us to formulate a strong hypothesis about Case and thematic-
role assignment: if an element a assigns Case or a 0-role in a direction
p, a always assigns it in direction P. If this principle is correct then
the child learning the language need not entertain the possibility that
a particular category may assign a 0-role to the right at one time and
to the left at another. An optimal theory would be one in which a
particular lexical item or category has direction of Case and 0-role
assignment constant.
A superficial counterexample to the above generalization is found
in Italian, a language in which subjects may occur preverbally (8a),
postverbally (8b) or not at all (8c):
(8) a. le brigate rosse hanno telefonato
the brigade red have phoned
b. ei hanno telefonato [NP le brigate rosseli
ec have phoned the brigade red
c. ej parl- ano di linguistica
ec speak- 3pl of linguistics
In (8a) the subject appears in sentence initial position but It is in
sentence final position in (8b). Further, in (8c) there is no subject at
all. How, then, are Case and thematic-roles assigned to Italian
subjects? Focusing first on the missing subject sentence in (8c), if
there is no subject, how can there be an assignment of nominative
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Case and the subject's thematic role (the agent 0.-role) (see Safir,
1981, for the view that Case must be discharged)?
This omission of a subject, not generally possible in English, is
possible in a number of languages (for example, Spanish, Italian,
Greek, Hebrew, Navajo and many others). These languages in which
the subject can be null are generally languages with rich verbal
agreement paradigms. Compare, for example, the verbal paradigms of
English and Italian:
(9) English Ithal
I talk (10) parlo
you (sg.) talk (tu) parli
he talks (lui) parla
we talk (noi) parlamo
you (pl.) talk (vol) parlate
they talk (loro) parlano
For a particular English verb form such as talka, it is possible to
know that this is the third person singular form, but all other
person/number combinations result in the same phonetic form [ts:k].
In English the morphological form of the verb does not generally
encode whether the subject is 1st, 2nd or 3rd person. In Italian,
however, every verb form is morphologically distinct and, as such,
makes manifest the person and number of the subject. Thus, it is not
surprising to find a contrast between English and Italian on the basis
of the following sentences:
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(9') a. *e speak- 0 [English]
ec speak lsg
b. e parl- o [Italian]
ec speak lsg
c. e habi- o [Spanish]
ec speak lsg
'I speak.'
English differs from Italian and Spanish in two respects: (1)
English morphological agreement is less rich than that of Italian or
Spanish; and (it) English subjects cannot be omitted while Italian and
Spanish subjects can. An intuitive connection between these two facts
is that when a subject is omitted in Spanish and Italian, the verbal
morphology still encodes the person and number of the subject-
subjects in Spanish and Italian are recoverable from morphological
material present in a subjectless sentence.
It has generally been assumed in the Government and Binding
and Principles and Parameters frameworks (Chomsky, 1981, 1982;
Rizzi, 1981 and references there) that rich Agreement is able to
license an empty category (called pro) in subject position in Italian but
not in English. This empty category is simply a null pronoun and may
receive 0-roles and nominative case like an overt subject. Returning to
our null subject example from Italian:
(8) c. eg parl- ano di linguistica
ec speak- Spl of linguistics
18
The subject of (8c) is pro which receives Case and 0-roles
assigned to the left. We may now return to the question of multiple
subject positions in Italian:
(8) a. le brigate rosse hanno telefonato
the brigade red have phoned
b. ej hanno telefonato [NP le brigate rossel
ec have phoned the brigade red
We claimed that the subject in (8a) receives Case and thematic-
roles assigned to the left. Do we have to say that the postverbal subject
(le brigate rosse) in (8b) receives Case and a 0-roles assigned to the
right? We may avoid this conclusion by assuming that there is also a
pro subject in (8b), hence:
(8) b. prot hanno telefonato [NP le brigate rosse 1
ec have phoned the brigade red
Once again pro receives Case and 0-roles which are assigned to
the left. We can maintain the claim that the Case assigner and 0-role
assigner for subjects in Italian always assign(s) to the left.
In Italian, positing pro allows us to maintain the claim that all
Italian sentences have a preverbal subject position and, more
importantly for the present discussion, the claim that Case/0-role
assignment is constant for particular categories (INFL, VP and V being
the assigners we have thus far considered). To test this claim about
Italian requires other data, of course. For every Case or 0-role
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assigner, we must establish that its direction of assignment is
constant. We would want to consider direct objects as well as
subjects. The following is drawn from Rizzi (1982; 1)
(10) a. Mario ha voluto [NP un costoso regalo di Natale]
'Mario has wanted an expensive Christmas present.'
b. *Mario [NP un costoso regalo di Natale] ha voluto.
('Mario has wanted an expensive Christmas present')
As (10) suggests, Italian direct objects cannot be freely
permuted to a position preceding the verb, its Case and thematic-role
assigner. Direct objects support the assumption that thematic-role
assignment is either rightward or leftward but not both. Similar data
may be found for objects of prepositions, which receive Case from
their prepositions. Again, data from Rizzi (1982; 1):
(11) a. Piero verr a parlarti [pp di parasicologial
'Piero will come to speak to you about parapsychology.'
b. *Pero verrA a parlarti [pp parasicologia dil
('Piero will come to speak to you about parapsychology.')
The object of the preposition must follow the preposition (11 a)
and may not precede it (11b). This is further evidence for the claim
that Case and 0-role assignment are unidirectional.
Not all languages show evidence of the Italian type, however.
Yagua, the only extant member of the Peba-Yaguan language family
(Northeast Peru), shows the object of the adposition appearing both
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before and after the adposition. Hence (data from Payne: 1985, p.
448):
(12) a Jimunu vuma
canoe inside
'Inside the canoe.'
b. rA- viimd Junu
3INAN - inside canoe
'Inside the canoe.'
The object of the adposition must precede it (12a) if the P is not
inflected with an agreement marker coreferential with the object. If
the agreement marker appears (12b), the object must follow the
preposition. Yagua thus represents another superficial counter-
example to the hypothesis that Case/0-assignment is unidirectional.
We return to Yagua presently.
Another more serious type of counterexample is represented by
so-called "free word order" languages such as the Pama-Nyungan
(Australian) language Warlpiri, discussed in several papers by Ken Hale
(in particular Hale:1983). Warlpiri seems to systematicady violate the
unidirectional requirement on Case/theta-assignment. Consider the
following sentences where the position of the direct object (either
wawirri, 'kangaroo' or wawirri yalumpu, 'that kangaroo') is not fixed: 3
(3S= 3rd subject, etc.)
3 Though I am using sentences from Hale (1983) the glosses of the AUX clitic
sequences are borrowed from Jelinek (1984) who uses basically the same data
presented below. The discussion below is taken from Jelinek's seminal (1984)
discussion of non-configurationality. In Jelinek's discussion, several central
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(13) a ngarrka- ngku ka- 0- 0 wawirri panti- rni
man- ERG PRES- 3S 30 kangaroo spear NONPAST
'The man Is spearing the kangaroo.' (Hale, 1983; 6)
b. wawirri ka- 0- 0 panti- rni
kangaroo PRES- 3S 30 spear NONPAST
'He/She is spearing the kangaroo.' (Hale, ibid.)
C. wawirui yamhaJ kapi- rna- 0 panti- rni
kangaroo that FUT- IS 30 spear NONPAST
'1 will spear that kangaroo.' (Hale, ibid.)
d. wawirri kapi- rna- 0 panti- rni yaiumPu
kangaroo FUT- 1S 30 spear NONPAST that
'I will spear that kangaroo.' (Hale, ibid.)
e. panti- rni ka 0- 0
spear NONPAST PRES- 3S 30
'He/She is spearing him/her/it.' (Hale, ibid.)
Warlpiri direct objects demonstrate the language's very free
word order. In (13a) the direct object immediately precedes the verb,
which, on the assumption-justified for English, Italian and Kpelle-
that 0-assignment is unidirectional and requires adjacency, we might
have assumed to be the only possible position. In (13b), the direct
object appears in sentence initial position separated from the verb by
the Auxiliary complex (ka-0-0). Note that sentence initial position is
the position occupied by the subject in (13a) but this position supports
the direct object in (13b). In (13c), we have added a demonstrative
pronoun yalumpu 'that' but the sentence in parallel to (13b) where the
insights are taken from Hale (1983) but I will be less punctilious than Jelinek
about the assignment of credit for particular notions. The interested reader
can see Jelinek's article for a fuller explication.
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direct object is separated from the verb. In (13d), the demonstrative
pronoun appears sentence finally while the noun wawirri 'kangaroo'
still appears in sentence initial position. Not only have we separated
the head noun from the verb, we have separated the demonstrative
from its head noun. Finally, in (13e) we see that the direct object, like
the subject, is optional.
While it might seem from the above examples as though Waripiri
tolerates any word order, this is not accurate. The second element in
the sentence must be the AUX sequence (ka- or kapt- above) which
supports the subject and object agreement morphemes and these
agreement morphemes must appear (though they may be 0- forms for
third person). Only one constituent may precede the AUX clitic
sequence, hence wawirri yalumpu 'that kangaroo' may precede but not
two words which do not form a constituent:
(14) a *ngarrka- ngku wawirri ka- 0- 0 panti- rni
man- ERG kangaroo PRES- 3S 30 spear NONPAST
('The man is spearing the kangaroo.' [Ken Hale: PC]
b. *ngarrka- ngku panti- rni ka- 0- 0 wawirri
man- EERG spear NONPAST PRES- 3S 30 kangaroo
('The man is spearing the kangaroo.') [Ken Hale, PC]
Following our discussion of Italian, we might begin to look for
ways to incorporate pro into Warlpiri, which like Italian, shows
missing or null NPs. Recall, however, that pro was helpful for us in
Italian because (I.) it supported the theory of unidirectional Case/B-
role assignment and (ii) It allowed us to assume a consistent subject
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position. It has been argued by Hale (1983) and Jelinek (1984) that
there is no need to assume pro for Warlpiri. We will review some of
those arguments.
Jelinek (1984) argues that nominals (such as subject and object)
are not governed by verbs in Warlpiri (and hence cannot receive Case
or 0-roles from them). The chief argument Jelinek employs is that
nominals do not match in grammatical person or Case with the
agreement clitics on the AUX node. She shows (I.) that auxiliary clitics
in Warlpiri show nominative/accusative case-where the subject of a
transitive clause is treated the same as the subject of an intransitive
clause and (1.) that nominals show ergative/absolutive case--where
the subject of a intransitive clause is treated the same as the object of
a transitive clause:
(15) a ngalulu- rlu ka- rna- ngku ytu- 0
I- ERG PRES- 1SGNOM 2SGAcc you- ABS
nya- nyi
see NONPAST
'I see you.' (Hale, 1973, p. 328)
b. nYuntulu- rlu ka- na- ju nga1u- 0
You- ERG PRES- 2sGNoM ISGACC me- ABS
nya- nyi
see NONPAST
'You see me.' (Ibid.)
c. nvuniu- g ka- jnpa- purla- ml
You- ABs PRES- 2SGNoM shout- NONPAST
You are shouting.' (Ibid.)
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To see the nominative/ accusative nature of the agreement
system, note that the subject clitic of the intransitive (15c) (-npa -
'2SGNOM') is the same as the that of the transitive (15b) (-npa-
'2SGNoM). The subject of the intransitive (15c) nyuntu-0 (you-ADS)
does not have the same case as the subject of the transitive (15b)
nyuntulu-rlu ('you-ERG'). The absolutive ending -0 is used to mark the
object of the transitive (15a-b). Thus, Warlpiri has a nominative-
accusative agreement pattern with an ergative-absolutive nominal case
system.
Jelinek also shows that nominals need not share grammatical
features with the agreement clitics. An example she gives (p. 46) from
Hale (1983, p.32) shows this non-agreement:
(16) nya- nyi ka- ma- ngku ngarrka- Q lku
see- NONPAST Pres- LSGNOM 2SGACC man- ABS- after
'I see you (as) a man now (i.e., as fully grown
or Initiated').
The referent of the 2nd person object clitic (-ngku) is the third
person nominal ngarrka-0 ('man-ABS'). Given that the two systems of
agreement and Case marking do not Ine up, (I.) how can we can we
express this fact about Warlpiri and (ii.) can we also explain the
extensive free word order and similarly extensive null anaphora of
Warlpiri? The position that Hale and Jelinek have adopted is that
assuming subJect and object pro is not particularly helpful for the
Warlpiri problem. Positing pro will not help us explain either Case
asymmetries or why agreement clitics in Warlpiri need not bear the
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features of the presumed triggers of that agreement. In fact, positing
pro only raises the presumption that these problems should not arise,
and that Warlpiri should behave like English or Italian.
The alternative suggested by Jelinek is to assume that the
agreement clitics, which are the only obligatory nominal elements in
Warlpiri clauses, are the real subjects and objects. The overt NPs, the
full NP subjects and objects, are thus adarguments, or adjoined to S.
Theta-roles are assigned to agreement clitics appearing on the AUX
node.
The basic intuition is that in languages like Warlpiri where an
account of word order in terms of Case or 0-assignment seems
Implausible, agreement clitics bear the argument functions of overt
NPs. To reverse the reasoning, Warlpiri free word order is a function
of the fact that NPs need not receive Case or theta-roles from the verb,
since these are assigned to agreement clitics (under strict locality
conditions).
To get an intuitive picture of the relation between agreement
clitics and NPs in Warlpiri, consider the following sentence of English
(Jelinek, 1984, p.50):
(17) Hei, the doctori, tells mek, the patientk, what to do.
The full NPs fill out the meaning of the pronouns and expand on
their reference but the pronouns fill the grammatical roles of subject
and object.
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We will discuss aspects of Jelinek's proposal in great detail in
later chapters of this work but returning to the question with which
we began "what accounts for word order?" we see that there may be at
least two types of answers. For languages like English, Kpelle and
Italian, the answer is Case and theta-marking which require NPs to be
proximate (usually adjacent) to assigners of Case and theta-roles. For
languages like Warlpirl, on the other hand, the answer is certainly
different. In fact, the answer is "nothing accounts for word order,
because there is nothing to account for." When we earlier posed the
question 'what accounts for word order', recall that we did not want
the result that the answer would differ depending on what language
we considered. The reason, suggested above to account for the
similarities between English and Kpelle, is that the highly specialized
principles that account for word order in English and Kpeile seem
unlikely candidates for material actually learned by the child. If in a
language like Warlpiri, these same specialized principles motivated for
English and Kpelle are inoperative, we are forced to posit that not only
does the English or Kpelle child have to learn the principles, s/he
must also learn that the determinants of word order in Warlpiri are
not applicable in Kpells. If, however, the language learner arrived at
the acquisition task knowing that languages were either like Warlpiri
or Kpelle/English and knew how to find data conclusively determining
which type of language his/hers is, then we could continue to assume
that the principles governing word order in English and Kpelle are
part of the innate language faculty. For children learning, Warlpiri, on
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the other hand, they must acquire the knowledge that their language
is different. It may seen reasonable to posit that there is a parametric
difference between English/Kpelle and Warlpiri such that the child
learns that word order principles set A (0-theory and Case theory)
apply to some languages and word order principles set B (those which
apply to Warlpiri apply to some other languages.
In fact, the distinction between languages like English and
Italian and Kpelle on the one hand and Warlpiri on the other has been
the subject of a great deal of work in modem syntactic theory going
under the name the non-confgurationality parameter. As the name
may suggest, it has roughly been assumed that there is a class of
languages the configurational languages which are approximately like
English in requiring NPs to be in particular syntactic configurations
with particular Case and 0-role assigners, such as verbs and INFL,
There is assumed to be another class, the non-configurational
languages in which these syntactic configurations are not present,
perhaps replaced by other syntactic configurations yet to be
discovered. Jelinek's version of this difference can be stated simply:
The Configurationality Parameter (after Jelinek, 1984)
a. Configurational languages assign 0-roles to NPs.
b. Non-configurational languages assign 0-roles to
agreement morphemes
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Thus, if this view is correct our question about word order does
permit a single answer because of a cross-cutting classification of
languages, the configurationality parameter.
Previous to our discussion of Warlpiri, we briefly Yagua as an
exaxple of a language which might require the assumption that theta -
assignment was both leftward and rightward. That was assuming that
the principles governing Italian/English/Kpzlle word order were
operative in Yagua. Now that Warlpiri seems to the force the claim
that word order may arise from different principles, we may return to
Yagua with the question: is its word order best describable with the
assumption that it is like Warlpiri, that it is like English or that it is in
a different class altogether. Consider again the data from (12)
reprinted below:
(12) a jimunu vlmd
canoe inside
'Inside the canoe.'
b. rA- vitma Jwunutu
3INAN - inside canoe
'Inside the canoe.'
While the above demonstrates that a noun phrase may be on the
left or the right of the adposition, a nominal element (either an NP or
an agreement clitic) must immediately precede the adposition.
Hence, the following forms are ungrammatical:
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(12') a. *rAiJymutiuviimd
3 canoe inside
b. *jymuiu r&-viimn
canoe 3- inside
Since the agreement morpheme and the full noun phrase
compete for a position before the adposition, one might assume that in
Yagua PPs, both the NP and the agreement clitic are equally
argumental, or that theta-assignment may be to one or the other, but
not both. This would suggest a change in Jelinek's configurationality
parameter:
Revised Configurationality Parameter
a. Configurational languages assign 0-roles to NPs.
b. Non-configurational languages assign 0-roles to
agreement morphemes
c. Quasi-configurational languages assign 0-roles to
agreement morphemes or NPs.
Yet if this version of the configurationality parameter is correct,
we are forced to assume that there are three different answers to the
question 'where does word order come from'. And since some
languages behave like Warlpiri in some constituents (Dogrib subjects
for example) but like Yagua in others (Dogrib PPs), we may be forced
to the unappealing answer that the question 'where does word order
come from' has a great many types of answers. This is unappealing;
we would like to assume that the types of possible word orders comes
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from an extremely restricted inventory. In this work, we will argue
for such a restricted set of possibilities.
1.1.2 Word Order in This Work
In the configurationality parameter suggested above, languages
are distinguished by whether they assign thematic-roles to NPs or to
pronominal agreement morphemes. Under Jelinek's analysis, a non-
configurational language is one which assigns thematic-roles to clitics
and a language which assigns thematic-roles to clitics is a non-
configurational language. In Alexander (1986) we observed that there
was a generalization missed by Jelinek's version of the non-
configurationality parameter. This generalization may be informally
stated as: Languages with multiple agreement clitics (subject, object)
such as Navajo and Warlpiri generally tend to have free word order
only if they have rich Case systems.
To see the importance of this generalization, we must
recapitulate our logic somewhat. We explained fixed word order, such
as in English, Italian and Kpelle, by appeal to Case and theta-marking.
We then explained free word order as being due to the lack of Case
and theta-marking to NPs in languages like Warlpiri. Part of the
evidence suggesting that Warlpiri lacked Case and theta-marking to
NPs (in the Kpelle/English sense) was that it had obligatory multiple
agreement clitics (for subject, direct object) and highly optional NPs.
The prediction of Jelinek's analysis is that free word order should
cluster with multiple agreement clitics (so, 0-assignment to those
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clitics) while fixed word order should cluster with the property of
lacking multiple agreement clitics (so, 0-assignment to NPs).
Alexander (1986) argued that this was incorrect and that free word
order clustered with rich Case. With respect to having relatively free
word order, languages like Warlpiri with rich agreement clustered
with languages like Japanese with no agreement. With respect to
having relatively fixed word order, languages like Navajo with very rich
agreement (for subject and direct object) clustered with languages like
English or Italian which do not have multiple agreement morphemes.
The relation between free(r) word order and rich Case is an old
insight, found, for example, in the work of Sapir (classically Sapir,
1921) and many others (e.g., Vennemann, 1975; Bloomfield, 1933,
§12.12).
Alexander (1986) concluded that Jelinek was correct in
concluding that there was a correlation between Navajo and Warlpiri in
the extent to which they permitted null anaphora, which was stronger
than in languages without multiple agreement clitics such as Italian
and English. This should not be surprising since we have seen from
Italian that rich agreement licensing null subject anaphora has an
intuitive plausibility. It is natural to assume that additional agreement
(as in Navajo and Warlpiri for the direct object) would result in
additional null anaphora (specifically direct object drop).
The position defended in Alexander (1986) was that languages
with rich Case systems such as Warlpirl and Japanese showed the free
word order expected of rich Case languages (though the radically free
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word order of Warlpiri cannot be so simply explained of course) and
that rich Agreement languages such as Warlpiri and Navajo showed the
null anaphora we are led to expect from consideration of moderately-
rich agreement languages such as Italian. Under this conception, the
generalization to a class of configurational and non-configurational
languages is essentially spurious, rather what is at work here are the
familiar effects of rich case and agreement. It is this conception of
configurationality we develop in this work.
This is not to say that Jelinek's mechanism for encoding non-
configurationality is necessarily incorrect. It might turn out that we
do want to adopt the claim that there are languages, with this hyper-
rich agreement, which assign 0-roles to agreement clitics. What we
cannot do, if the reasoning in Alexander (1986) is correct, is assume
that it is 0-marking to clitics alone which results in Warlpiri type
languages since Navajo is only partially similar to Warlpiri in its null
anaphora but dissimilar in that Navajo lacks case distinctions and
manifests relatively fixed word order. Logically, we must account for
(I.) Warlpiri free word order (naturally rich case suggests itself); and
(it.) Navajo fixed word order. With respect to fixed word order in
Navajo, its analysis will have to be different from the analysis of fixed
word order in English since, if we do follow Jelinek, we do not have
available for Navajo the mechanism of Case/B-role assignment to NPs
that was the basis for the analysis of fixed word order in English. 4
4 A view worth considering is that we must make a distinction between
abstract or structural case on the one hand and lexical or non-structural Case
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If, on the other hand, contra Jelinek, we abandon the claim that
languages with rich agreement and no Case assign 0-roles to
agreement clitics, we are forced to group Navajo with Italian, English
and Kpelle. Consequently, we must assume that Navajo does have
thematic-role assignment to NPs. We would also want to assume the
existence of pro in Navajo type languages, with pro bearing the
thematic-roles assigned to the empty NP positions (which we now
must posit). It is very difficult to find empirical differences between
the claim that empty NPs in Navajo are simply non-existent and the
claim that they are filled by an empty element (pro) although we will
discuss what we find a very convincing argument against Navajo pro
due to Platero (1982). A parsimonious method might be to assume
that all languages have pro; following the logic above, this would
prevent the language learner from having to discover una in those
languages where it appears. Since the existence of pro in some
languages such as Warlpiil is disputed (by Hale and Jelinek among
others), it would be circular to assume that pro is present in all
languages. When we find a language in which we cannot tell if pro is
on the other. Under this view, it might be argued that structural Case, as the
term suggests, requires a local structural relation, presumably adjacency or
government, whereas lexical Case is essentially non-local. Although we do not
phrase our position as such, it is possible to assume that the relation we call
government (adjacency) below should be called structural (or abstract) Case
assignment. We could say then that languages without rich case require
adjacency for Case assignment while languages with rich morphological case
do not (arguments for the second conclusion will be advanced below). This
would be nearly identical to our claim below that non-configurational
languages are those which assign theta-roles to agreement morphemes (as
Jelinek suggests) but such languages differ (Warlpiri vs. Navajo) in the
locality requirements of NPs to their licensers (verbs or agreement clitics).
34
present (perhaps in Navajo-type languages), obviously we might
assume pro where doing so solves particular problems and not assume
it if doing so raises problems.
This raises the question: what is at stake in assuming pro for
three arguably non-configurational languages (languages with multiple
agreement morphemes): Navajo, Dogrib and Yagua.
One language where it does not immediately appear helpful or
harmful to posit pro is Navajo. We will focus here on Navajo
postpositional phrases because it is easier to see the component parts
of the phrase but the argument extends to other categories. In Navajo,
the object of the postposition is optional but inflection on the
postposition Is obligatory.
(18) a tl'ot y- ee
rope 3sg- with
'with a rope' (Hale, 1988; 4)
b.hy- ee
3sg- with
'with it'
c. *Ut'66t ee
rope with
Cwith a rope')
We could assume that (18b) contains a pro object of the
postposition but there is no obvious benefit to doing so. We would
then say that the object of the postposition Is tl'66t ('knife') if it
appears or pro otherwIse. To rule out (18'c) we need only say that pro
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may not appear unless it is licensed or identified by agreement, as is
familiar from Italian.
(18') b. pro1 y.. ee
ec 3sg- with
'with a rope'
c. *pro ee
ec with
('with a rope')
Although these two analysis (one with pro, one without) make
the same predictions, they do represent two different ways of thinking
about Navaho postpositional objects. In the pro analysis, the
postpositonal object is either an overt NP or an empty one. Either NP
triggers agreement-in fact, either NP is impossible without
agreement. For Navajo postpositions, we say, as we do for Italian, that
it has rich agreement and is so able to license pro. Under an analysis
which does not admit pro in Navajo, we would say that the effective
postpositional object is the agreement morpheme (y- above) but that it
is possible to add a specifying (or resumptive in Ken Hale's
terminology) NP. Navajo PPs would be parallel to the English case
below:
(18") a tl'661i [pp yj. ee
rope sg- with
'with a rope'
b. He hit hIm [pp with itj ], [the stickj1
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Although the English cases are certainly a bit marginal (perhaps
because parentheticals must hang off S which would prevent linking
the resumptive NP with the pronoun in PP), we have seen [(16) above]
that such resumptive NPs are generally acceptable for English subjects
and direct objects.
A strong argument does exist against positing pro in Navajo
however. Platero (1982) [discussed in Hale, 19851 calls attention to
the following sentence:
(19) [adadA ashkii at'eed yiyiitts&n-eej yldoots'os
yesterday boy girl 3-3--saw-REL 3-3-will-kiss
The boy will kiss the girl he saw yesterday'
'S/hej will kiss the girl that the boyi saw yesterday
What is significant is that the third person subject marker on
the main verb will kiss refers to the subject of the relative clause
which is in object position. If the sentence had a pro subject the
representation would have to be that in (19'):
(19') proj [adAdiA ashki at'66d yiyiittsAn-e1 yidoots'os
yesterday boy girl 3-3-saw-REL 3-3-will-kiss
This representation cannot be appropriate however since the
proi in subject position would c-command and hence bind the subject
of the relative clause, thus violating Condition C of the Binding Theory
(Chomsky, 1981) which requires that R-expressions never be bound.
Any empty category In subject position would thus force an illicit
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representation and predict (19) to be ungrammatical, which it is not.
Hence we seem forced to the conclusion that pro cannot appear, at
least as a subject, in Navajo-even though it is precisely as a subject
that pro has been chiefly motivated. We are not aware of the
replication of Platero's argument for other languages. It is unlikely,
however, that the result would only hold for Navajo.
An indeterminacy of the existence of pro in Navajo PPs extends
to another Athapaskan language, Dogrib, which has a different set of
agreement facts.
(20) a *mbeh ye- t'&
knife 3sg- with
('with a knife') (Saxon, 1986; 54)
b. ye- t'&
3sg- with
'with it'
c. mbeh t'&
rope with
'with a rope'
In Dogrib, an overt NP may appear with an uninflected
postposition or an inflected postposition may appear but it is not
possible to have both an overt adpositional object NP and inflection on
the postposition. With a theory that assumes pro, we must account for
the data below:
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(20') a proj yet t'&
ec 3sg- with
('with it')
b. ye- t'A
3sg- with
'with it'
c. *pro t'a
ec with
('with it')
For this data, we may explain (20'c) with the assumption that
pro must be licensed by rich AGR (as in 20'a) and since there is no
agreement in (20' c), there can be no pro. If there is no pro, the
postposition lacks an object, which presumably violates the selection
requirements of P. This analysis dodges the question of why an overt
NP cannot appear with agreement (*mbeh yet'd). What excludes the
sentence in (19a)? If we assume an analysis which denies pro, we can
claim that mbeh (knife) and ye- (3sg) are both nominal candidate
instantiations of the postpositional object role. Under a pro analysis,
we must claim that lexical NPs do not trigger agreement while empty
NPs do (or, more properly, that without agreement it is not possible to
have the relevant empty NP). Though the pro theory might seem
rather disingenuous here, this is essentially the position defended by
Stump (1984) for Breton (Celtic) which shows the Dogrib type
complementary distribution between overt NPs and agreement on
heads.
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(21) a Ul levr brezhonek a zo ganto (pro)
a book Breton Pci is with:3PL ec
They have a Breton book' (Stump, 1984; 325)
b. *UI levr brezhonek a zo ganto ar vugale
a book Breton Pci is with:3PL the children
('The children have a Breton book' )
c. Ul levr brezhonek a zo gant ar vugale
a book Breton Pci is with the children
The children have a Breton book'
Simplifying slightly, Stump argues that the AGR absorbs the Case
of the overt NP which, consequently, cannot surface. This is
essentially the same proposal made for Breton by Lapointe (1983;
130). The difference between the agreement morpheme absorbing
the Case of the overt NP and actually being the object of the adposition
is not particularly clear and we would require a bit more formalization
to point out potential distinctions but there is an intuition, shared by
Lapointe and Stump, which would permit a pro analysis for Dogrib.
The analyses of Lapointe and Stump do not seem as promising
for Yagua since as for Breton or Dogrib; though the agreement marker
and NP compete for the same pre-head position, the NP may surface
in a posthead position in Yagua. In Yagua the subject NP can appear
before the verb (22a) or after the verb (22c) but the cooccurrence
possibilities are restricted by the appearance of an agreement
morpheme. Consider the following data: (Everett, 1989, p. 352)
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(22) a Pauro pnnchi Anita
Paul carries Anita
'Paul carries Anita'
b. sa- pnnchi Anita
3sG- carries Anita
'He carries Anita'
c. sat- puchi Pauror fnii Anitaj
3so- carries Paul- 3sG Anita
'Paul carries Anita'
d. *Pauroj sat- pndUichl Anita
Paul 3sG- carries Anita
('Paul carries Anita')
If the agreement morpheme absorbs the Case of the NP, when it
does surface, how is it assigned Case? With respect to pro, one could
argue that the complementary distribution of between agreement and
the NP is really complementary distribution between pro (which must
be licensed by the agreement) and an overt NP (which cannot trigger
agreement). Alternatively one could propose that there is no pro in
Yagua, and that the agreement morpheme and the NP compete for the
same theta-role. We will discuss these options in Chapter 4. As with
Navajo and Dogrib, positing pro in Yagua does not seem to solve any
problems. With Dogrib and Yagua, pro does not raise any evident
problems as it may in Navaho. We suggested that for both Dogrib and
Yagua, positing pro required stipulating that overt NPs could not
cooccur with an inflected head-though the complementary
distribution is position relative in Yague, absolute in Dogrib. There are
researchers who are willing to accept this cost and posit pro, Stump
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and Lapointe for Breton, whose facts parallel Dogrib's, and also Everett
(1989) who makes a similar proposal for Yagua. Thus, positing pro in
Navajo, Dogrib and Yagua is not untenable-neither is it obviously
beneficial. The point is that given Platero's argument against pro in
Navajo and given Hale and Jelinek's arguments against pro in Warlpiri,
positing pro is not automatic and consequently it is not a simple
matter. Is Yagua like Navajo and Warlpiri in lacking pro or like Italian
in having it? How could we tell? The question is also raised for
Breton and Dogrib which both generally behave alike with respect to
complementaiy distribution between an agreement morpheme and a
full NP. Do both have pro, neither or does one have it and one not.
Obviously the problem for the linguist is also the problem for the
language learner. We would hope to have a theory of grammar which
easily determines for the child when to posit pro. Thus far, we have
found no such theory.
Returning then to the main discussion, these three languages
(Navajo, Dogrib and Yagua) are ones with multiple agreement clitics,
languages in which Jelinek would assume (i.) 0-assignment to clitics
and (ii.) no reason to assume pro. Thus, even if Jelinek's version of
the configurationality parameter is incorrect, as we will suggest, it
does not follow that her claim that 0-roles can be assigned to clitics is
to be abandoned and we have seen evidence to suggest that it is a
reasonable assumption. The reason for this is that Jelinek's
mechanism (theta-marking of clitics) does not explain the phenomena
she attempts to describe (a cluster of Warlpiri properties including
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free word order) because the property of free word order does not
exist in Navajo, a particularly good candidate for theta-marking of
clitics given Platero's argument, or Dogrib and Yagua. It might turn
out however, as we will argue here, that theta-assignment to
agreement clitics can be motivated to explain other properties
(extensive null anaphora, lack of NP movement rules, etc.) that are
common to Warlpiri, Navajo, Dogrib, Yagua and other languages.
If one of the non-pro analyses sketched above is correct, we have
a third type of answer to our initial question: 'where does word order
come from.' For languages like English, Italian and Kpelle, the answer
is Case and 0-assignment to NPs. For Warlpiri, while the answer
might make to reference to Case, essentially the mechanisms of Case
and 0-role assignment to NPs seem inoperative. For Navajo and Yagua
and perhaps Dogrib, we might provide a third answer if theta-roles
may be assigned to clitics with NPs still requiring proximity to
assigners. Perhaps in these languages, NPs require Case, which is still
under government. Perhaps NPs must be proximate to the clitics
which are assigned thematic-roles. Perhaps some other mechanisms
explains word order in Navajo or Yagua type languages.
The existence of languages somewhat like English and somewhat
like Warlpiri raises a number of questions-and problems for Jelinek's
analysis. Within the discussion of word order, such languages are of
particular interest and this work will consider many of the questions
raised by these languages. The overall question is still the one with
which we began: 'why do languages put words in a particular order'
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with added inquiry: 'how does the theory of non-configurationality
contribute to/or detract from our understanding of the above
question'.
1.2 Another Question: How does Agreement Work?
1.2.1 Some Background
Having introduced one of the questions with which this work is
concerned, we now turn to a second, requiring another approach to
much of the data already briefly considered.
This is a work about agreement and, in particular, it is an
exploration of the relationship between noun phrases which trigger
agreement (such as subjects and direct objects) and the morphological
registers of agreement which are triggered (agreement morphemes).
As can be seen from a superficial (and probably misleading)
exploration, English shows the canonical agreement pattern. Consider
two simple declarative sentences in English:
(23) a. John like-s apples.
b. The men like-0 apples.
Traditionally we say that the subject (John, the men) agrees with
the verb (like) and that the verb takes a suffix which indicates or
registers the person and number of the subject (-s, or -0 above). We
thus have two elements, a verb and a subject noun phrase, related by a
third element, an agreement suffix. Looked at in this way, English
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agreement manifests the canonical case of subject-verb agreement, a
tripart relation involving subjects, verbs and agreement morphemes.
Not all languages show subject-verb agreement in this canonical
manner, however. Consider for example, the Brazilian language
Hixkaryana (Carib) (Derbyshire:1979, 1985). Abstracting for now over
certain low-level complications, Hixkaryana, like English, has a subject
agreement morpheme (a prefix), but there are options in Hixkaryana
not available in English, such as omission of the subject NP.
(24) a w- enyhoretxehkan uro1
lSUBJ- finished making I
'I finished making it.'
b. wj- enyhoretxehkan e1
lSua- finished making ec
'I finished making it.'
In Hixkaryana, it is possible to omit the subject (and, in fact, to
omit the direct object). In (24), the person of the subject (but not the
person of the object) is marked by a prefix on the verb (w-). This
option taken by Hixkaryana is well known from so-called pro-drop or
null-subject languages such as Italian or Spanish:
(25) a Yo habl- o
I speak- 1SG
'I speak.'
hHabl- o
speak- 1sG
c. (Yo) habl- o
I speak- 13(G
# ('I speak it')
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Spanish, like Hixkaryana, permits subjects to be omitted if the
person of the subject is represented morphologically on the verb.
Hixkaryana permits richer null anaphora than Spanish since (direct
object) NPs may be omitted even when there is no morphological
register of their person (even non-third person NPs) but, essentially,
lixkaryana and Spanish together differ from English along the same
dimension; that is, there is not the same overt three way relation
between a subject, a verb, and an agreement affix. For Spanish, it is
customarily assumed that there is an empty category in subject
position (pro) which triggers agreement with the verb, hence
maintaining the three part agreement relation. The literature is less
clear for languages like Hixkaryana; as we have seen work such as that
by Jelinek (1983), etc., argues against the claim that there is a pro
subject in rich Agreement languages such as Hixkaryana. We have
discussed this question informally. For now we merely note that
Spanish and Hixkaryana seem to differ from English in the optionality
of an overt subject as the trigger of agreement.
Another type of agreement pattern differing from English is
found in Yagua, also discussed above. As we have seen, in Yagua, both
the agreement morpheme and the NP are optional in certain
environments, though at least one must appear. Both the subject NP
and the subject agreement morpheme may appear together but when
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this occurs the subject NP is in a different position than it occupies in
the absence of subject agreement. 5
(26) a Pauro pUchl Anita
Paul carries Anita
'Paul carries Anita'
b. sa- pnuchi Anita
3SG- carries Anita
'He carries Anita'
c. sat pnnch Pauror niV Anitaj
3SG- carries Paul- 3SG Anita
'Paul carries Anita'
d. *Pauro1 sat- pnnchi Anita
Paul 3SG- carries Anita
('Paul carries Anita')
As discussed above, when there is no subject agreement (26a)
the subject appears before the verb. The form in (26b) shows the
optionality of the subject. In (26c-d) we see that when the subject
occurs with subject agreement, the subject may not appear in the
position preceding the verb but must instead follow the verb. Yagua
differs from both English and Hixkaryana in that in Yagua (I) the
subject is not only optional, it is in some cases obligatorily absent, and,
(11) the occurrence of the subject and subject agreement depends on
positional factors, i.e. there is no absolute complementary distribution
between subjects and subject agreement but there is position-relative
5 As the reader may suspect from the following, the direct object agreement
marker is required if the direct object is separated from the verb. We will
discuss direct object agreement in Yagua in greater detail In a later chapter.
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complementary distribution. Again, whatever the analysis of Yagua
agreement, it is not obviously a simple instance of the canonical
agreement pattern discussed for English.
A fourth type of agreement pattern is represented by languages
such as Irish (see particularly McCloskey and Hale:1983, Hale:1988
and Hale and Baker: forthcoming), Dogrib, Breton and others. In Irish
it is possible to have either subject agreement or an overt subject, but
not both.
(27) a cuiri- m
puts- 1sG
'I put'
b. cuireann Eoghan
puts Owen
'Owen puts'
c. *cuir- m m6
puts- ISG I
('I put')
In (27a) it is possible to have subject inflection with no overt
subject. In (27b) we see no subject inflection but an overt subject and
in (27c) we see the impossibility of having both subject inflection and
an overt subject.
Irish is like Yagua in not permitting the cooccurrence of a
subject NP in subject position with subject agreement. Unlike Yagua
however, no repositioning of the subject yields a grammatical form.
Again, if we think of agreement as the registering of the person and
number of a subject (by an agreement morpheme) on the verb, Irish
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represents a superficial counterexample since the element registered
(the subject) cannot cooccur with the register itself (the agreement
morpheme).
1.2.2 The Outline of this Work
A theory of grammar must have an account of agreement which
predicts the possibility of cases like Hixkaryana, Irish and Yagua. This
is only to reach the level of descriptive adequacy (Chomsky: 1965, etc.).
It is reasonable to expect more. We would like to resolve fundamental
issues such as 'why do languages have agreement at all?' 'do all
languages have agreement, at some level of abstraction?' 'what is the
relation between the nominal element subject and the element
agreement morpheme and how do they differ with respect to the
property: satistfies the selectional requirements of a predicate?'
This work is a contribution to a general theory of agreement. It
will rarely be self-consciously so. As is natural with theories of such
abstract notions as case, word order, etc., our focus will often be
much narrower and concern phenomena far less abstract than the
questions raised above. The goal, however, is the articulation of a
theory of agreement which bridges the superficial gaps between the
canonical type of agreement as discussed for English and the various
non-canonical cases which appear (such as Irish, Yagua and
Hlxkaryana),
In this work, we approach the construction of a theory of
agreement by consideration of four different sub-issues.
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The first of these sub-issues is the so-called configurationality
parameter. It is well-known that there are languages (canonically
Warlpiri, see Hale:1983) whose syntactic behavior is strikingly
different from that of English. These non-configurational languages
are marked by properties such as extensive null anaphora, lack of NP
movement transformations, lack of pleonastics, free or scrambling-
type word order and so forth, all absent from the canonical
configurational language lEnglish. It is also well known (as summarized
in Speas,1985) that some configurational languages have properties of
non-configurational languages (e.g. Italian has extensive null anaphora)
and some non-configurational languages do not have all the properties
of non-configurational languages (e.g. Navajo has relatively fixed word
order). Given this difficulty in characterizing the set of configurational
and non-configurational languages, it is not obvious that there is a clear
(bivalent) distinction between languages with respect to the
properties of (non)configurationality. Of course, the theory of
grammar must still have some means of accounting for the observed
differences between English and Warlpiri or Warlpiri and Navajo.
Jelinek (1984, following Hale, 1983 in part) argued that agreement
played a role in distinguishing these two types of languages, She
proposed that languages may differ with respect to which nominal
elements (NPs or agreement morphemes) may satisfy the selectional
requirements of lexical heads, Languages like Navajo and Warlpiri
require the assignment of grammatical functions (subject and object)
to agreement elements while languages like English and Japanese
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require the assignment of grammatical functions to noun phrases in
argument positions. Thus, in some clear sense a subject in Navajo or
Warlpiri is an agreement morpheme rather than a particular NP. We
will continue to explore this view and its consequences in greater
detail but we can see that this analysis of non-configurationality relies
heavily on a theory of agreement which differs from the canonical view
suggested for English. In Chapter 3, we develop a theory of non-
configurational variance which rejects the binary configurationality
parameter of Hale (1983), Jelinek (1984), Speas (1985) and Saxon
(1985), as suggested above. We will argue that general principles of
the theory of agreement (and the theory of Case) can account for
configurationality without a separate parameter.
The second subissue we consider in this work arises from the
fact that many languages show agreement with the direct object as
well as the subject, many languages also show agreement inflection on
prepositions and nominals. One such language with inflected
prepositions is Irish, and the cooccurrence possibilities of this
inflection are the same for prepositions as for subject agreement
observed above. To see this, compare the following paradigms:
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a. cuiri-m
puts- is
'I put'
b. cuireann Eoghan
puts Owen
'Owen puts'
C. *cuiri-m me
puts-1S I
('I put')
(28') a. or-m
on-1
'on me'
b. ar Eoghan
on Owen
'on Owen'
c. *or-m md
on-I 1
('on me')
With both subject inflection and object of the preposition
Inflection, Irish permits either the inflection (28-28'a) or the NP (28-
28'b) but not both (28-28'c). Yagua too has parallel agreement
paradigms across categories: (for [29J, Everett, 1989; p. 352; for [301,
Payne, 1966; p. 448)
(29) a Pauro pdnchi Anita
Paul carries Anita
'Paul carries Anita'
b. sa- pndchi Anita
3sG- carries Anita
'He carries Anita'
c. sac princhi Pauro- nfi Anitaj
3SG- carries Paul- 3so Anita
'Paul carries Anita'
d. *Pauroj sar pnnafchi Anita
Paul SSG- carries Anita
('Paul carries Anita.')
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(28)
(30) a. jymunu viimn
canoe inside
'Inside the canoe.'
b. r&- vllmn Jymuinu
3INAN - inside canoe
'Inside the canoe.'
c. rA- viimnl
3INAN - inside
'Inside it.'
d. w*nunu rA- viimn
canoe 3INAN - inside
(inside the canoe.')
With postpositions-as with subject agreement--the object of the
postposition can appear before the postposition (29,30a) only if there
is no inflection on the postposition. If such inflection occurs then the
object must follow the postposition (29,30c).
Other languages do permit inflection on the postposition to
cooccur with an overt NP. One of these languages is Navajo
(Hale:1988) which, as noted above, requires an agreement marker on
the postposition and which optionally permits an overt NP.
(31) a tl'66t y- ee
rope 3sg- with
'with a rope' (Hale, 1988; 4)
by- ee
3sg- with
'with it'
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a *tl'66t ee
rope with
('with a rope')
The obligatory nominal element in Navajo PPs is the agreement
morpheme and the NP is fully optional.
An obvious question raised by the appearance of inflection on
verbs (referring to subjects) and on postpositions (referring to the
object of the postposition) is whether both of these cases are examples
of agreement. There is a theory-internal reason to suspect that they
should not be the same. Consider the structure of a simple English
declarative sentence with a PP, simplified somewhat for ease of
exposition.
(32)
IP
Spec, IP l'
NP I VP
AGR tense V PP
P NP
I I
John PAST drove to Boston
Note that the agreement element (AGR) in Infl (I) does not c-
command the subject NP. These elements may be coindexed by virtue
of being in a Spec-head relation (see Chomsky, 1985) but there is no
structural c-command. Compare the relation between AGR and
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subject with the relation between P and its NP object. The NP object
is not a specifier of P. it is a complement of P and naturally the P c-
commands (governs) the NP object. If agreement is a structural
relation between lexical heads (such as 10) and Specifiers (such as the
NP subject) mediated through an AGR node in the head, we are led to
suppose that the structure of Irish prepositions is as follows:
(33)
PP
P Spec, PP
P AGR NP
There are a number of consequences of the claim that objects of
prepositions in Irish or Navajo type languages are in Specifier
positions rather than complement positions. Naturally these
consequences will have to be explored in some detail before we reject
or accept the claim made by this analysis. One consequence (which is
not obvious) is that we do not have an explanation for the relation
between the properties (I.) being a Specifter and (it.) being a trigger of
agreement. It would be uninteresting to claim that Irish has
prepositional agreement because objects of prepositions in Irish are in
Spec positions since the only motivation (so far) for claiming that PP
objects are in Spec positions comes from the fact that they trigger
agreement. It is not clear that there is a factual correlation between
the property of being a Spec and the property of triggering agreement.
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The reverse does not seem to be the case. For example, though there
is no (overt) subject agreement in languages like Chinese we would not
want to claim ipso facto that subjects in Chinese are in complement
positions (though in principle there could be arguments for this).
The above discussion should make the point that a number of
issues are raised by object agreement and agreement inflection on
nominals and adpositions. These issues are clearly bound up with a
general theory of agreement.
The third subissue of a theory of agreement we will explore in
this work is also concerned with inflection across categories. Apart
from deriving a theory of agreement, the theory of grammar must
develop a theory of incorporation. Incorporation (see Baker:1988, for
example) is a common grammatical process in which XO elements
attach to lexical heads. In Hixkaryana incorporation seems to be
confined to NOs which refer to body parts, and is used only in the
formation of a limited set of idioms:
(34) a. ryexemnukyaha
ro- exe- munuku- yaba
loBJ throat press NONPAST
'he/she/it is choking me.'
b. kahowosi
ki- aho- wo- si
SUB3J arm inject IMP
'let me inject you.'
i.e.: 'let me inoculate you.'
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This process seems distinct from agreement (for example in
Carib it is only possible to have one agreement morpheme/syllable per
surface: Alexander, 1989b and the incorporated noun does not count
toward this total) but there are reasons to suspect that incorporation
and agreement may converge. Hale (1988) assumes incorporation to
account for the Irish type cases discussed above, and reprinted below:
(28) a. cuiri-m (28') a. or-m
puts- iS on-1
'I put' 'on me'
b. cuireann Eoghan b. ar Eoghan
puts Owen on Owen
'Owen puts' 'on Owen'
c. *cuiri-m m(' c. *or-m me
puts-iS I on-I 1
('I put') ('on me')
Following Hale, assume that the NP position (subject in 28 and
PP object in 28') in Irish can be filled at D-Structure by either an NP
[such as Eoghan] or a pronoun (NO or a determiner, DO) [such as -m].
If the NP position is filled by a DO it may incorporate into the V or P,
leaving a trace. It is impossible to generate a full NP in this position
also. Only a pronoun, which may be incorporated, or an NP can be
generated (i.e. only one can appear). Thue, this analysis accounts for
why agreement inflection is in complementary distribution with NPs
in Irish. It does so with the assumption that Irish really does not have
agreement per se; it simply has incorporation of pronouns.
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As we will discuss in Chapters 4-5, Hale's analysis risks the
distinction imposed by Jelinek between languages in which NPs
assume grammatical functions (configurational languages) and those in
which agreement elements assume grammatical functions (non-
configurational languages). Briefly stated, the problem is that there are
non-configurational languages which show the Irish pattern of
incorporated agreement. Following Hale, we must assume that in
these languages agreement morphemes appear at D-structure in NP
positions (prior to incorporation). If this is so then they are assigned
0-roles in these NP positions and, hence, 0-roles are assigned to NP
positions in non-configurational languages. This is paradoxical under a
Jelinek-style analysis since non-configurational languages are defined
as being languages in which thematic-roles are assigned to agreement
morphemes and not to NPs. Either Hale's analysis of incorporated
agreement inflection or Jelinek's analysis of non-configurational
variance must be altered or given up completely. The relation
between these two analyses will occupy Chapter 4.
The fourth and final subissue of a general theory of agreement
we will discuss concerns an issue latent in the above discussion: what
is the relationship between an NP and an agreement morpheme,
particularly in non-configurational languages? To oversimplify
somewhat, non-configurational languages are marked by the optionality
of NiPs and the obligatory character of agreement morphemes. This
suggests that lexical heads select agreement morphemes rather than
tiPs to discharge their selectional restrictions. How, then, are NPs
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selected when they do appear? Does the lexical head select them,
does the agreement morpheme select them or is there another
system altogether? We will see evidence (first presented in Chapter
3) that suggests that agreement morphemes select NPs in non-
configurational languages. In Chapters 4-5, we will see evidence
pointing in the opposite direction, evidence that suggests that, for
example, verbs attempt to have Specifiers, even though the
grammatical role of the NP in Specifier position is actually assigned to
an agreement morpheme. As will become clearer, it appears to be the
case that Jelinek's analysis cannot completely be maintained because
even languages in which agreement clitics bear thematic-roles seem to
generate (a limited inventory of) NP positions. We will suggest that
the position immediately adjacent to the verb behaves like a structural
position in both Hixkaryana and Yagua, though the languages behaves
like Jelinek-type non-configurational languages.
Thus, this work will consider four interrelated subissues in the
theory of agreement, focusing on how issues in the theory of
agreement border on issues related to non-configurationality. It is not
claimed that this subset of issues is exclusive or even particularly
appropriate as the locus of study for all of the general questions this
work addresses. This partitioning of the question does have the
advantage that it focuses on languages which are (1) under-studied;
and (2) have hyper-rich agreement. It is a possible shortfall for the
theory that the well studied languages, which have been the basis of
work on agreement, are often languages without particularly rich
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agreement systems. Obviously English fits this pattern but even so-
called "rich Agreement languages" such as Italian have, from a
comparative point of view, relatively weak agreement systems. We will
suggest throughout this work that while agreement is agreement, a
relation which does not particularly differ from English to Hixkaryana,
"hyper-richness" of agreement does have interesting and convoluted
syntactic consequences. 6
1.3 Theoretical Assumption
As previously stated, this work follows the Principles and
Parameters approach of Chomsky (1985a, 1985, 1989). In this
section, we outline some of the salient theoretical assumptions made
in this work. Much of the discussion in following chapters is narrowly
focused on issues concerning agreement and the representation of
phrase structure in so-called non-configurational languages,
consequently it is for these issues that the present section is an
introduction, rather than for the entire Principles and Parameters
approach. For such an introduction, see Cook (1988).
Initially note that it is a non-trivial claim that syntax is the
proper locus of analysis for the subject matter discussed herein. One
might imagine that the theories of phonology or morphology could be
6 The term "hyper-rich" agreement is not one we favor but it is forced on as
by the fact that there is a class of languages called "rich Agreement
languages" whose agreement systems are weaker than "hyper-rich agreement
languages". In the next chapter we will suggest alternative terminology
which avoids the problems of the "rich", 'hyper-rich" terminology, though at
the expense of some clarity.
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revealing for the discussion of agreement-agreement morphemes are
parts of words and syntax is generally thought of as involving the study
of orderings of words, not parts of words. Insofar as the present study
is successful, then, it provides evidence that the classical definition of
syntax (as confined to phenomena at the level of the word and beyond)
is too narrow or, alternatively, that the principles that govern syntactic
representations are applicable at other levels of structure (obviously
the work of other researchers might suggest this conclusion, for
example Baker, 1985). In any event, the questions 'what is syntax'
and 'do syntactic principles find application at other levels of
structure' find no ultimate (or a prior) answer in any syntactic
framework.
As the name suggests, Principles and Parameters claims that
there are two major components of any linguistic theory: invariant
principles characteristic of all human languages and parameters-
where parameter might be understood as a choice of two or more
principles of grammar offered to the speaker with only one option
being instantiated in the grammar that the child finally arrives at. One
often discussed parameter is the null-subject parameter which
determines for a particular language which, if any, noun phrases may
be non-represented. As we have seen, English does not generally
permit the null expression of NPs as Italian does. A child learning
Italian hears sentences such as those in (35) while a child learning
English hears only the form in (36a):
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(35) a. lulparli
he speak:3sg
'he speaks'
b. parli
c. parli lul
(36) a. he speaks
b. *speaks c. *speaks he
Obviously the child does not hear the absence of fonns such as
(37b-c); what can a child in the construction of a grammar could
conclude from the absence of such forms? Notice that the
grammatical English sentence forms are a subset of the grammatical
Italian forms mutatis mutandis. Chomsky (1985b) suggests that the
child selects the grammar generating the smallest corpus of sentences
consistent with the evidence. If this is correct, both Italian and
English children will begin with a [-null subject] setting and eventually
the Italian child will find his/her grammar in conflict with the data
and shift to a [+null subject] value for the parameter. Since the data
that Italian is a null subject language is so readily available in the
linguistic data available to the child, it would not be surprising if this
shIft occurred before the child ever produced a two word utterance-
in which case it would be impossible to determine that such a
parameter switching had actually occurred.
Another issue concerning the null subject parameter and,
consequently, parameters in general is the fact that languages differ in
the extent to which they permit null expression of nominals. Hence,
62
Italian permits null subjects, generally requires direct objects to be
expressed, and always requires expression of the object of a
preposition. In Navajo and Warlpiri, however, full NPs are generally
never required (though perhaps some idiomatic expressions are
exceptions, Ken Hale: P.C.). In Irish, full NPs are optional (in some
sense-being in complementary distribution with inflection
morphemes) for subjects, genitive possessors and objects of
prepositions but direct object NPs are required. One might wonder if
this entails that the null subject parameter has several values. If it
does, this does not represent a problem with the model discussed in
Chomksy (1985b), since, again, all children could assume the [-null
subject] value, move to the Italian setting [+null subject] and then to
the Irish setting [+null subject, object of P, Spec of NI and finally be
forced to the Warlpiri and Navajo setting [+null NPs,VNPj. Though
this is not unnatural, a more likely scenario is that there is some
principle from which it is possible to derive the different null subject
properties of Italian, Irish and Navajo. If this were the case, if these
difference were independently derivable from some Principle P, [+null
subject languages] might simply be subject to the principle 'make NPs
optional to the extent permitted by F' in which case we could keep
the two-valued null subject parameter. But, if there is some principle
of the formed outlined, it might be possible to extend it to English;
this is to say that Principle P might exclude null subjects In English as
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null objects of prepositions are excluded in Italian-in which case, of
course, there is no null subject parameter at all. Actually, there
might be a more limited type of parametric difference. Luigi Rizzi has
suggested that if we consider the six basic morphological distinctions
in the verbal paradigm (1st, 2nd, 3rd person, singular and plural),
languages with five or six actual distinctions [in the sense of note
following] are always null subject languages vhile those with three or
less are never null subject languages (such as spoken French with
three distinct forms) while languages with four actual distinctions may
or may not be null subject languages. 8
7 If this view is accurate, presumably both Principle P and the principle
'make NPs optional to the extent permitted by Principle P' would be related to
the Recoverability Condition on deletion which would have to be suitably
recast. We would probably want to avoid having recoverability be a meta-
condition on grammar formation but it might be that, from the point of view
of the grammar, null expression of NPs is preferable and that pragmatics
forces expression of NPs. Since NP omission in English is never recoverable,
except in the Imperative, we are unable to see that, again from the point of
view of the grammar, English and Italian are essentially identical. This would
be parallel to the fact that English permits gapping of verbs (John ate apples
and Bill pears) while languages with richly inflected verb such as Hixkaryana
do not (*rakoronomehe John, [V e] Bill, John helps me and (I help) Bill)
simply because the information on the verb cannot be reconstructed from
context-the omission is unrecoverable, It would be odd, under these
circumstances, to assume that there was a gapping parameter to explain the
Hixkaryana-English contrast since both languages gap to the extent permitted
by recoverability though, again, in English there are many environments for
gapping in which the second verb is not omitted. It is not clear whether the
null-subject parameter is particularly different for this case and whether a
non-parametric account is not more appealing.
8 Written French: je, tu, il, ils [parl], vous parlez, nous parlons. 3 distinct
verbal forms; Spanish (Spain) imperfective: yo, 61 (& usted) hablaba, td
hablabas, nosotros hablamos, vosotros hablasteis, ellos (& ustedes) hablaron. 5
distinct verbal forms; Spanish (Latin America) imperfective: yo, 61 (& usted)
hablaba, td hablabas, nosotros hablamos, ellos (& ustedes) hablaron. 4 distinct
verbal forms.
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For the present discussion we may put aside these issues of
parametric variation-what is important is that from the point of view
of a fully formed grammar (say that of an adult speaker) the distinction
between a principle and a parameter is probably of no real
consequence since both the principles and the particular parametric
variations are fixed for the grammar at issue. If, however, principles
are immutable and parameters may be altered even in adult grammars
during periods of language change, the distinction might become
crucial.
In addition to the claim that the theory of grammar requires
both principles and parameters, P&P also maintains that the grammar
is made up of modules which, though acting separately, conspire to
determine the form of utterances. These modules are listed below:
(37) 1. 0-theory
IL, Case theory
II. Binding theory
iv. Bounding theory
v. Control theory
vi. Government theory
Each of these subcomponents of the grammar consists of a small
number of simple principles (with a limited degree of possible
parametric variation). 8-theory, which we have discussed briefly in
this work, concerns the assignment of thematic-roles such as agent
and patient. It requires a local relation between the assigning element
and the NP to which a 0-role is assigned-the exact nature of this
relation is a subject of government theory. Government theory
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concerns, first, the relation between lexical heads and arguments with
which they are in construction such as, classically, the relation
between a verb and its direct object. Government theory is also
concerned with the local relations used in Case and 0-role assignment.
As should be evident, government theory interacts with other
components of the grammar-Chomsky (1985a) discusses this in great
detail. One of the modules most affected by government theory is Case
theory which concerns the assignment of grammatical cases such as
nominative and accusative to NPs. In English, these cases are
generally abstract (non-overt) but such case distinctions are overt in
many other languages, such as Japanese. Some languages, notably
Warlpiri, have considerably richer case distinctions and such richness
must also be permitted by Case theory.9 Binding theory is concerned
with the reference of pronominal elements, forms which are
dependent on other elements for their reference. One particular type
of empty pronominal category (called PRO), the 'empty' subject of
infinitivals such as John wants PRO to win is the concern of control
theory. Finally, bounding theory concerns limitations on the rule
move-a (see below) and contains the subjacency condition.
This work is primarily concerned with the assignment of
thematic-roles and naturally we will discuss government and Case
assignment. We will not discuss Control theory, Bounding theory or
Binding theory in this work.
9 Note that in this work, as is customary, we capitalize case (Case) only when
used in the technical sense of Case theory; e.g., nominative case, Case assigner.
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The modules discussed above apply to operations at several
levels of structure. Principles and Parameters follows the T-Model
(see Chomsky and Lasnik, 1977).
(38) The T-Model (Chomsky and Lasnik, 1977)
D-Structure
S-Structure
PF Component LF Component
Surface structure (or S-structure) is the output of the syntax
which is interpreted by Phonetic Form (sound) and Logical Form
(meaning). We will explore the properties of Deep Structure (or D-
structure) below; for now, we may make a simple distinction between
D-Structure and S-Structure on the basis of simple declaratives and
wh-questions. Consider the following pair of sentences:
(39) a John put the car in the garage.
b. Where did John put the car?
In (39a), the verb put has a following direct object and
prepositional phrase. In declarative sentences, put requires both
arguments, hence:
(40) a *John put in the garage.
b. *John put the car.
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The requirement that put have an NP and a PP argument is
inoperative in wh-questions, however, since one of these arguments
may be missing:
(41) a What did John put in the garage?
b. Where did John put the car?
It is possible to show a relation between the wh-word in
sentence initial position and the missing argument of the verb. In
(40a-b) we saw that the verbs complements may not be missing in
declarative sentences, further a wh-word cannot occupy sentence
initial position unless there is a missing argument with which it may
be construed.
(42) a John died.
b. *John died Mary.
c. *What did John die?
In (42a-b), we see that die does not select a direct object. With
die it is also not possible to have a wh-question construed with a
direct object. We may capture this generalization by assuming that
wh-questions are formed by moving a wh-word from inside the
sentence to the sentence initial position. We may derive the sentence
in (43c=39b) from (43b) below:
(43) a Where did John put the car?
b, John put the car where?
c. Wherej did John put the car ti?
In (43b) the requirement that put have a locative argument is
satisfied (and, of course, 43b Is a grammatical echo question In
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English) and (43) shows the representation of the sentence after
movement: the wh-word is in sentence initial position and in locative
position there is an empty category (trace, or t) which is coindexed
with the moved wh-word. D-structure is the level where the
selectional requirements of lexical heads are satisfied; so, if put
requires a locative argument, that argument must appear at D-
structure. D-structure may be transformed in a (constrained) number
of ways, such as by wh-movement of phrases to sentence initial
position. S-structure is the level of representation derived by these
transformational processes operating on D-Structure and, as stated, is
the input to the interpretive levels PF and LF, Phonetic and Logical
form, respectively. We may fill out the T-model accordingly:
The T-Model
D-Structure
transformational processes
S-Structure
PF Component LF Component
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Principles and Parameters thus assumes two levels of syntactic
structure-related by transformational processes. It is not obvious that
P&P could not be construed as a single level theory (with, say, direct
generation of gaps or traces) but we will avoid that issue here, treating
P&P as a two-level theory (see Chomsky, 1989, note 12 for details;
and Sag, et. aL., 1986; 238-254, for an alternative view). Given this
two-level theory, what determines D-structures?
1.3.1 D-Strncture Representations
1.3.1.1 The Lexicon
We noted above that D-Structure is that level where the
selectional requirements of lexical heads are satisfied. By selectional
requirements we mean the types of arguments that verbs are required
to appear with. Put, for example, requires both an NP and a locative
PP argument. Drive is a verb very similar to put but drive does not
require two arguments, it requires either an NP or a PP, though it may
take both:
(44) a John put the car in the garage.
b. *John put the car.
c. *John put in the garage.
(45) a John drove the car to Dallas.
b. John drove the car.
c. John drove to Dallas.
We may describe the properties of put using the follo wing
notation.
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put, V, __ NP, PP
The notation, called a subcategorization frame, records that put
is of category V and obligatorily appears before a noun phrase and a PP.
Some verbs, such as believe, require more complicated
subcategorization frames. Believe requires that its complement be
either a NP (John believes Mary) or a subordinate clause (John
believes that the world is oblong). We may express this through the
notation below:
(47) believe, V, -- NP
The curly brackets ({ )) indicate that there is an option in
satisfying the subcategorization of the verb. Subcategorization can be
quite complicated, even a fairly simple verb like drive raises
difficulties, since it may either have a PP alone (John drove to Dallas)
or the pair NP and PP (John drove the car to Dallas) and, in fact, and it
may be that drive may surface without either, insofar as John drove is
acceptable.
(48) drive, V, - ((NP), PP)
The parentheses indicate that the enclosed item is optional.
The words of any language show a great deal of idiosyncrasy.
This information can be quite specific. For example, the fact that the
verb to crane, (he craned his neck) requires that the craned neck be
that of the craner (*he craned my neck). This is, of course, very
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(46)
specific information about the verb to crane which all speakers of
English have come to know, but it is an idiosyncratic fact about a
particular word. Such idiosyncratic facts must be learned separately.
On the other hand, the fact that the plural in English is formed by
some reflex of /-z/, is a general fact about the language. A child
learning that lad /led/ has lads /ladz/ as its plural with the /-z/
requires very little data to assume from day /dey/ that its plural is
/deyz/. Certainly children do not need to learn most English plural
forms separately, those which are regular, or are formed by rule, have
a different status than those not formed by rule, viz. ox-oxen. In
Principle and Parameters (among other theories), the particular facts
of a language, those which do not follow from general facts about the
language, are expressed in the lexicon, the mental dictionary of the
language. Irregular plurals must be listed in the lexicon since they
must be learned by children as special or irregular cases. Information
about subcategorization must be listed in the lexicon as well since this
is information about particular words. This is easily demonstrated.
Knowing that a word is of category noun tells us that its plural is one of
the allomorphs of /-z/ but knowing that a word is a verb does not tell
us what type of complements it takes. There is presumably an upper
bound to the idiosyncrasy permitted in the lexicon, and, hence in the
language. There could probably not be a language in which each noun
had an irregular plural, for example. Whatever the extent of permitted
idiosyncrasy, it is presumably finite though not small. In this work, we
will generally take subcategorization and other lexical information as a
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given. Since our focus will be on general properties of human
language, we will of course concentrate on general properties of
particular human languages. Consequently, the lexicon in general and
the lexical properties of particular words will not enter our discussion.
When we claim that D-Structure satisfies the selectional requirements
of verbs, we will not be precise about just what those properties are-
though, of course, it is possible to be precise.
Thinking about the lexicon more abstractly for now, consider
the type of information that we have included in our lexical entry for
put.
(49) put, V,_ NP, PP
This entry provides a gap ( _ ) to show that put appears before
its NP and PP complements. We already showed (§ 1.1) that it is a
general fact about English that verbs precede their complements,
hence the impossibility of the forms below:
(50) a *Ithe car put in the garage.
b. *1 in the garage put the car.
c. *1 in the garage the car put.
d. *1 the car in the garage put.
Since the lexicon contains only particular facts about words, it is
not appropriate to stipulate that put precedes its complement. As
suggested above, we want this to follow from general facts about
English such as Case and 0-theory. We can simplify the lexical entry
above to the following form:
(51) put, V, NP, PP
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This lexical entry still contains general facts about the language.
It stipulates that the direct object NP precedes the PP argument but it
is a general fact that direct objects in English immediately follow their
verbs, as can be seen from consideration of drive and hid, two verbs
which may also take the array NP PP:
(52) a Brian drove the car to Detroit.
b. *Brian drive to Detroit the car.
(53) a Brian hid the car in the park.
b. *Brian hid in the park the car.
We thus don't have to specify the ordering of NP PP since this
should be made to follow from general principles of the language-
again, perhaps Case and 0-theory. We may simplify our
subcategorization frame further:
(54) put, V. NP PP
This type of subcategorization, specifying the category of the
head's complement(s) is called c-selection. This method alone will
not suffice to adequately express the selectional properties of verbs.
For example, the following sentences are categortally consistent with
(54):
(55) a I Neal put generosity beside Monika.
b. I Neal put the car with aplomb.
c. I Neal put mustard with a car.
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These sentences are deviant because they do not respect the
semantic-selection (s-selection) properties of verbs. Put requires a
putter, a put thing and a place where the thing is put. We may refer to
these as agent, patient and locative arguments. Combining these types
of selection, c-selection and s-selection, we get the following
subcategorization for put.
(56) put, V, [NP PP] <Agent, <Patient, Locative>>
The square bracket describes the categorial requirements of
complements to the verb (notice that the categorial status of the
subject is unspecified: it follows from general facts about English).
The angle brackets describe the semantic type of the arguments
which must appear with put. The agent argument is special because it
is reserved for the subject. The other two arguments are assigned to
the verbs complements, the NP and the PP. Just as we saw that NPs
precede PP, we could show that patients precede locative arguments
in English-hence we do not have to specify that the NP receives the
patient argument and the PP receives the locative. These semantic
arguments, agent, patient, locative, etc. are called thematic-roles or 0-
roles,
Note that the agent 0-role is underlined in the subcategorization
of put and we indicated that it was special since it is assigned to the
subject. More formally, we make a distinction between the external 0-
role and internal 0-roles. An Internal 0-role must be assigned Internal
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to the phrase headed by the selecting category, i.e., a verb's internal 0-
roles must be assigned inside the Verb Phrase. A verb's external 0-
role must be assigned outside VP. We thus get the following 0-
structure for put
(58) Is NP+AGENT IVP put NP+PATIENT +LOCATVE1I
This structure is consistent with both the c-selection and the s-
selection of the verb. Though very simple, the subcategorization in
(57) provides a great deal of information about put. The structure in
(58) does not exhaust the possibilities of expanding sentences with
put of course. It is possible to include adverbials for example and
other optional material.
(59) a Mark put the car in the garage with aplomb.
b. Mark put the car in the garage Friday.
c. Mark put the car in the garage with aplomb Friday.
Although put may appear with these optional elements, it is not
required to do so and, further, it is not a particular fact about put that
it may appear with them. Subject to some pragmatic constraints, any
verb may appear with them.
(60) a Jess shaved with aplomb,
b. Jess shaved Friday.
c. Jess shaved with aplomb Friday.
Thus whatever permits these optional elements need not be
specified in the lexicon, but rather should be abstracted as general
facts about the language.
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Other types of categories also have lexical entries. For example,
the nominal destruction has idiosyncratic subcategorization
information with respect to c-selection and s-selection:
(61) a Scott's destruction of the city angered Pierre.
b. The destruction of the city angered Pierre.
c. *Scott's destruction angered Pierre.
d. *The destruction angered Pierre.
(62) destruction, N, [ NP I <(agent), patient>
Destruction requires a patient but its agent is optional, indicated
as usual with parentheses. Further, though its complement appears
after of, we have listed the c-selection of the complement as NP, for
technical reasons discussed below. We may want to assimilate the
subcategorization of destruction to that of destroy, a verb with which it
shares properties. We will not be making that assumption here,
instead will be adopting the lexicalist hypothesis (see Chomsky, 1970
for details).
There are other interesting aspects to the lexicon but the
discussion here is sufficient background for the present study.
1.3.1.2 X-Bar Theory
Having discussed the treatment of individual words in Principles
and Parameters, we may now turn to the treatment of phrasal and
sentential groupings of words. We will be assuming X-Bar theory (or X-
theory), see Chomsky, 1970; Jackendoff, 1977; and Stowell, 1981.
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X-theory, relativized to English, is composed of the following
principles:
(63) -theora
1. L XP >...X....
ii. X > Specifier X'
iii. X' > X complements
The first principle states that a phrase of category XP always
contains an X, hence VPs contain Vs, NP contains Ns etc. To
demonstrate principles (11.-ill.) note the following phrase marker:
(64)
NP -N"
SPEC N'
NP POSS N PP
P NP
I I I IJohn 's photo of Mary
Complements are familiar from our discussion of the lexicon.
Complements are phrases which are selected by a head and which
follow that head. Specifiers precede their head, need not be phrases
(the photo of Mary vs. John's photo of Mary) and are not as closely
Linked to their heads-are more likely to be optional, for example.
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Given this informal characterization of basic English phrasal
structure applied to NP, we can ask 'what types of categories (heads)
are there in English'?. Following Chomsky (1970, 1985), we assume
that there are six basic parts of speech. The first four of these are:
Noun (N), Verb (V, Preposition (P) and Adjective (A). These four
categories conform to principle (iii.) of X-bar theory, so we have the
following types of structures depending on our choice of X.
(65)
XP
SPEC X'
X PP
P NP
I I
N = photo of Mary
A - angry at himself
V = drove to Dallas
P = out of Africa
All four lexical heads fit naturally into the same frame (perhaps
with the exception of P which generally requires an NP complement)
but the four categories do not behave uniformly with respect to
Specifiers:
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(66)
XP
SPEC K'
x PP
P NP
I I
N . John's photo of Mary
A - very angry at himself
V - Just drove to Dallas
P = right out of Africa
Although each of the categories permits the appearance of a
category preceding the head, these preceding elements don't form a
natural class. Nominals, for example, permit an entire phrase to
precede (in fact an NP + possessive marker) while the other
categories do not permit phrases and also do permit NPs (*John's
drove to Dallas). It might be that the best characterization of Specifier
is, simply, non-complement-if we admit that A, V, and P have
Specifiers. We could assume that of the four categories discussed so
far, only Ns have Specifiers. When we discuss the other two categories
(I and C) which do permit phrasal Specifiers, we could perhaps find a
principled definition of Specifier. We will not make this move,
however, since it would lose the uniformity of X-bar theory.
Turning now to the two additional phrasal categories assumed by
P&P:, in Government and Binding theory, it was assumed that S was
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the root node of sentence and that it dominated S and a category
COMP, the landing site for wh-question formation. S dominated the
subject NP and VP, hence:
(67)
s'
Comnp S
NP VP
V NP
I I
who1 can John see t
Here the wh-word moves from direct object position to Comp,
leaving a coindexed trace. The position of the fronted 2nd position
auxiliary (can) was something of a mystery in GB. Government and
Binding theory also assumed that there was a category INFL (or
inflection) which contained tense and agreement features (or AGR).
This led to a structure as follows:
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(68)
so
CoMp S
NP INFL VP
AGR tense V NP
I I
who1 can John see L
In GB, The categories Infi, $ and Comp did not behave like their
lexical counterparts (NV,P,A) but Chomsky (1985) proposed that Infl
(=10) and Comp (part of Comp Phrase or CP) be assimilated to the
lexical categories. This provides a structure as follows:
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(69)
CP
C'
C p
SPEC
can John t.
i i
VP
V NP
I I
see I.
I
As suggested somewhat in the discussion of Jelinek above, in the
languages analyzed in this work we will generally not be able to make
very explicit claims about phrase structure. The defense of the above
structure for English can be found in Chomsky (1985a, 1989).
1.3.1.3 0-theory
D-structure is that level at which the selectional requirements of
lexical heads are satisfied-or the level onto which the selectional
requirements of lexical heads are directly projected. We may
formalize this somewhat with the following principles of 0-theory.
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SPEC
who
(70) -criterio (Chomsky, 1981; 36)
Each NP bears one and only one 0-role and each 0-role
is assigned to one and only one argument.
This principle requires that each of the arguments called for in
the s-selection of particular lexical heads actually appears at D-
structure. We may extend the application of the 0-criterion to other
levels by the Projection Principle:
(71) Protection Principle (Chomsky, 1981; 29)
Representations at each syntactic level (D-Structure,
S-Structure, Logical Form) are projected from the
lexicon, in that they observe the subcategorization
properties of lexical items. (i.e.: The 0-criterion holds
at all syntactic levels, Ibid. at 38-39).
This will ensure that NPs do not come and go in the course of a
derivation. For verbs like put, this will guarantee that all of the
arguments called for by the lexicon appear at all levels, and in
particular that the 0-structure represented above and reprinted below
be instantiated throughout the derivation:
(72) (S NP+AGENT Vp put NP+PATIENT PP+LOCATIVE1i
This will have the correct results for verbs such as put which
have a 0-role for agents, but there are verbs which do not 0-mark their
subjects; so called raising verbs such as seems and aapears.
(73) a John seems to have won the contest.
b. It seems that John has won the contest.
c. *John seems that he has won the contest.
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Verbs like seems show a dependency whereby a lexical
referential subject requires that the infinitival subordinate clause lack
a subject while if the matrix subject position is filled by a non-
referential (expletive, pleonastic, or dummy) subject such as it (which
are assumed to not receive 0-roles) , then there is an overt subject in a
tensed subordinate clause. GB and Principles and Parameters derive
such sentences by raising of the subordinate clause subject to matrix
subject position.
(74) a e seems [ John to have won the contest I
b. Johnj seems [ ti to have won the contest]
The subject John receives its 0-role from the verb win in the
lower clause. We know that win assigns an agent 0-role to its subject
on the basis of sentences such as (75a-b):
(75) a John won the contest.
b. *ItPLEONASTIC won the contest.
In simple declaratives, win takes an agentive subject (75a) and
cannot take a pleonastic, non-0-marked subject. Thus, John receives a
0-role from win in its D-structure position in (74a). Since an NP may
receive only one 0-role, it cannot also receive one in its S-Structure
position in (74b). Hence, subject position of seems does not receive a
0-role and seems has the following subcategorization frame.
(76) seems, V, CP
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If seems does not assign a 0-role to its subject position, we must
exclude the following sentence:
(77) *(e) seems John to have won the contest.
This sentence is acceptable from the point of view of seems but
clauses in English require an overt subject, even a dummy subject such
as it. The sentence in (78) is forced by the Extended Projection
Principle (79):
(78) It seems that John has won the contest.
(79) Extcnded Projection Principle (Chomsky,1981;
26-27 as '7; 1982; 10)
.) All clauses have subjects;
ii.) The 0-criterion holds at all syntactic levels.
Since subject positions are required by the Extended Projection
Principle, it will follow that they may be non-thematic, i.e., may be a
position to which a 0-role is not assigned. The Projectioi Principle
will guarantee that all non-subject positions are assigned 0-roles.
Since, an NP cannot receive two 0-roles, all movement must be from a
non-subject 0-marked position to a non-thematic subject position. We
still have to guarantee that if John does not raise (It seems that John
has won) that the subordinate clause is tensed (*It seems John to have
won). This will follow from Case theory which we discuss below.
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1.3.1.4 Case Theory
Case theory, in Principles and Parameters, concerns the local
relations formed pursuant to the requirement that every phonetically
realized noun phrase must receive (generally) abstract case. This
requirement is formalized as the Case filter:
(80) Case Filter (Chomsky, 1985b; p. 74, for example)
Every phonetically realized NP must be assigned Case.
Particular Cases are assigned by predictable case assigners so
that nominative case is assigned (leftward in English) to the subject by
the +tense aspect of INFL, accusative is assigned (rightward in
English) by verbs and prepositions to their objects and genitive case is
assigned intenal to NPs, perhaps by the genitive marker itself
(assuming the KP analysis discussed in Chapter 3). Case is assigned
locally, perhaps under the relation of adjacency for English (see
Chomsky, 1985b, p. 82). Given the local or adjacent relation of Case
assignment it follows that elements case dependent on a lexical head
will appear adjacent to that head, exluding the following types of
sentences:
(81) a. *John put in the mailbox the letter
b. *John wants to go [pp to [the mall] [the Kroger]]
Further, the fact that only designated assigners may assign
particular Cases excludes, for example, the possibility that the subject
of a tenseless clause can recieve nominative Case, excluding the
sentence below:
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(82) It seems [CP he to win the contest]
The noun phrase in subject position of the infinitival subordinate
clause cannot be assigned Case since there is no adjacent tense
marker to assign it Case and the verb is unable to assign Case into the
projection CP. Therefore the subject (he in this example) does not
recieve Case, violating the Case fiter.
As demonstrated in § 1.1, the somewhat overlapping local
relations of Case and 9-assignment are the essential proximate cause of
English fixed word order (though see our discussion of the KP analysis
in Chapter 3 for an slightly different view of Case assignment).
1.3.2 D-Structure to 8-Structure: Move-a
Thus far we have discussed D-structure, the level at which the
selectional properties of lexical heads are most directly satisfied; the
Projection Principle ensures that selectional properties are
maintained throughout the course of a derivation. At D-structure the
relation between a head and the arguments It selects is local,
sufficiently local, for example, to permit thematic-role assignment.
During the course of a derivation, through the mechanism of
grammatical transformations, the relationship between a lexical head
and Its arguments may come to be non-local-it may in fact come to an
apparently unbounded, as examples below show:
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(83) a. Whoj does John think that Mary says that Fred hopes
tj will come?
b. Howj do you think Bill expects Fred to cut the meat tt?
c. What1 do you think Bill expects Fred to cut ti?
We state that the relationship established by grammatical
transformations is apparently unbounded because, though in principle
a moved wh-word may be any number of clauses away from Its D-
structure position, there are certain locality conditions constraining
movement of a wh-phrase. Consider the following sentences:
(84) a. *Who does John think that Mary says that Fred hopes
that tj will come?
b. *Howj does John wonder whether Bill expects Fred to
cut the meat ti?
c. ?Whatj does John wonder whether Bill expects Fred to
cut ti?
Without discussing the specific analysis of the contrasts between
(83) and (84), the properties of S-Structure locality will apparently
differ from D-structure locality. At D-structure, the crucial relations
are a lexical head licensing its selected arguments but S-Structure
permits relationships of a different kind. The sentences in (83-84)
show this different relation: the relation between a moved phrase and
Its D-Structure position.
Since initial formulations of generative grammars (e.g., Chomsky,
1957) syntactic theory has posited transforming operations which
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convert D-Structure representations to S-Structure representations.
One of these transformations was the the process which moved wh-
words from sentence internal positions to sentence initial positions:
this transformation is at work in (83-84). Given that there is a class of
transformational rules then, the obvious questions are 'how many
transformations are there?' 'what types of things can transformations
do and what things can't they do' and 'what sorts of mechanisms
constrain transformational operations'. Even syntactic theories which
admit transformations may differ markedly in their answers to these
questions. The position of the Principles and Parameters theory is
that the actual content of the transformational operations should be
maximally general, permitting the assumption that a child learning the
language does not have to learn highly complex and language specific
rules. Further, because of this strategy, Principles and Parameters is
able to maintain the claim that the number of transformational
operations is very small, perhaps limited to the single operation affect-
a, that is: do anything to something. Obviously this highly general
formulation permits an enormous number of problems but the positing
of affect-a does not claim that transfoamational operations really may
do anything, rather it claims that the limitations on what they can do
is not a specific property of particular rules but instead follows from
general facts about the particular language, or languages in general.
Even a very general transformation contains redundant
information. Taking still the operation which puts wh-words In
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sentence initial position, a transformation would have to minimally
contain the following information:
(85) WH-Movement (optional)
COmp X wh
SD: 1 2 3
SC: 1+3 2 0
This transformation would take a wh-phrase from somewhere in
a sentence and move it to the Comp position at the front of some
clause. Inherent in the formulation is the claim that the movement is
from right to left but this is a general fact about wh-movement in
English and probably all languages. This rule also explicitly states that
the movement is to the Comp position but this too is a general fact
about wh-movement. The rule in (85) does not explicate these
general facts, nor is it capable of distinguishing these general facts
from the language particular fact that the rule is optional in English
(since It is obligatory in Italian; Rizzi, 1982). In Principles and
Parameters, the general facts about transformations are kept distinct
from the specific facts. The question is whether there are any
interesting language specific facts which a rule of the form in (85) may
explicate. While P&P claims that there are interesting differences
among languages, and, hence, interesting language specific facts, it
claims that highly specific rule schemas such as that in (85) are not
particularly revealing.
We will assume that the transformational component of human
language Is maximally simple of the form affect-a. Our theory then
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owes a characterization of what other parts of the grammar permit and
constrain the application of this highly general rule. The independent
application of the modular subtheories of the grammar have the
responsibility of constraining affect-a.
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Chapter 2
Approaches to Configurationality
In this chapter we concentrate on one particular line of inquiry
into the syntax of exotic languages going under the term "non-
configurationality". A salient feature of the non-configurationality
debate is that much of the work has related to a series of articles by
Ken Hale on the Australian language Warlpiri (Hale, 1973, 1981,
1982, 1983, 1985). This has the benefit that it has focused the
discussion on a language representing a clear example of the
phenomena the debate was concerned with; unfortunately this
tendency obscured the relation between Warlpiri and languages which
were less radically non-configurational, such as Navajo. In reviewing
the literature, we begin with Hale's (1981) "On the Position of Warlpiri
in a Typology of the Base," where many of the central issues of non-
configurationality are first raised In a recognizable fonn, then moving
to Hale (1982), Hale (1983), Jelinek (1984), Speas (1986) and Saxon
(1985). In Chapter 3, we discuss and provide additional evidence for
an alternative view of non-configurational proposed in Alexander
(1986) called the Case-Agreement analysis.
2.1 "On the Position of Warlpiri In a Typology of the Base"
Hale's (1981) 'On the Position of Warlpiri in a Typology of the
Base," (POWTB) is recognizable as a contribution to the literature of
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non-configurationality, though previous work by Hale on Warlpiri (most
notably Hale, 1973) had been in circulation. In POWTB Hale discusses
what was long seen as the central problem of Warlpiri syntax, its
extremely free surface word order. Hale gives an example showing six
possible arrangements of the terms verb, subject and direct object in a
simple transitive sentence: (Hale: 1981; 1)
(1) a kurdu- ngku ka maliki wajilipi- nyi 80N
child- ERG PRES dog chase- NONPAST
The child is chasing the dog'
b. maliki ka kurdu-ngku wajilipi-nyi OSV
c. maliki ka wajilipi-nyi kurdu-ngku OVS
d. wajilipi-nyl ka kurdu-ngku maliki VSO
e. wajilipi-nyt ka maliki kurdu-ngku VOS
f. kurdu-ngku ka wajilipi-nyt maliki SVO
The only restriction on word order in the above clause is that
the auxiliary element (ka above) must appear in second position.
Warlpiri shows another dimension of free word order,
permitting constituents, such as the components of a nominal
expression, to be discontinuous. An example from POWTh (2) follows:
(2) kurdu- Jmra-u ka- pala maliki wajilipi- nyl
child- DUAL- ERG PRES- DUAL dog chase- NONPAST
wita-Ia- ri
small- DUAL- ERG
The two small children are chasing the dog.'
As Hale puts It "a prominent (Interpretation (2) can receive] is
that in which the two words kurdu-Jarra-rlu (child-DUAL-ERG) and
wtta-Jarra-rlu (small-DUAL-ERG) form a single semantic expression..."
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To account for these facts, Hale makes a distinction between
familiar, X-Bar type languages "which impose a hierarchical, or
'configurational', organization upon syntactic expressions" and those
which do not impose such structures. Hale suggests the term W-Star
language for this second type, the Warlpiri type. These languages have
no phrase structure rules of the conventional X-bar type. To indicate
this lack of phrase-structure, Hale suggests the following schema for
Warlpiri sentential expressions. (Hale, 1981; 2)
(3) E ---> W*
This expresses the claim that an expression (E) in Warlpiri is a
string of words (W) where string length is arbitrary. The W-Star
schema has often been misunderstood as asserting that Warlpiri has a
phrase structure component and that (3) is the rule of Warlpiri. In
fact, as Hale proposes it, the W-Star schema is the defining criterion
for a type of language lacking phrase structure rules. As he notes (p.
3) "It is important, I think (though I am not absolutely certain about
this), not to misconstrue the schema (4 [our 31) as a kind of phrase
structure rule, defining some sort of 'flat' phrase structure
configuration".'
The empirical difference between configurational languages and
W-Star languages as claimed by Hale is to be stated over the availability
of gaps (or empty categories). As Hale writes:
1 A factor perhaps leading to misunderstanding of Hale's claim is that in Hale (1982) he
does propose a basically flat structure for Warlpiri.
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An X-bar language will have phrase structure rules.
There is, therefore, the possibility that a phrase structure
rule can be optional, so that a position in phrase structure
can be unfilled. Thus, for example, an entity of the form
[NP e] can exist in an X-bar language. There can, for
example, be an empty noun phrase in subject position, or
object position, etc., simply by virtue of the optionality of
the phrase structure rules which expand NP. In the
conception of W-Star grammar which I wish to put forth
here, this is an impossibility. There can be no such entity
as [Np e]-there are no phrase structure rules, and there is
accordingly no way in which a phrase can be left
unexpanded. Further, I would like to assert that there are
no stipulated 'positions' in W-Star grammar-i.e., no
positions like 'subject position', 'object position', 'specifier
position' or the like. The only notion of position that
makes sense in a W-Star grammar is the relative linear
position of words (and morphemes within words, of
course) in strings which constitute genuine expressions of
the language. Since there are no stipulated positions, no
such positions can be unfilled-thus, the notion 'gap' does
not make sense in W-Star grammar. [p. 3-4]
Some claims here must be translated into the Principles and
Parameters framework. For example, Hale's identification of empty
noun phrases with optionality in phrase structure would no longer find
favor. Instead, empty noun phrases, as in passive or raising, would
most likely be identified with absence of 0-role assignment to the
empty position. Some of the assumptions made by Hale in the section
quoted above were adopted by Jelinek (1983) such as the claim that
there are no 'stipulated positions' or A-positions in Warlpiri and, of
course, the absence of [NP el. Leaving aside the full translation and
consideration of Hale's proposal, much of the reasoning above is
uncompelling, as discussed below; further, much work on non-
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configurationality, by Hale and others, has reflected a bias against gaps,
yet to be satisfactorily motivated.
First, we will discuss the sense in which Hale's analysis is
uncompelling. The data of Warlpiri which Hale has cited, before
making the argument against gaps quoted above, are the data from
discontinuous constituents and extensive free word order. It is easy
enough to see how the W-Star schema expresses these two facts since
in this system it is possible to insert words in "any order"; in fact, free
word order and discontinuous constituents are criterial for Warlpiri's
being a W-Star language. Nothing about the W-Star schema predicts
the existence of empty noun phrases (say [NP pro] for example) but
nothing obviously precludes such a possibility either. One can imagine
a W-Star analysis of Warlpiri permitting gaps, as directly below.
Warlpiri shows extensive null expression of nominal arguments
(Hale., 1981; p. 33):
(4) wajilipi- nyi ka- pala
chase- NONPAST PRES- 3DUAL
The child is chasing the dog'
Hale's suggestion that gaps are not possible in W-Star languages
hinges on only one conception of gap. If we assume that gaps such as
PRO are real NPs in sentences such as Johnj wants PRO1 to win,
generated by the phrase structure, nothing prevents generation of
such a real NP as a subcomponent of a W-Star expression. This would
be an expression such as: E --->[waftli-nyl ka-palat p d. Although
97
Hale's article was written before exploration of the properties of pro (a
more likely candidate for a Warlpiri gap than PRO), we could generate
empty NPs as follows:
(5) E --- > [NP prolg wajilipi- nyl ka- palag
eC chase- NONPAST PRES- 3DUAL
They (two) are chasing it'
Consistent with a W-Star grammar, we could generate an empty
subject coindexed with the DUAL number features in AUX. It would be
incorrect (and uninteresting) to stipulate that sub-components of E in
W-Star languages must be non-null. A 0-tense marker (Hale, 1973;
310, etc.) must be generated as a W in E in Warlpiri since such a null
tense marker may be a host to an agreement clitic. Given this, it
seems ad hoc to reject null NPs ([NP el) in Warlpiri.
Note also that under a W-Star conception, the possibility of null
NPs in Warlpirl has a very different cause than similar possibilities in
Italian. Thus, in Italian rich Agreement licenses null anaphora
whereas, under Hale's W-Star analysis, null anaphoAa in Warlpiri,
which also has rich Agreement, is due to optionality in the phrase
structure component.
We belabor the point about empty categories being possible in a
W-Star language because it is fairly common to find analyses of non-
configurational languages rejecting the appearance of empty categories
without strong arguments for doing so (as, for example, in Alexander,
1986) when it may turn out that the strongest argument against empty
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categories in most non-configurational languages is that they do no
particular work in any analysis (though seu our discussion of Paul
Platero's, 1982, analysis of Navajo in §1.2). This should be evident
from the Warlpiri example just cited. There is nothing particularly
interesting about the claim that any empty NP can be inserted
'somewhere' in a Warlpiri string of words. In fact, it should be
possible to generate any number of them within Hale's conception of a
W-Star language, filtering out all those which find no appropriate
interpretation (E --> ...proj prok prom prob...). Again, there is no
obvious benefit in doing so, but such a move is consistent with Hale's
W-Star analysis.
We must provide an explication of the notion 'non-
configurational (or W-Star) language.' Hale (1982) includes an
interesting discussion of the possible criteria of W-Star languages that
has been largely ignored in work by others in this area (exceptions
being Hale, 1985 and Speas, 1986). Hale notes that it would be
surprising to find W-Star languages which use "dummy" (pleonastic)
noun phrases such as English it or Danish der "whose function is to
fill a certain phrase structure position" (p. 37). He notes, however,
that such a lack is not itself criterial for a W-Star language since
languages such as Spanish, certainly a configurational language, does
not use pleonastics.
Another possibly criterial property of W-Star languages is
scrambling type (extremely free) word order, demonstrated for
Warlpiri in (1) above. This extensive free word order is found in
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languages which do not overtly seem like Warlpiri; Hale cites Uto-
Aztecan Papago which lacks overt case but which has almost identical
word order possibilities as Warlpiri. Hale suggests that scrambling
type word order might correlate more strongly with W-Star languages
than with X-Bar languages, but that it is not criterial.
Following on this, Hale makes an interesting point, virtually
unique among researchers in non-configurationality (also made in
Hale, 1985), that the distinction between X-Bar and W-Star languages
may be a weak distinction from a typological point of view. He
suggests for example (p. 41-42) that even within a particular language
community, speakers may differ as to whether they use an X-Bar or a
W-Star grammar-in Hale (1985) he again suggests that non-
configurationality may be a property of particular constructions in
particular languages (or, perhaps, in particular speech communities).
Thus, for Hale, the fact that it is difficult (if not impossible) to provide
a set of criteria defining the set of W-Star or non-configurational
languages is not at all problematic. This point has been generally
misunderstood in the literature of non-configurationality but is stated
in all of Hale's work on the subject.2
2 This is a misunderstanding in which this author has participated, Speas (1985) refers
to Hale's (1982) "diagnostics of configurationality" including, among others, free word
order, extensive null anaphora, use of discontinuous constituents, lack of pleonastic
NIs, etc, when Hale actually states that "there exist certain superficial characteristics
[emnp-mj which are often mentioned in close association with the label (p. 1).", listing
among these "free word order" though stating that it is "probably not criteria] (p. 2)". As
noted, we have participated in this misunderstanding In Alexander (1986) though in
this work when we refer to Hale's position on non-conftgurationality, it will be with the
understood caveat that Hale does not assert the existence of two clearly distinct classes
of languages, configurational and non-configurational,
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Moving beyond these general questions and returning to Hale's
analysis of these two types of languages, he seems to assume from
POWTB through later work that there are two types of ways that
sentences may obtain semantic interpretations: first, by the
interpretation of constituent structure in a manner familiar from
English; and second, as mediated by a set of parsing strategies or rules
of association, leaving this somewhat vague here. He writes: "The
primary addition which a W-Star grammar requires consists in a
system of parsing principles which determine the constituency and
category of expressions present in a given concatenation of words. In
effect, these parsing principles, impose a labelled bracketing upon
strings of words." Semantics operates on a labelled bracketing of
words in Warlpiri as in English. One might imagine (see arguments in
Higginbotham, 1989; 466) that it is necessary that both languages
share a very similar semantics. The difference between X-Bar and W-
Star languages, then, is the source of labelled bracketing, coming from
the syntax in X-Bar languages and induced by parsing principles in W-
Star languages.
Such a parsing strategy is the rule that forms adjacent nominal
elements into a single constituent. Compare the following sentences
(Hale, 1981; 1, 17):
(2) kurdu- ng Lar lu ka- pala maliki wajilipi- nyl
child- DUAL- ERE PRES- DUAL dog chase- NONPAST
small- DUAL- ERG
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The two small children are chasing the dog.'
(6) maliki ka- pala wajilipi- nyi kurdu wita- j a .ril
dog PRES- DUAL chase- NONPAST child small- DUAL- ERG
The two small children are chasing the dog.'
The two sentences share a semantic interpretation but differ in
two notable ways: (I.) the elements which make up the English
semantic expression 'the two small children' are discontinuous in (2);
and (1.) the number and case ending on the nominal kurdu 'child' are
missing in (6).3 In Warlpiri, adjacent constituent nominals may
surface with the number and case endings appearing only on the
rightmost element in the constituent. A parsing strategy Hale
considers would have the effect of taking two adjacent nominals,
perhaps kurdu-Jarra-rlu and wtta-Jarra-rlu, sharing relevant semantic
features-such as number and case-and merging them into a single
constituent, such as kurdu wita-Jarra-rlu.
There are clear corollaries of parsing strategies in Hale's later
work such as the Case-linking analyses in Hale,1982 and 1983. We
will discuss them where appropriate.
The central issues of Hale (1981) which continue to be of
interest for non-configurationality can be summarized rather simply:
There exists a body of data in one language, Warlpiri, which (a) finds
3 We must be careful when claiming that two Waripiri sentences share an
Interpretation, Hale (1983, for example) makes clear that the semantic effects of
alternate word orders in Warlplrl Is In need of exploration, If we take semantic
Interpretation In some weak sense, such as conditions of truth, then It Is likely we can
say that pairs such as the sentences above share an Interpretation, i.e. truth conditions,
Strong claims about similarities In Interpretation must await further work on Waripiri
semantics but we wIll abstract over this question, assuming the sentences above to be
the same in interpretation In some obvious intuitive sense.
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counterparts in other languages, such as Navajo; and (b) do not find
counterparts in languages like English. These are, among others,
extensive free word order, extensive null anaphora and lack of
pleonastics. Hale (1981) explores whether the categorial, or phrase
structure component, might be able to express this difference. Hale
(1982) presents a lexicon based analysis and we will consider that
analysis in the next section.
2.2 "Prelimlnary Remarks on Conflgurationalty'
Hale's (1982) "Preliminary Remarks on Configurationality,"
extends the attempt to provide an analysis of the differences between
Warlpiri and English in terms of Government and Binding theory.
Again, Hale is clear in expressing his view that non-configurationality
should not be taken as a bivalent parameter, writing "[in] recent years,
a terminological usage has arisen according to which languages are
classified as either configurational or non-configurational. I have
participated sometimes in this usage, and I am very interested in the
question of the position in linguistic typology of languages which might
reasonably be placed somewhere near the non-configurational end of
the spectrum. (p. 1)"
Hale extends the "superficial characteristics which are often
mentioned in close association with the label inon-configurationality]"
to Include the following: (Hale, 1982; p. 1-2)
(7) Superficial Characteristics of Non-conflgurational Languages
a. "free" word order;
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b. the use of discontinuous expressions;
c. free or frequent "pronoun drop";
d. lack of NP movement transformations;
e. lack of pleonastic NPs;
f. use of a rich case system;
g. complex verb words or verb-cum-AUX systems;
He states: 'The list goes on. I seriously doubt, however, that any
of the superficial characteristics is criterial, in the sense of itself
defining a type."
As an aside, some attention should be paid to the fact that Hale
refers to non-configurationality as a terminological usage. This is a
terminological usage to which few researchers are committed, In Hale
(1981), he referred to X-Bar languages as configurational though he
did not suggest a class of languages that were non-configurational.
Superficial consideration of Warlpiri shows certain configurations
readily: the subject clitic precedes the object clitic on AUX (see Hale,
1973, p. 309; etc.) and, obviously, the position of AUX itself is
stipulated second position, with only minor caveats (ibid.), Further,
infinitival clauses In Warlpiri have a fixed verb-final word order (Hale,
1981; p. 7). No one would seriously consider that Warlpiri, or any
language, lacked grammatical configurations in all senses of the term,
but it is possible to make three specious conclusions from the term
non-corifigurationality.
The first is that insofar as syntax is a field of study focused on
grammatical configurations, it is properly concerned only with
languages having such configurations, excluding languages such as
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Warlpiri from serious discussion. This is certainly falsified by the fact
that we need to know why Warlpiri is free to lack configurations in the
relevant sense; it is also falsified by Hale's repeated urgings that there
are no criterial facts separating Warlpiri from configurational
languages, and hence, that there is no way to draw a line between
those languages manifesting syntactic configurations and those lacking
them.
A second misconception engendered by the term non-
configurational is that languages with certain sorts of configurations
are prima facie configurational. For example a language with relatively
fixed word order, such as Navajo, might be excluded from inclusion in
the class of non-configurational languages by virtue of having fixed
word order. In fact, relatively successful theories of configurationality
(such as that in Jelinek, 1984, or Hale, 1985) might include Navaho in
the class of non-configurational languages on the basis of its lack of
pleonastics, extensive verb words and null anaphora.
A third misconception arises from the fact that non-
configurationality specifies a negative characterization of a class of
languages. It is obvious that this significant class of languages requires
a positive characterization of its properties, but there is also the
suggestion that Warlpiri and languages like it are impoverished in
some sense. Perhaps having "configurations" in the sense of English is
a symptom of English's impoverished case and agreement system.
There is a value in keeping in perspective the fact that the properties
of English are not so strikingly different from those of Warlpiri-
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though Warlpiri is often used, at least anecdotally, as an example of a
language more different from English than one might have expect to
be possible.
Having made the terminological argument against non-
configurationality, we will presently continue to use the term in
conformance with the accepted pattern of usage in the literature. In
Chapter 3 we will suggest a view of configurationality that avoids some
of the possible problems mentioned above. As noted, it is not clear
that any researcher has any investment in these terms and perhaps
they should be discarded. We make the arguments against them here
because the misconceptions listed above do seem to find a reflex in
the literature of non-configurationality.
Returning to the proposals in Hale (1982) accounting for the
superficial characteristics listed in (7) above, Hale considers and
rejects an analysis that would explain non-configurationality with
reference to scrambling (see for example Ross, 1967). This analysis
would claim that the grammars of configurational and non-
configurational languages might be identical except for the PF side of
the grammar, which would include a local scrambling rule in Warlpiri.
As Hale points out, however, this analysis seems "to lose some of its
theoretical interest...when one notices that few real predictions are
made by it (p. 2)." A further problem Hale notices is that appeal to
scrambling only solves one of the problems raised by canonical non-
configurationality, free word order, which is probably not even
criterial (ef. Navajo). Scrambling would not predict the lack of
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pleonastics or extensive null anaphora (cf. Spanish which presumably
lacks scrambling).
Instead Hale proposes an analysis relying on X-Bar theory and a
particular way of understanding government. Hale again argues that
there are two types of languages with respect to whether they use both
or just one of the X-Bar schemata below:
(8) a.X"---->...X.
b.X0---- .X..
The difference Hale suggests is between languages with one level
of structure (X-Bar languages) and those with two (X"-languages). The
fact which Hale wants to reduce to (8) is the "relative tightness of
grammatical organization" in configurational and non-configurational
languages (Hale, 1982; p. 3). In configurational languages, there is a
"relatively straightforward and consistent relationship between theta-
role assignment and structural position" (ibid.). Thus, configurational
languages are marked by the fact that "grammatical principles are
typically articulated in structural terms" (ibid.).
The relation Hale wants to explore is government. Hale outlines
a classical GB view of government reducible to the sisterhood relation:
a governs p if a is a head of ak and a is an immediate sister of p.
Consider the following structure:
(9)
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X"1
A" X'
X B"
The category A" is governed by X' which is the head of X" and
the category B" is governed by X which is the head of X'. Government
can be used to specify which of two arguments A" or B" is "closer" to
XO, in some intuitive sense. As Hale puts it: "government can function
in such a structure to distinguish among the arguments of the lexical
head (X), where that is a verb, say" (p. 4).
On the other hand, Hale assumes a flat phrasal structure for non-
configurational languages and hence a head cannot "partition a
structure into distinct sub-phrasal subdomains of government-and
correspondingly, it cannot serve, in and of itself, to distinguish among
the arguments of X..." (ibid.). The appropriate structure follows:
(10)
X'
A' B' X
Hale's conclusion is reprinted in full (p. 5):
One could say here that both A' and B' are governed
by X. That would follow from our definition of government.
An alternative, however, is to say that government simply
does not operate in such structures. This seems a rather
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natural alternative in the conception of government briefly
outlined above-in which government, in the absence of
configurational structure, cannot distinguish among
nominal arguments and in which, in fact, government is
entirely derivative of sisterhood. I will adopt the second
alternative.
Hale reasons that since (I.) a function of government in
configurational (X") languages is to distinguish among arguments and
(.) this function cannot be extended to non-configurational (X')
languages, then (III.) government does not operate in non-
configurational languages. He extends this to the claim that since
abstract Case assignment and theta-role assignment are dependent
upon government in configurational languages and government does
not operate in non-configurational languages, heads do not assign Case
and 0-roles in non-configurational languages. It will follow then that
non-configurational languages can only have inherent Case ("case
associated with nominals alone or perhaps by the categorial
component in languages with case-like post-positions or enclitics,
such as Japanese and Navajo, p. 5"), and not assigned Case.
Turning to 0-role assignment, Hale argues that since heads in
configurational languages have the ability to assign Case and 0-roles to
NPs they govern, "it also allows for failure of assignment in one or
another of the domains of government." For example, following Burzio
(1981), a non-finite V' will fall to assign Case to the subject and a past
participle will fail to assign Case to its object. Hale assumes that such
an absence of assignment is not possible in non-configurational
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languages since "all positions are theta-positions in non-configurational
languages". Though Hale does not elaborate on this here, assume it is
the case because (i.) NPs are assigned thematic-roles in the word
formation component, as with Case; or (Ui.) NPs cannot enter the
structure unless they bear a thematic-role, derivative from the
Projection Principle.
Before turning to the further predictions Hale claims for this
analysis, there are two immediately troubling aspects of Hale's theory.
An internally inconsistent claim concerns inherent Case for non-
configurational languages. Hale mentions Navajo and its "case-like
postpositions" but Navajo subjects and direct objects do not bear overt
case of any kind (and postpositions do not occur with them), exactly
like English noum phrases. Hale must assume in this event that both
subjects and objects in Navajo receive abstract inherent Case, a not
very likely conclusion given that abstract Case is generally associated
with structural Case, not inherent Case.
More importantly, Hale's central assumption, that the lack of
productivity of government suggests that it is inoperative, seems ad
hoc and uncompelling. See our arguments below concerning Hale's
claim that there is no option of PRO in Warlpiri.
Turning now to the claimed consequences of Hale's analysis, the
first is the lack of NP movement in non-configurational languages. In
such languages it appears that passive is formed as a lexical process
rather than by movement. In configurational languages, the Projection
Principle guarantees that an NP appearing at D-structure will have a 0-
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role and if the position to which movement is affected also receives a
0-role, the moving NP will acquire two thematic-roles, violating the 0-
criterion. Hence, in the English passive, we have the following
movement from a [+0, -Case] object position to a [-0, +Case] subject
position:
(11) [NP ej] was hit John
-0, +C +0, -C
(12) Johnjwas hit ti
+0,+C
In a non-configurational languages which Hale assumed to lack
non-theta-positions (0-bar positions), NP-movement would always be
from one 0- position to another, violating the 0-criterion. On the
assumption that all NP positions are theta-positions in non-
configurational languages, there will be no NP movement in non-
configurational languages; note, as we will see, that Jelinek, 1984,
argues that all NP positions are non-0 positions in non-configurational
languages, and she derives essentially the same consequences.
Above we provided two possible rationales for Hale's claim that
all NPs were in 0-positions in non-configurational languages. Either
(I.) NPs are assigned 0-roles in the word formation component-in
which case they are lexically inserted with 0-roles; and (ii.) that NPs
could not enter the structure without receiving a 0-role (d La the
Projection Prlnciple)-in which case their appearance guarantees that
they are 0-marked; Essentially, Hale argues for the first of these
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claims. He notes certain difficulties with his analysis: "how does an
overt nominal expression get its theta-role? The question is both
important and vexed, and I am not sure that its answer will be
altogether neat. (p. 6)"
He assumes that 8-role assignment is related to the inherent
Case he also assumes for non-configurational languages and posits a
lexical-functional structure (LFS) at which the functional structure of a
predicate, such as pantirni, "to spear, stab, pierce, etc.", is mapped
onto the Case and 0-structure of its arguments.
(13)
ERG ABS
I I( x, y, ) PANTIRNI
A P
Hale assumes that there is a process of association by which
arguments of the verb are linked to particular 0-roles (agent and
patient in the above example) and that there is another process by
which nominals are associated with particular case categories such as
ergative and absolutive. He is not entirely specific about how these
processes are linked, suggesting they are separate (p. 6) but also
claiming "an overt nominal bearing case C receives its theta-role by
being associated with an argument position bearing linking register C."
Assuming therefore that nominals receive thematic-roles from the LFS
of the predicate, what consequences are expected?
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Hale uses this assumption to explain the status of missing
nominals in non-configurational languages. As we have discussed
earlier, Warlpiri permits extremely free null anaphora for subjects and
objects.
(14) a wawirri pantu- mu (Hale, 1982; p. 6-7)
kangaroo:ABs spear- PAST
'He speared the kangaroo.
b. pantu- mu
spear- PAST
Are these missing arguments empty categories or simply not
present? Hale writes: "my gut-feeling answer to this question is that
these missing NPs are not PRO--rather, they are truly missing" (p. 7).
Hale proposes that in non-configurational languages, "argument
positions of predicates are freely evaluated" (ibid.). Each argument
position is assigned an index which may be bound by an overt NP
(which might be likened to the quant(fying in of Montague Grammar,
see for example Dowty, Wall and Peters, 1981, Chapter 5). We would
begin with a basic predicate as in (15) which could be interpreted as
(16) with binding by (one or) both overt NPs of the argument positions
(n, m) in (15-16).
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(15) <n,c< m, PANTURNU> >
(16) Ingarrka(n) [ wawirri(m) < n < m PANTURNU> >111
man kangaroo speared
X'He speared the kangaroo.X LFS
The form in (15) is also evaluable, though we must be careful to
make explicit the allowed meaning. The relation between (15) and
(16) is analogous to, though not identical with, the following two
expressions from first order predicate calculus:
(17) a. $x 'x flies'
b. F(U) ( = John) 'John flies'
The difference between (17a) and (1 7b) is in the binding of the
argument slot of the predicate F. Similarly, Hale seems to claim that
in (15) above, the variables (n, m) are permitted in roughly the same
sense as the variable in (17a) though with the "interpretation of an
English definite pronoun" (p. 7). When the variable is bound, as in
(16) or (17b), the interpretation is that standard for noun phrases, as
in English. The difference between English and Warlpiri would be the
availability of interpreted structures like (17a) or (15). If this is a
correct interpretation, there is nothing strained about such a view of
the configurationality distinction-(though Hale's method of arriving at
the distinction may not be satisfying). As Hale understands, the
problem Is how to have a syntax permitting free generation of variables
In Warlpiri and excluding the same for English. When we encounter
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Jelinek's (1984) analysis of non-configurational languages, it might be
possible to state this claim in a more appealing manner.
Returning to the question of PRO and the status of missing
arguments, Hale notes "in a framework of the sort being developed
here, there is no need for the element PRO in non-configurational
languages" (p. 8). Hale considers two possible arguments for the claim
that PRO cannot occur in non-configurational languages. The first is
that PRO is inherently Caseless and, given the argument that NPs in
non-configurational languages receive thematic-roles by virtue of
receiving (being linked to) Case, PRO in non-configurational languages
could not avoid Case, and hence could not appear.
The second argument against the existence of PRO in non-
configurational languages concerns the definition of PRO within
government theory. PRO has a curious status with respect to binding
theory by virtue of being [+anaphor, +pronominalj; being an anaphor,
PRO has to be bound in its minimal governing category, but, being a
pronominal, PRO has to be free in its minimal governing category.
The solution to this puzzle is that PRO is never governed, and thus has
no minimal governing category. PRO's distribution, as subject in
infinitivals for example, follows from this claim.
Hale uses this analysis of PRO, arguing that "the concept of PRO
is intimately bound up with the theory of government, within the GB
framework, and it may well be that government is crucially involved in
the definition of PRO. Suppose this is so. Since government is non-
functional in languages of the non-configurational type, they cannot
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have PRO." This analysis, apart from the fact that it relies on an
analysis of PRO which is not universally accepted (see for example:
Manzini, 1983; Sportiche, 1983; Bouchard, 1984; and Huang, 1989),
seems unappealing. Government is also crucially involved in defining
the notion minimal governing category and thus the notions anaphor
and pronominal (the fact which led to the PRO theorem in the first
place), yet we would not want to claim that non-configurational
languages perforce lacked anaphors and pronominals. This argument
is parallel to Hale's argument about PRO.
Hale's first argument, based on Case, is not easily discarded, If
all NP positions in non-configurational languages are Case-marked,
PRO would be excluded (thought not pro); unfortunately, the claim
that all NP positions are inherently Case marked is a stipulation.
It seems again that the strongest claim is that empty categories
seem not to be needed in the account of non-configurational
languages-and this is certainly suggestive.
The framework of Hale's "Preliminary Remarks" anticipates a
number of the details of the analyses of non-configurationality in Hale
(1982), Jelinek (1984), etc. Some of the insights here are interesting
and find no full expression in later work, such as the quant(fying in
analysis of Warlpiri argument structure-though, as noted, this could
be replicated in a Jelinek-style framework. On the whole, however,
Hale's analysis fails to address a central question it raises. Recall that
Hale has argued that the superficial characteristics of non-
configurational languages are not criterial and that there are non-
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configurational languages which do not share all the properties of the
canonical examples of non-configurationality. This state of affairs
suggests that all the "superficial characteristics" of non-
configurationality should not be made to follow from a single (bivalent)
distinction or parameter. This is exactly what Hale's analysis does; it
is an attempt to find one distinction (X' vs. X" structures) accounting
for all the properties of non-configurational languages. This strategy of
seeking a single underlying configurationality difference is found in
Hale (1981) as well as Hale (1983), Jelinek (1984), Speas (1986) and
Saxon (1985), though rejected in Alexander (1986) and the present
work.
2.3 "Waripiri and the Grammar of Non-Configurational Languages"
In Hale's (1983) "Warlpiri and the Grammar of Non-
Configurational Languages," he extends the views presented in
"Preliminary Remarks". In particular, he follows the pattern of
development in GB to reduce the role of the phrase structure
component. We can see this development by consideration of rules
such as that in (18):
(18) VP ---> V NP PP
As discussed in chapter 1, we hope to reduce rules like (18) to
independently motivated statements such as "Case assignment is
Rightward" and "0-role assignment is rightward". In Hale (1983), his
alterations of the configurationality parameter follow this trajectory of
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development. As Hale notes, an analysis in terms of phrase structure
such as that in Hale (1981, 1982) "simply begs a fundamental and
more interesting question:, namely: Why does Warlpiri use a phrase
structure of this highly 'permissive' type (p. 10)." Before considering
his analysis, however, we will show how Hale generally viewed the
question of configurationality in this article.
Once again we find the tendency to view non-configurational as
something of an arbitrary label, (cf. the "terminological usage" in Hale,
1982), as Hale writes: '"The grammar of Warlpiri...exhibits a number of
properties which have come to be associated with the typological label
'non-configurational,' including, among others, (i.) free word order,
(it.) the use of syntactically discontinuous expressions, and (iii.)
extensive use of null anaphora. (p. 5)." Somewhat surprisingly, given
his repeated claims that no properties of non-configurational
languages are criterial we find a clear desire to seek a single cause for
all of the properties of non-configurational languages. Thus, "I am
concerned with the question of whether there exists a unified
explanation for the concurrence in Warlpiri of certain properties,
including those mentioned above....Is there a parameter, clearly
definable within a general theory of language, from which the observed
differences between the two linguistic types follow straightforwardly?"
Again, Hale attempts to find a single parametric difference atcounting
for the properties of non-configurational languages.
Hale assumes a Lexical Structure (LS) which is essentially the
same as the LFS of Hale (1982) together with a Phrase Structure (PS)
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component, freely generating NPs to be linked with LS.. LS has more
structure than LFS in this conception, however. The initial LS of
panti-mi, 'to spear', would be as follows:
(19) [arg x, arg y, panti-rnij
Hale again assumes that nominals are assigned 0-roles at LS. So,
argx in (19 [Hale's (10)]) above is assigned the agent 0-role. (p. 13)
Similarly, argy is assigned the patient 0-role. As we will see this
assignment will be determined by internal 'quasi-syntactic' structure
in LS. These thematic-roles are linked to Warlpiri case categories
(such as ergative, absolutive, dative, etc.) yielding the intermediate
structure of (20):
(20) [erg x, abs y, panti-rniJ
A linking mechanism relates an internal argument (an object)
with a particular case, such as absolutive. These cases are then linked
to the nominals appearing at PS. The linking rule follows:
(21) Linking Rule (Hale, 1983; p. 15)
Co-index N' in PS (Phrase Structure) with arg in LS,
provided the case category of N' is identical to that of arg
(assigning a distinct index to each arg in LS).
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This linking of the LS structure, projected from the predicate,
with the PS structure provides the functional structure (22) of
sentences (23a-c):
(22) [ ngarrka-ngkui, wawirrik, [erg i, abs k, panti-rnll
(23) a. ngarrka- ngku ka wawirri panti- rni
man ERG PRES kangaroo spear NONPAST
'The man is spearing the kangaroo.'
b. wawirri ka panti-rni ngarrka-ngku
c. panti-rni ka ngarrka-ngku wawirri
And so on.
The sentences below are ill-formed, however, since there is no
proper linking of LS and PS to generate them.
(24) a. *kurdu- ngku ka yula- mi
child ERG PRES cry NONPAST
b. *kurdu- ngku ka-Ju rdanpa- rni ngaju- ku
child- ERG AUX accompany NONPAST me- DAT
The verb in (24a) takes an absolutive argument, while the verb in
(24b) takes the array absolutive-dative. "In neither sentence,
therefore, can the ergative nominal in PS be linked and thereby
integrated into a coherent logical form (p. 15)."
For discontinuous constituents, Hale assumes that the
component parts of the expression are free to link separately; for
example (Hale, 1983, p. 6):
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(25) wawirri kapi- ma pant- rni valumpu
kangaroo FUT- 1SUBJ spear NONPAST that
'I will spear that kangaroo.'
This form must have the functional structure of (26a) and not
that of (26b), possible in principle.
(26) a. [ 1st [ YaFmpk, wpark, gj, abs k, panti-mnijl
b. * 1sti 1 Yalurnu i,. wawirrik, [r, abs k, panti-rnilj
In (26), the ergative case is not linked to a full nominal, since it
is represented by a null 1st person argument the reflex of which is the
agreement marker on AUX (in 25). The nominals yalumpu and
wawirrl may link to the absolutive or ergative case arguments of panti-
m but the combination in (26b) is presumably excluded; so too must
be excluded functional structures such as the following:
(27) [kurduk [ngarrkak [wawirrik [<ergi <absk PANTIRNI> >111
child man kangaroo speared
X'I will spear that child man kangaroo.'X LS
As Hale notes, "something must, of course, be said about the
interpretation of sentences exhibiting this sort of many-to-one linking,
but nothing prohibits it (p. 15-16)."
As suggested above, "while the coherence principle requires that
a case-marked N' in PS be linked, the dependency is not reciprocal.
Thus, a given argument in IS may or may not have a N' linked to it...
(p. 16)." ThIs will account for cases of null anaphora, as below in (28a-
c): (Hale, 1981; p. 7).
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(28) a ngarrka- ngku ka panti- rni
man EaM PRES spear NONPAST
The man is spearing him/her/it..'
b. wawirri ka panti- rni
kangaroo PRES spear NONPAST
'He/she is spearing the kangaroo.'
c. panti- rni ka
spear NONPAST PRES
'He/she is spearing him/her/it.'
The expressions in (28) would be derived from failure to link
one (28a-b) or both (28c) arguments in LS with an N' in PS.
What of the interpretation of these unlinked arguments in LS?
As in (Hale, 1982), he argues that the interpretation of these
arguments is essentially like that of English definite pronouns. In the
present article, however, Hale tries to derive the interpretation from
the claim that such LS arguments are pronouns.
Two facts suggest to Hale that that the null arguments, unbound
variables in the LS structure, are pronouns. First, in the
reflexive/reciprocal construction, the subject binds the
reflexive/reciprocal, and the object cannot. Second, in cases of
obligatory control, the matrix argument binds the subject of an
infinitival. Taking these facts in turn.
We can identify separate subject and object agreement markers
on the AUX node. (Hale, 1983; p. 18)
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(29) a. ngaulu- rlu ka- rn- ngku nyuntu nya- nyi
I ERG PRES- 1suaJ- 2oBJ you see NONPAST
"I see you.'
b. maliki- Jnarra .rlu ka- p.ajl- agna puluk- patu
dog DUAL- ERG PRES- 3suaJ- 3oBJ bullock- PLR
wajilipi -nyi
chase NONPAST
The two dogs are chasing the several bullocks."
The subject marker precedes the object marker.
In the reflexive/reciprocal, the refl/recip marker follows the subject
agreement marker and refers to the subject. (Hale, 1983; p. 21)
(30) kurdu-ja rig ka- pala- nyanu paka- rni
child DUAL- ERG PRES- 3SUBJ- RELF strike NONPAST
The two children are striking themselves/each other."
Thus, reflexives are bound by subjects and not by objects.
The second type of example Hale gives is that in cases of
obligatory control of infinitival subordinate clauses, the subject
argument is bound by an argument of the matrix clause. In (31a)
below a matrix object controls the subject of the infinitival clause (with
the -kurra complementizer) and in (31b) the infinitival clause subject
(with -karra) is controlled by the subject of the matrix clause:
(31) a. purdau- nya- nyl ka- ma- ngkU
aural perceive NONPAST PRES- 1subj- 2obj
[wangka -nja- kurral
Speak- INFIN- CoMP
"I hear you speaking.'
not: I hear you as someone speaks to/of you.
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b. ngara-d ngia ka purlapa yunpa- rni
man ERG PRES corroboree sing NONPAST
[karli jartni- rninja- ka- rlu]
boomerang trim INFIN- COMP- ERG
The man is singing a corroboree song while trimming
the boomerang.
Infinitival subjects marked with the complementizer (-kurra) are
controlled by a matrix object while those marked with (-karra) are, for
most speakers, controlled by the matrix subject. What is significant is
that only the subject of an infinitival clause may be controlled, not an
object or oblique. In (31a) the matrix object ('you') controls the
infinitival subject and (31a) cannot mean that the speaker (subject of
infinitival) is the main clause subject or some person understand from
context. The subject of the infinitival must be controlled and the
direct object cannot be controlled. Thus, cases of obligatory control
must make reference to grammatical functions of subject and object,
even in cases where the controlling NP is not overt (such as in 31a)
and Warlpiri shows a subject/object asymmetry with respect to
binding of infinitival clause argument positions. Since there is no
syntactic structure which can provide a definition of subject and object
NPs, Hale argues that Warlpiri requires the assumption that there is
structure in LS, permitting that level to distinguish subjects from
objects.
For the Infinitival control cases, Hale assumes that the
complementizers -kurra and -karra mark the "subject agreement
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marker of an infinitival as anaphoric ([+an]), and that an argument not
so marked is simply non-anaphoric (and, by convention, assigned the
feature [-an]) [see Borer, 1986, 1989 for a similar proposal]. Under
this assumption, LS can be seen as containing arguments of two sorts-
pronouns ([-an]) and anaphors ([+an])-whose behavior can be
expected to conform to conditions (A) and (B) of the Binding Theory.
(p. 23)" He assumes that the LS of a tense clause is the governing
category of each argument it contains. To account for subject/object
asymmetries in the reflexive/reciprocal construction, Hale assumes an
internal structure of LS, as follows: 4
(32) [vt erg, [v abs, panti-rni]]
In the structure above, the subject (ergative) argument, c-
commands the object (absolutive) argument but the reverse is not true.
Thus a subject can bind a reflexive in the object position but the
reverse is not true. Further, we could not have a reflexive in subject
position (attempting to bind an argument in object position) since the
reflexive could not then be bound in its governing category.
Hale is intentionally vague about the account of obligatory control
within this structured LS view: "...the subject of an infinitive can be
marked anaphoric. I am not prepared to pursue this idea further,
since to do so would require a fully developed theory of functional
structures... .It is sufficient to say here that a proper account of control,
4 Note that V and V projections in LS do not have the same formal status of similar
projections in the Phrase Structure. As Hale does, we indicate LS projections with
lower case letters.
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under the assumption that the controlled subject is an anaphor, will
require the characterization of the 'governing category' which will
allow the subject of an infinitival (but not the object thereof) to be
bound by a matrix argument. (p. 24-25)"
Reviewing, the data from obligatory control and reflexive
interpretation suggested that Warlpiri requires a built-in distinction
between subjects and objects. This is not possible in the Warlpiri
phrase structure component so Hale assumes that LS is structured so
that subjects asymmetrically c-command objects. This can account for
the reflexive facts straightforwardly, though the details of the
obligatory control cases are not worked out.
Hale suggests (following Marantz, 1981) that this structured LS
is universal and, hence, that all languages are configurational at LS.
This leads Hale to assume that "Perhaps, then, the place to look for
the fundamental difference between configurational and non-
configurational languages...is in the relation between [S and PS...(p.
25)" and this is the approach he takes.
The theory of Warlpiri developed so far contains a PS, a
structured LS, and linking processes which relate arguments to case
arrays in LS, and relate Case marked variables in LS to Case marked
NPs in PS. We may now consider Hale's statement of the
"configurationality parameter".
The crucial varying aspect of the theory is the Projection
Principle (Chomsky, 1981; p. 29):
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(33) The Projection Principle
Representations at each syntactic level (i.e. LF, D- and
S-Structure) are projected from the lexicon, in that they
observe the subcategorization properties of lexical items.
Alternatively, if a assigns a thematic role to p at syntactic level 1,
then a assigns a thematic-role to p at all syntactic levels.
Hale states the configurationality parameter as follows:
(34) The Configurationality Parameter (CP) (Hale, 1983; p. 26)
a. In configurational languages, the projection principle
holds of the pair (LS, PS).
b. In non-configurational languages, the projection
principle holds of LS alone.
In fact, Hale's parameter forces the claim that the Projection
Principle does not hold in non-configurational languages; that is, the
Projection Principle states that 0-role assignment must be constant
across syntactic levels, while Hale's configurationality parameter
restricts conditions on thematic-role assignment to one stipulated
level, rendering the Projection Principle vacuous for non-
configurational languages, as Jelinek (1984) notes.
The LS structure for languages like English will be almost
identical to that of Warlpiri, with an added categorial specification for
each argument: (Hale, 1983; p. 27)
[v'=S arg x = NP, Iv=Vp arg y = NP, verb = VI
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As Hale puts it, "a strict interpretation of the CP with respect to
configurational languages might further require that the
configurational definition of argument positions in LS be mirrored
precisely in PS, forcing the phrasal syntax of configurational languages
to exhibit the familiar NP-VP partitioning of clauses. (p. 27)"
The central claims of the configurationality parameter can be
seen quite clearly from the section below:
The CP, in short, determines a tight connection
between LS and PS in configurational languages. But for
non-configurational languages, by contrast, the CP does not
determine any connection at all between LS and PS
(leaving that to other principles of grammar). From this,
the observed non-configurational properties of Warlpiri
follow, assuming Warlpiri to be non-configurational. That
is to say, because of the manner in which the projection
principle holds in non-configurational languages, the
system of phrase structure rules and the process of lexical
insertion are allowed to appear in what appears to be a
highly unconstrained manner. But in the conception of
configurationality being considered here, this is not
directly a function of phrase structure and lexical insertion
themselves; rather it is a function of the position of
Warlpiri in regard to the CP and, consequently, of the
manner in which the projection principle holds in
Warlpiri. Thus, in the absence of independent principles
of grammar which might impose limitations to the
contrary, the relation between LS arguments and PS
nominal expressions is neither bi-unique nor structurally
isomorphic-hence the possibility of null anaph ra (in the
sense used here), discontinuous expressions, and free
word order. (p. 27)
Another property of non-configurational languages which Hale
tries to reduce to the configurationality parameter is the lack of NP
movement rules. As in Hale (1982) and as is standard in Principles
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and Parameters, assume that NP movement is movement from a 0-
position to a non-0 position where both positions are argument
positions (A-positions). "It will follow, then, that Warlpiri, being non-
configurational, cannot have NP movement rules, since the notion
'argument position' applies only to LS-there are, strictly speaking, no
argument positions in PS, where the category NP (or N') is
instantiated. (p. 28). This is something of a departure from the view
in Hale (1982) where all NPs in Warlpiri were in 0-positions,
presumably argument positions, though the consequences are the
same-under the Hale (1982) view, NP movement would result in an
NP receiving two 0-roles; in the Hale (1983) view, the lack of
argument positions means that there is no non-0-position for an NP to
move to.
In this analysis, Hale more successfully argues against the
existence of empty categories in non-configurational languages. He
argues that since it is the Projection Principle forces the appearance
of empty categories in configurational languages, they do not appear in
non-configurational languages. "If they are not motivated [by the
Projection Principlel, they may not appear. It will then follow that
such categories are excluded from initial PS representations in non-
configurational languages. If, as seems appropriate, the class of
categories at issue here is extended to embrace not only empty
categories, but expletive (or pleonastic) elements as well, then
another non-configurational property of Warlpiri follows from the CP-
namely, the lack of PS explntives in that language. (p. 29)"
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Hale's (1983) version of the configurationality parameter goes a
good deal further than previous work toward finding a probable unified
explanation (which Hale calls a lack of "grammatical tightness") for a
number of properties of Warlpiri (lack of NP movement, lack of
pleonastics, extensive free word order, discontinuous constituents,
etc.). Ironically, because he attempted to explicate "grammatical
tightness" by weakening the otherwise appealing Projection Principle,
his analysis was rejected by Jelinek (1984) and others, without full
consideration of how successful Hale was in finding a single property
which came close to deriving the observed properties of non-
configurational languages.
We will not argue against Hale's (1983) analysis here, relying on
the arguments in Jelinek (1984). We will note, though, that Hale's
attempt to find a single explanation for properties which do not
pattern together particularly close is still troubling, since an
alternative analysis attempting to analyze these properties with two
parameters had not been considered. Jelinek (1984) presents
another bivalent configurationality parameter which drew from Hale's
work on Warlpiri.
2.4 "Empty Categories, Case, and Configuratonality"
Eloise Jelinek's (1984) "Empty Categories, Case, and
Configurationality," takes up many of the issues of Hale (1983),
providing a framework for work on configurationality focusing on the
role of grammatical agreement in non-configurationality. Recall from
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the "superficial characteristics of non-configurationality that one the
properties of non-configurational languages was "complex verb words
or a verb-cum-Aux system". This is descriptively accurate for
Athapaskan languages such as Navajo which have quite complicated
verbal morphology but is only weekly true for languages such as
Warlpiri, which, though it has a verb-cum-AUX system, does not show
anything like the morphological complexity of the Athapaskan
languages, or even other North American Indian languages such as
Kiowa-Tanoan, etc. Among other Amerind languages, morphological
complexity is not particular apparent. In Hixkaryana (for example)
and Carib in general, verbs are most often formed from just the terms
(agreement clitic, root verb and tense). Yagua (Peba-Yaguan), another
Amazonian language is equally uncomplicated, relative to Athapaskan.
Other languages families, such as Mayan or Uto-Aztecan, do not
approach the complexity of certain other Amerind language families.
It is true across languages of the Americas that there is richer
agreement (as opposed to richer verbal morphology in general) than is
found in more familiar European or Asian languages. Jelinek (1984)
makes use of this property in an interesting way.
Jelinek's central criticism of the framework in Hale (1983) is
that reliance on the Projection Principle as the locus of parametric
difference is inappropriate and, further, she claims that there is no
need to posit different application of the Projection Principle for
configurational and non-configurational languages. She points out that
Hale's analysis permits "a sentence with no surface indications of
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grammatical relations" which would be "uninterpretable" (p. 43). She
argues that "Hale's [configurationality parameter] threatens to permit
languages with uninterpretable surface structures" (ibid.).
This claim is not obviously true, however. Recall that Hale tried
to argue that missing NPs in Warlpiri had the status of definite
pronouns in English. He showed that these gaps could bind reflexives
and could control infinitival subjects. It may be strained for Hale to
reject empty categories yet to permit missing elements to bind
reflexives, but this is not the argument that Jelinek makes-Jelinek
argues that Hale's system permits sentences with uninterpretable
surface structures. This is not true if there are well-formed
interpretations of these missing NPs-interpretations for which Hale's
analysis does provide.
Since this is only the starting point of Jelinek's analysis, we
need not take too seriously her failure to make a strong argument
against Hale's proposal. The alternative Jelinek suggests is to take
person marking clitics on AUX as the real arguments of Warlpiri verbs,
calling them "case-marked, fully referential clitic pronouns that serve
as verbal arguments" (p. 44). Further, she argues that "pronominal
clitics are never bound by a nominal in an argument position, since
nominals never occupy argument positions. Clitics may have
antecedents outside their governing category, the sentence, as any
pronoun may. They are comparable to the 'free' use of pronouns in
English... (Ibid.).
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Person marking clitic pronouns are not agreement for Jelinek-
for example they can be linked to nominals with which they do not
share person, number or case. Clitic pronouns are arguments at LS
and PS and nominals are simply adjuncts. Further she claims that
clitic pronouns bear cases which reflects their grammatical function
(subject and object) while nominals bear non-grammatical (oblique)
case "and are governed by their case particles/postpositions.
The first pages of Jelinek (1984) propose a very different way of
approaching the syntax of non-configurational languages, with
implications for the broad class of languages, mentioned above,
showing the hyper-rich agreement of languages like Warlpiri and
Navajo. Since Jelinek is just concerned here with Warlpiri, most of
these implications are not fully explored.
The first claim Jelinek defends is that the case of Warlpiri
agreement morphemes is different from that of Warlpirl nominals. A
nominative accusative case system treats intransitive and transitive
subjects the same and distinct from transitive objects. An ergative
absolutive system, on the other hand, treats intransitive subjects the
same as transitive objects, and both as distinct from transitive
subjects. The following data from Jelinek (1984; p. 45) adopted from
Hale (1973; p. 328) shows the case facts for nominals and agreement
markers:
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(35) a nggual- ±a ka- ma- naku nrP - 2
I- ERG PRES- ISGNoM- 2sGAcc you- ABS
nya- nyi
See- NONPAST
'I see you.'
b. nyutulu- ru ka- upa- j nalu 0
you- ERG PRES- 2SGNOM- ISGACc me- ABS
nya- nyi
see- NONPAST
You see me.'
c. nxuntu _ ka- nna purla- mi
you- ABS PRES- 2SGNOM- shout NONPAST
You are shouting.'
In (35a-b) the subject of the transitive clause bears ergative case
and the object bears absolutive case; in (35c) the intransitive clause
subject bears absolutive case, like a transitive object. This
demonstrates that Warlpiri nominals show an ergative/absolutive case
pattern. As (35b-c) the subject agreement marker for intransitive
subjects is the same for transitive subjects (-npa, '2SGNOM') and
different from the transitive object marker (-ngku, '2SGACC'). Thus,
Warlpiri demonstrates a nominative accusative pattern for agreement
markers.
The above data shows that Warlpiri clitics do not share case with
their associated nominals. Jelinek also argues that need not agree in
person and number either. (Jelinek, 1984, p. 46; and Hale, 1983, p.
32-33)
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(36) a puyukuyuku- puru kula- lpa rlipa- nyanu
fog- WHILE NEG- IMPERF- 1+3NoM- REFL
xDa- Q nya- ngkarla
person- ABS see- IRREALIS
We (plural inclusive) cannot see one another (as) person(s)
(i.e. our shapes and figures) when it is foggy
b. nya- nyi ka- ma- ngjg. ngarrka- - lku
see- nonpast pres- 1sgNom- 2sgAcc man- ABS- after
'I see you (as) a man now (i.e., as fully grown, initiated)."
In (36a), the third person absolutive nominal (yapa-0, 'person')
is linked to the reflexive clitic -nyanyu which is interpreted as linked
to the 1st person inclusive nominative (-rlipa). In (36b) the third
person absolutive nominal ngarrka-0 ('man') is linked to the second
person accusative clitic (-ngku). Thus, the agreement clitics need not
share the features of the overt nominals. This would be surprising if
the person markers were simple agreement markers.
Jelinek extends this analysis to Spanish, and other pro-drop
languages (data from Jelinek, 1984; p. 48)5
(37) a Las mujeres tienen esperanza
DET women have:3PL hope
'Women have hope.'
b. Las mujeres teneis esperanza
DET women have:2PL hope
You women have hope.'
c. [as mujeres tenemos esperanza
DET women have:1PL hope
'We women have hope.'
5 Jelinek glosses Las mguleres tenemos esperanza as 'DET women have-3p1 hope'. We
assume that this is unintended.
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In these examples the person of the subject is not necessarily
related to the agreement marker triggered. Jelinek argues that the
subject in Spanish is the agreement marker with the subject NP (Las
muJeres) an adjunct. She points out that in pro-drop language such as
Spanish and in Warlpiri (and non-configurational languages in general,
it seems) independent pronouns are used for "emphatic contrastive
reference" and that "sentences with an independent pronoun in
adjunction to a pronominal affix ur clitic are the marked construction"
(p. 48).
(38) a Yo sd lo que paso no td
I know:lSG it which happened not you
'I know what happened, not you.'
b. Me lo dio a mi
Me:DAT it gave to me
'He gave it to me.'
c. ngajulu- rlu wawirri- 0 kapi- ma- 0
I- EG kangaroo- ABS FUT- iSG- 3sG
panti- rnl yalumpu- 0
see- NONPAST that- ABS
'I (myself) will spear that kangaroo.'
She argues "there is no reason to assume that these languages
should match English in requiring an independent lexical subject,
which is then dropped, in the unmarked construction: grammatical
relations may be marked in the morphology as well as in the syntax"
(p. 49). She points out that verbs which (for semantic reasons) "do
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not permit contrasts in referential emphasis, may exclude pronouns as
adjuncts" (ibid.)
(39) a. llueve
It's raining
b. *el llueve
'It is raining, (not...)
Thus, Jelinek argues that null anaphora in Spanish and Warlpiri
derive from the same source: the argumental status of "agreement
markers" as clitic pronouns. She does not claim that Spanish is non-
configurational, however, explicitly noting "I suggest that the term
configurational be reserved for languages such as English or Spanish,
where there is an asymmetry between the marking of subject vs.
object grammatical relations" (p. 50).6 It is not clear then what
accounts for the different syntactic behavior of Warlpiri vis-d-vis
Spanish. Though with respect to agreement Jelinek claims that
Warlpiri and Spanish are identical, she appears not to be claiming that
Warlpiri subjects are treated exactly like Spanish subjects-Spanish
subjects do not permit discontinuous constituents of the Warlpiri type
and Spanish subjects are not freely permutable. Thus, her analysis of
Spanish, though interesting, is somewhat confusing in the context of
her discussion of Warlpiri.
Returning to the proposal for Warlpiri then, and bracketing the
claims about Spanish-under Jelinek's analysis, there is no need to
6 I s not clear what Jelinek would say about the subject-object asymmetries
demonstrated by Hale (1983) with respect to binding of reflexlves/reciprocals and the
Impossibility of object control In infinitival clauses.
137
assume that Warlpiri behaves differently from English with respect to
the Projection Principle. 0-roles are assigned to agreement clitics at
all levels of structure. This makes sense of some facts that
pretheoretically might have seemed curious. Though Warlpiri permits
extremely free word order and extensive null anaphora, the order of
agreement clitics is fixed and they are required to be present. If we
state locality conditions and appearance requirements over agreement
clitics, Warlpiri begins to seem less surprising.
Jelinek claims that other properties of Warlpiri follow from this
analysis also. For example, she argues that "since nominals are not
arguments or bi-uniquely related to arguments [i.e. clitics--mJaj, more
than one nominal may be adjoined to a single argument, to yield
apparently discontinuous expressions....And since nominals are mere
adjuncts, there is nothing to require that they have a fixed order."
The picture that emerges of non-configurational languages is
that the predicate and its agreement clitics constitute a "complete
finite sentence" (p. 63) or, perhaps, a complete functional complex in
the sense of Chomsky (1985b). Jelinek assumes a class of non-
configurational languages called W-type non-configurational languages-
though she suggests no alternative class.7 "If a language has AUX clitic
pronouns that (in finite clauses) always mark all verbal arguments, and
that cooccur with optional nominals, It is a W-type non-configurational
7 For example, If 'W-Type' means has fully referential agreement clitics (in Jeilinek's
phrase) then perhaps Spanish Is a W-Type Configurational Language. Japanese could be
a non-W-type non-configurational language, depending on what Jeilnek Intends. She
clearly assumes that the reference of "V-Type' Ls separate from the reference of 'non-
configurational' but does not define 'non-configurational.'
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language (ibid.)". Jelinek's claim that there are languages which assign
thematic-roles to agreement clitics is clearly the central. principle of
her analysis and consideration of it will occupy almost all of the
remaining sections of this work. In Chapters 3-4, we reject much of
Jelinek's model but 0-assignment to agreement clitics is an aspet of
tier analysis we tentatively assume.
In the next section we briefly consider two alternative accounts
of non-configurationality which have some of the same consequences
as Jelinek's
2.5 Two Alternative Conceptions: Saxon (1985) and Speas (1986)
2.5.1 "The Configurationality of Slave"
An alternative analysis of configurationality is provided by Leslie
Saxon in her (1985) "Lexical versus Syntactic Projection: The
Configurationality of Slave." Saxon's analysis is very similar to that of
Jelinek and basically renames the distinction in Jelinek (1984),
though, as we note, her analysis entails a slightly different class of non-
configurational languages.
Saxon assumes that there are two classes of languages, which
she terms lexically projected and syntactically projection.
Syntactically projected languages are like English and "'empty NPs'
may be required in PS...to satisfy the Projection Principle' (p. 4, cf.
Hale, 1982). Lexically projected languages differ In that "the argument
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structure of clauses is satisfied at the LS. Overt NPs are therefore not
arguments in a clause...(p. 4, cf. ibid., Jelinek, 1984).
What is interesting about Saxon's formulation is that she assumes
that Navajo is non-configurational (lexically projected) while its close
Athapaskan relative Slave is configurational (syntactically projected).
Slave and Navajo pattern together with respect to the "superficial
characteristics of non-configurationality" sharing extensive verb words,
free null anaphora, lack of pleonastics and both having relatively fixed
word order. We reject the analysis she proposes and review the
argument for this conclusion here, following on a similar analysis in
Alexander (1988).
As noted, both Navaho and Slave show the extensive null
anaphora that is characteristic of so-called "non -configurational"
languages:8
(S1) a ShI dii 'ashiike bich'odeeshniit Navaho
I this boy:PL 30: 1S:take the side of
'I will take the side of these boys'
b. bich'odeeshniit
30: S:taketheside of
'I will take his/her side'
(S2) a Sarah k'ahjine sedehcho Slave
almost 1S:30:iMP:be of a size with
'Sarah is almost as tall as me'
b. k'ahjine sed6hcho
almost 1S:30:IMP:be of a size with
'He/she is almost as tall as me'
8 Forms taken from Saxon will have a prefixed S to the number they are assigned In
Saxon (1985).
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Saxon find contrasts between Navaho and Slave in the following
examples where it is not possible to have missing NPs:
(S18) a. bk h6"
knife with
"Cut it with
b. *h6
with
"Cut
tddihwie
2S-IMP-cut
the knife"
tAdihwie
2S-IMP-cut
it with it"
c. beh6 tidihwie
3-with 2S-IMP-cut
"Cut it with it"
(S19) a. sn tuwekl k'igoweneliQ soup 2S-PF-taste
"Did you taste the soup?"
b.*sd
Q
"Did
C. sn
Q
"Did
k'igoweneli
2S-PF-taste
you taste it?
bek'Agowenell
3-2S-PF-taste
you taste it?
(S20) a. Charlie 116
dog (poss'd)
"Charley's dog"
b. *116
dog (poss'd)
"his dog"
c. beli6
3-dog (poss'd)
"his dog"
cf. b
dog (non-poss'd)
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In the (S18) forms, we see complementary distribution between
an agreement morpheme and an overt NP. In (S18a) we get the NP
with the uninflected postposition, ble ht, knife with, but in (S18c) we
get the inflected postposition with no NP, beh, 3-with. In (S18b),
neither the NP nor the agreement morpheme surfaces and the form
ht, with, is excluded. In (S19) and (S20), Saxon extends the
demonstration of the Dogrib pattern to direct objects and and
possessors in NP. In Navajo, however, the corresponding a and b
forms are acceptable.
Saxon interprets the above data as follows: [in Dogrib] "The
examples of (18)-(20), graunatcal with a lexical NP, as in (a), are
ungrammatical if the NP is 'missing', as in (b). The (c) examples show
that if an overt Agreement form is used to 'replace' the missing NP,
grammatical sentences are found again." She makes the following
argument: Since (1) Missing NPs are characteristic of non-
configurational languages ('lexically projected'); (2) Lexically projected
languages always permit null NPs (Navaho does, for exami le); (3) Slave
does not always permit null NPs, though it does permit them in many
environments; thus, (4) Slave is not lexically projected and must be
syntactically projected (i.e. is in the class with English and not in the
class with Navaho). In fact, we could turn Saxon's argument on its
head by making the following argument. The examples of (18)-(20),
grammatical with an agreement clltic, as In (c), are ungrammatical if
the clitic Is 'missing', as In (b). The (a) examples show that if an overt
NP Is used to 'replace' the missing clitic, grammatical sentences are
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found again." We could then argue as follows: Since (1) theta-marked
clitics are not characteristic of configurational (syntactically projected)
languages (2) syntactically projected languages do not theta.mark
clitics (English does not, for example); (3) Slave theta-marks its
clitics; thus, (4) Slave is not syntactically projected and must be
lexically projected. Thus, Saxon reasons from the premiss that the
crucial difference between English and Warlpiri is that NPs are often
not expressed in Warlpiri and she assumes that obligatory NPs is a
hallmark of configurationality (though, obviously see Italian, etc.).
Following Jelinek, however, we might also reason that a particular
relation between lexical heads and agreement morphemes defines
non-configurationality. Slave shows a familiar pattern (more examples
of which appear in Chapter 4) of complementary distribution between
agreement morphemes and full NPs. The question then is whether we
should focus on the fact that NPs are sometimes required, in the
absence of a clitic, (making Dogrib seem configurational) or the fact
that Dogrib NPs are sometimes (obligatorily) absent, in the presence of
a clitic, (making Dogrib seem non-configurational). Both arguments go
through but seem to miss the central intuition which is that, contra
Jelinek, there may not be two types of systems [NP as arguments or
clitics as arguments] but may a type of middle case. Saxon does not
suggest this however and uses the above data to drive the following
discussion:
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...how do Navajo and Slave children recognize their
languages as lexically or syntactically projected? For the
Navajo child, the crucial evidence must be of the following
type:
(S36) a. Mary b&
3.for
'for Mary'
b.bA
3.for
'for her/him
The children learn from contrasts such as these that the
occurrence or non-occurrence of a lexical NP in a phrase
does not affect the availability of a form, or Its
morphological structure. Thus they recognize Navajo as
lexically projected. This is not what Slave children learn,
however. The hear (37), but never (38).
(S37) a. Mary gha
for
'for Mary'
b. begha
3.for
'for her/him'
(S38) *gha
for
(for her/him)
They may deduce from this that the occurrence or not of a
lexical NP in a phrase is significant and therefore that
Slave is syntactically projected.(p. 17)
The difference between Navajo and Slave Is that in Navajo
postpositions are always inflected and may take an optional overt NP
object, while In Slave, the postposltion has a choice of appearing with
either an NP object or Inflection on the head P. In neither language
can the postposition surface without some nominal (either Inflection
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or a full NP). It seems to us much more reasonable to suppose that the
Navaho child learns from (S36) that theta-marking and government is
right-to-left in Navaho (and if negative evidence were available, that
Navaho cannot assign its theta-roles externally) and the Slave child
only learns from (S37-38) that (1) Slave assigns its 0-roles to the left;
and (2) theta-roles can be assigned internally or externally to the
category P. Both language learners should get the following from UG:
(3) Subcategorized theta-roles must always be discharged. We need
only say that Navaho does not assign its theta-roles externally and that
Slave may assign its theta-roles externally to explain the contrasts
above, The only case which is blocked in Slave (and presumably in
Navaho, and all languages) is one in which the postposition does not
assign a theta-role to either the object or the object clitic. What is
cruckal is that Navaho and Slave do not differ on the "superficial
characteristics of non-configurationality" and a theory which makes
Navaho different from a set of languages including English and Slave is
going to face difficulty explaining the data from these superficial
characteristics because Slave patterns with Navaho instead of English.
Slave behaves like Navaho as a function of 0-marking its clitics, which
is Jelinek's claim.
In a footnote, Saxon presents evidence that the view we are
taking here Is correct.9 There is a Slave construction in which
9 Tefootnote 5 which we refer to is appended to a September 10, 1985 versIon of the
paper. A different footnote 5 appears In the text of that version but we will be refer to
the appended footnote 5, whIch Is undated.
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ungramnaticality does not result from the absence of an overt NP
possessor (cf. S20 above).
(S20) a. Charlie liec.i
dog (poss'd) "dog (non-poss'dY'
"Charley's dog"
b. *11e
dog (poss'd)
"his dog"
c. belie
3-dog (poss'd)
"his dog"
(Sf51) a. Margaret bemo
3-mother
"Margaret's mother"
b. bemo
3-mother
"her/his mother"
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c. *Margaret mo
mother
"Margaret's mother"
d. *mo
"mother"
Here there is no complementary distribution between clitic and
the overt NP. In the unique case in Slave where marking of the clitic
is obligatory (bemo vs. *mo), it is not possible to have just the overt NP
(*Margaret mo). This is precisely the connection we expect. If the
clitic is obligatory, then it is obligatorily 0-marked, as in Navajo, and
the NP appears as an adjunct. Saxon states: "Like the Navaho
examples discussed in footnote 3. this construction is unexpected,
given the claims that stand concerning the projection type of Slave. I
consider the given case a well-defined exception to the usual pattern."
Footnote 3 refers to examples in Navaho where it is not possible
to omit objects of complex postpositions. The following are examples
Saxon gives from Young and Morgan (1980):
(i) Shidi Weh yanitti'
1S-older sister according to 2S-IMP-speak
"You talk like my older sister."
(1) Ta shinli k'eh 'isht't
just iS-mind according to 1S-PF-do
"Do as I say."
(iii) dzit ta'gi
mountain-between-at
"between the mountains; inter-mountain"
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(iv) Gah yazhi yas tah yilwot go yiittsA
rabbit little snow among 3-IMP-run COMP 1S-PF-see
"I saw the little rabbit running in (among) the snow"
In these cases, it is not possible to omit the object of the
postposition (an exception to the general Navajo pattern). Saxon cites
Young and Morgan as noting that these constructions appear to be
lexical compounds.10 In any event, they are not inflected with an
Agreement clitic, as were the cases in Navaho where omissibility of
the NP was possible. What is interesting to us is that examples in
Navaho where it is not possible to assign a theta-role to a clitic result
in theta-assignment to the overt NP predictably leaving no option for
failing to discharge the theta-role by omitting the NP. Saxon notes:
"In footnote 5, we see a construction involving postpositions which
has more the character of lexical projection than of syntactic
projection. If Athapaskan languages are undergoing a process of
change from syntactic to lexical projection, then these Navajo
examples are historical remnants, and the Slave example (footnote 5-
mjaI is a construction ahead of its time. Or vice versa." There is no
need to assume a construction to be ahead of its time or that Navaho is
moving toward configurational status or away froai it. Hale's analysis of
complementary distribution 'agreement cases' discussed in detail in
Chapter 4 handles the Navajo and Slave cases easily, without affecting
the configurational status of these two similar languages. Further, the
10 Ithank Ken Hale for confirming the lexical compound or idiom status of these
constructions.
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Slave pattern of some obligatorily possessed nouns and other non-
obligatorily possessed nouns (or obligatory non-possessed nouns) is
quite common (see Hixkaryana, for example with the same pattern of
data as Saxon presents for Slave, Derbyshire:1979, 1985) and does not
represent evidence for a move toward lexically projected status.
Summarizing the material from footnotes 3 and 5, Saxon sees
the material in footnote 5 as an exception and footnote 3 as a
historical remnant. Neither example is easily explained by the
lexical/syntactic projection distinction. Both cases can be explained
by the assumption that there are languages (and constructions) in
which theta-roles may be assigned to clitics gj to overt NPs, a
conclusion we explore and support in Chapter 4.
The lexical/syntactic distinction offers nothing to our
understanding of how Hale's diagnostics reflect underlying differences
among languages and, finally, Saxon's distinction is bivalent and
requires further parameterization to distinguish languages like Warlpiri
from languages like Navaho, languages like Slave from languages like
English and, further, languages like Japanese from languages like
English. Given this, we do not accept the lexical/syntactic projection
distinction derived from the test of omissibility of NPs. (We discuss
this omissibitty in detail In Chapter 4.)
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2.5.2 The Saturation Parameter (Speas 1986)
We will now briefly consider an analysis due to Speas (1986) in
which she formulates a "configurationality parameter" very similar to
that in Saxon's (1985) lexical and syntactic projection. Speas uses the
following terminology:"1
(40) The Saturation Parameter
a. In a Lexically Protected language, theta-positions are
discharged through theta-role assignment in
Morphological structure.
b. In a Syntactically Projected language, theta-positions
are discharged through theta-role assignment in Syntactic
structure,
Speas thus follows Jelinek in assuming that in a hyper-rich
agreement language such as Navajo, thematic-roles are discharged to
agreement clitics. However she explicitly rejects Jelinek's claim that
(the optional) NPs are non-arguments. She states (p. 215):
1 We will not present the arguments against Saxon's account in this section. In
general, the implications for Speas' distinction should be clear from the section on
Saxon. Furthermore, many of the arguments to follow here regarding Speas (1986)
apply equally well to Saxon (1985). In particular the argument, made several times in
this chapter but most strongly below, that a bivalent configurationality parameter is
Insufficient will apply to Saxon's distinction.
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... although the theta-roles are discharged by the
clitics, the overt NPs are governed by the verb. The view
of Chomsky (1981, 1986a) that the status of a particular
position as an A(argument)-Position is divorced from its
status as a theta-position.{sici Thus, we can clear up an
ambiguity in Jelinek's claim that pronominal clitics 'are
arguments'. The overt NPs in the above phrase marker are
in A-Positions in that they are governed by V-zero, but
these are not positions to which theta-roles are assigned.12
(p. 215)
This position does not seem consistent with the cited position
of Chomsky. In what is presumably the section of Chomsky (1981) to
which Speas is referring, he notes (p. 47):
'The positions to which GFs (grammatical functions or
theta-roles) are assigned are sometimes called "argument
positions", but since I am using the term "argument" in a
slightly different way, I will avoid this terminology,
referring to them rather as "A-positions"... An A-position is
one in which an argument such as a name or a variable may
appear in D-structure; it is a potential 0-position. The
position of subject may or may not be a 0-position,
depending on properties of the associated VP.
Complements of X' are always 0-positions, with the
possible exception of idioms.
Chomsky refers in a note (Ftn. 12, p. 138) to the tendency to
use "argument" to refer "to elements occupying 'argument positions"',
i.e. "base-generated NP-positions." Thus, Speas seems to imply that
Chomsky (1981) suggests that there is a class of elements (call them [-
0+AJ) which are NPs not assigned theta-roles but which nevertheless
12 Tesecond sentence presumably should read 'The view of Chomsky (1981, 1986a) is
that the status of a particular position [Lug. MJAI as an A(argument)-Positlon is
divorced from its status as a theta-position."
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are arguments. It is not-obvious that Chomaky suggests this, since he
still refers to 'potential theta-roles' for particular subjects-and does
not advocate suspension of the theta-criterion. Be that as it may, it is
not clear why Speas wants to associate the properties of these
elements, idioms and subjects of particular "associated VPs" in
Chomsky's sense (perhaps pleonastics), with the properties of Navajo
overt NPs. That is to say, Chomsky does not suggest a class of -0+A
and furthermore it seems dubious to associate this category with
Navajo NPs.
Speas suggests that her analysis improves on Jelinek's by
deriving a e!milarity among both types of languages in the concept
chain. She derives this by assuming that overt NPs in 'morphologically
projected' languages receive structural Case, like English NPs. In
English, as is familiar, we see transformations which result in the
formation of chains (an NP and its coindexed trace, as below) with the
trace receiving a thematic-role and the moved NP receiving Case.
(41) a. John was hit
b. e was hit John
+0, -Case
c. John1 was hit ti
+Case +0
Though not stated as such, Speas suggests the same for
morphologically projected languages, with the agreement clitic
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assuming (literally) the role of the trace, as follows: (data from Jelinek,
1984, 43; Speas, 1986; 219)
(42) Wawirri kapi-rna- 0 panti-rni yalumpu
+Case +0
kangaroo AUX; 1Subj -3obj spear-NONPAST that
'I will spear that kangaroo.'
There is a chain (wawirrt, 0) analogous to the chain (John, t) in
the passive example above (41). The claim she makes (explicitly) is
that the Warlpiri type chain is parallel to that of the English left-
dislocation construction demonstrated below: (Speas, 1986; 217,
204, respectively)
(43) a. My sister, bh's a genius.
b. That car, man, I thought it would never make it over here.
These chains cannot be parallel to (NP, agreement clitics)
chains in Navajo or Warlpiri, even under Speas' terms. First, the left-
dislocated NP in (43b) is not governed by VO as Speas argues Navajo
direct objects are. Secondly, the left-dislocated NPs in (43) do not
seem to receive Case from the standard Case assigners, as Speas
suggests for the head (wawirrQ in the chain (wawirrt, 0).
There is a clear sense in which the examples in (43) should look
like chains in non-configurational languages-this point is made by
Jelinek (1984) for examples like "Het, the doctori, tells mek, the
patientk, what to do." Speas seems to share this intuition but her
theory cannot adequately express the similarity for the reasons just
mentioned: the left dislocated object NP in (43) is not obviously
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governed by V and the left dislocated NPs in (43) do not seem Case
marked by the ordinary means, as Speas argues is true for Navajo overt
NPs. Jelinek, on the other hand, who argues that Navajo overt NPs are
not governed by V and does not claim that overt NPs in Navajo are
assigned structural Case, can capture the similarities between English
left-dislocation and the overt NP-agreement clitic relation in non-
configurationality.
Since the connection between the two types of constructions is
largely a matter of intuition, which we cannot ultimately decide, we
must turn to the underlying claims. We have argued that Jelinek's
analysis (V does not govern Navajo NPs, Navajo NPs are not assigned
structural Case) permits the same analysis of English left-dislocation
and Warlpiri/Navajo overt NP constructions, while Speas' assumptions
for Navajo (government of overt NPs and structural Case assignment to
them) do not; we may ask: which of these sets of assumptions is
correct.
This merely raises the question: correct for what? Speas'
analysis makes the assumption that overt NPs in Navajo are governed
and assigned Case, very much like English NPs. Speas correctly
predicts that Navajo would have relatively fixed word order, just like
English, as a result of the fact that Navajo NPs must be proximate to
their Case assign!ers. Jelinek rejects both of these assumptions:
neither of her claims imply the need for NPs to be proximate to
governors or Case assigners. And Jelinek is correct also, but for
Warlpiri. Navajo has fixed word order, suggesting that Speas may be
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correct; Warlpiri has radically free word order, suggesting that Jelinek
may be correct. What is striking then is that it seems Speas and
Jelinek intend their theories to be theories of both Navajo and
Warlpiri. They share a crucial assumption (thematic-roles are assigned
to agreement clitics in hyper-rich agreement languages of the
Navajo/Warlpiri type) but they diverge on how to account for the word
order properties, in particular they differ on how Case is assigned in
Navajo/Warlpiri type languages.
With respect to Case assignment, Jelinek and Speas show a
difference mirroring the problem above. Speas suggests that Case
assignment in morphologically projected languages is structural Case,
as in English, as opposed to lexical Case, such as that assigned by
obliques, case endings in Japanese (see Travis and LaMontagne, 1987,
and references there) and so forth. This has the appealing
consequence of correctly predicting that Navajo would lack overt case,
again just like English. Jelinek, on the other hand, argues, as we
discussed above, that structural Case is not assigned to overt NPs.
Jelinek assumes that lexical Case is assigned to overt NPs and thereby
derives the equally appealing prediction that (1) Warlpiri has rich
overt case; and (2) Warlpiri case is free to be ergative/absolutive while
its agreement is nominative/accusative. Thus, Jelinek denies the link
between overt NPs and agreement clitics, as chains and provides a
compelling analysis of Warlpiri overt case on the basis of it. Speas
asserts a chain link and derives a compelling analysis of Navajo non-
overt case on the basis of this assumption.
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It appears that Jelinek (1984) can analyze Warlpiri and not
Navajo while Speas (1986) can analyze Navajo but not Warlpiri. This is
not in itself disastrous for either theory, but both theories purport to
be able to explain both types of languages. We do not agree. In
Chapter 3 we adopt the view that any theory which ignores the
distinction between Warlpiri and Navajo is not a reasonable candidate
for the correct explication of the issue of non-configurationality.
2.5.3 Summary of the Analyses Considered Thus Far
Thus far we have several analysis of non-configurationality which
differ in a number of details. The crucial detail which these analyses
share is that they are bivalent parameters. This is rather curious,
given a superficial consideration of the typological data. For example,
Navajo has optional NPs and agreement clitics for subject and direct
object. It meets the criterion for a nonconfigurational language in
Jelinek's ters (and Speas' as well). While it is true that Navajo lacks
overt case, this is also true of Papago which Jelinek and Hale explicitly
label non-configurational. In short, Navajo seems a clear example of a
language which assigns thematic-roles to agreement clitics. As
Jelinek writes: "...since nominals are mere adjuncts, there is nothing
to require that they have a fixed order" (p. 50). Navajo nominals do
have a fixed order, the subject nominal precedes the object nominal
(except in cases where a special verbal affix indicates that the order is
reversed) (see Hale, Jeanne and Platero, 1977). Navajo does not
manifest the most obvious property of non-configurational languages,
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Navajo does not have free word order any more than, for example,
English does. Jelinek (1984), Saxon (1985), Speas (1986), perhaps
Hale (1984), etc., do not admit a distinction between Navajo and
Warlpiri. Hale (1981, 1982), and also Speas (1986), recognize that
the supposed properties of non-configurationality do not pattern as a
single set with all non-configurational languages having all the
properties and all configurational languages lacking all of them.
Researchers have icealized over these distinctions. Perhaps
recognizing the subcases would lead to abandoning the notion of non-
configurationality. This is not logically necessary, however. Alexander
(1986) argued that there is a way to approach non-configurationality
which does not lose gross distinctions between languages such as
Warlpiri and Navajo. This approach involved two distinctions
separating the possible languages with respect to configurationality.
Although that analysis was neutral with respect to whether these
distinctions were parameters, here we shall take the view that there is
no need to assume parameters and that the distinction follows
independently from general principles of the grammar.
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Chapter 3
A Non-Bifvalent Theory of Non-Configurationality
Having discussed several formulations of a proposed parameter
which opposes, at least, the canonically non-configurational Warlpiri
from the canonically configurational English, for the remainder of this
chapter we discuss a multi-valued opposition, the case/agreement
distinction, proposed in Alexander (1986) and extended in Alexander
(1988). In this section we focus on the strengths of the
case/agreement view over classical non-configurationality. We then
discuss ways that successes of non-configurationality can be replicated
within case/agreement and examine some problematic cases which
arise from the initial, informal characterization of case/agreement.
Preliminarily, almost like a mnemonic device, we can think of
configurationality as the characterization of the difference between
four gross types of languages represented by English, Warlpiri, Navajo
and Japanese. Thus far we have discussed theories of
configurationality which in one way or another make a binary
opposition between languages like English and some other class of
languages. This other class of languages could be understood very
broadly, including, for example, languages as different from one
another as Japanese, Navajo and Warlpiri. This might be entailed by
the analysis of configurationality in Chomsky (1981) where the
presence of a VP constituent was the salient characteristic of
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configurational languages.1 Other theories, following largely from Hale
(1982) oppose English and Japanese on the one hand with Navajo and
Warlpiri on the other (cf. Jelinek:1984, Speas:1986, etc.). Another
analysis we have discussed, that of Saxon (1985) opposes English,
Japanese and Dogrib on one hand with Navajo and Warlpiri on the
other. Previous discussions of non-configurationality have thus shifted
the four canonical tokens (Warlpiri, Navajo, English and Japanese) into
two piles and several distinct permutations have been claimed as the
correct binary configurationality distinction. Alexander (1986)
departed from this tradition in non-configurational analyses by arguing
that it was incorrect to look for a simple binary distinction with
respect to the properties of non-configurationality and suggested two
separate oppositions: on the basis of rich morphological case and
agreement.
As a typological fact not particularly abstract from the data it is
possible to separate the four canonical tokens on the basis of
morphology. For example, Japanese and Waripiri share the property
of having rich case systems, while English and Navajo share the
property of lacking them:
1 Under a Chomsky (1981) conceptIon, Navajo would presumably be configurational
given its fairly rigid SOy word order. Of course, proponents of a Chomusky (1981) type
analysis could also adopt most of Jelinek's adargument analysis of Navajo, It is not
likely that anyone will attempt this but the part of Jelinek's analysis which assumes
That languages like Navajo lack VP constituents is one which we will present evidence
against in this work.
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(1) a. John-ga sushi-o tabeta
John-NOM sushsi-ACC ate
'John ate sushi' (Japanese)
b. kurdu-ar-lu ka-pala maliki wajilipi-nyl wit-larra-rlu
child- Dual-ERG PRES-DL dog-ABS chase-NPST small-DL-ERG
The two small children are chasing the dog.' (Warlpiri)
c. The rock crushed John. (English)
d. Ashkiu at'ded yiylitts&
girl boy 30-3S-saw
The boy saw the girl' (Navajo)
We have four subject NPs in the above sentences John-ga
(Japanese) maliki (Warlpiri), the rock (English) and ashkit (Navajo).
To convert these subject NPs into examples of direct object NPs would
require morphological changes in Japanese (for example to John-o)
and Warlpiri (to an ergative form) but not in English or Navajo where
the rock and ashki would remain unchanged. This Is a general fact
about NPs in English and Navajo, just as the need for morphological
case changes (covarlant with the change from subject to object) is a
fact about Japanese and Warlplri. With respect to morphological case
there is a simple descriptive distinction which may be drawn between
English and Navajo on the one hand and Japanese and Warlpiri on the
other.
Another distinction may be made on the basis of richness of
overt agreement. Consider some examples from the languages we
have been considering:
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(2) a. At'ttd ashkll yiylittsA
girl boy 3S-30-saw
The girl saw the boy' (Navajo)
b. ngajulu-rlu ka- ma- ngku nyuntu-0 nya-nyi
I- ERG PRES-1sgNOM-2sgACC you- ABS see-NPST
'I see you' (Warlpiri)
c. John likes that picture.
d. John-ga sushi-o tabeta
John-NOM sushsi-ACC ate
'John ate sushi' (Japanese)
In Navajo and Warlpiri, the person and number of the subject
and of the direct object are registered, on the verb in Navajo and on
the AUX in Warlpiri whereas the person of the direct object is not
registered on the English verb and neither the person of the subject
nor of the direct object is registered on the Japanese verb. In Navajo
and Warlpirl, changing the grammatical person of the direct object
induces a covariant morphological change in the AUX or verb; more
simply, Navajo and Warlpiri have direct object agreement while
English and Japanese do not. Navajo and Warlpiri have far richer
agreement than English and Japanese. This is not to say that English
or Japanese lack agreement (this is a question which we would have to
discuss separately) but there is a clear sense In which Warlpiri and
Navajo are opposed to English and Japanese. Together with the
distinction with respect to rich case systems, we have found two
cross-cutting oppositions (rich agreement links Navajo and WarlpIri
and rich case links WarlpIrI and Japanese). To summarize them (for
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now, using ±AGR to mean agreement for the person of the subject and
direct object, and ±Case to indicate whether the subject and the direct
object trigger different case marking):
(3) The Case/Agreement Opposition
+Case -Case
+AGR Warlpiri Navajo
-RGR Japanese English
In its simplest form: the central claim of the case/agreement
analysis is that the interesting properties of non-configurational
languages can be related the typological location of particular
languages in the schema above; i.e., where languages find their place in
(3) on the basis of observable, morphological properties.
We claimed in Alexander (1986) that the 'superficial
characteristics of non-configurationality' vary with respect to the
morphological classes above. Hence:
Properties which contribute to [+Case, +Agreementi
[+Casel [+Agreementl
[+Case] [+AgreementI
a. "free"(-er) word order b. pronoun drop
g. use of a rich case system c. no NP movement
d. no pleonastics
e. complex verb words
We claim that in the unmarked case, [+Agreementj languages
will have the right side properties and [+Casej languages will have the
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left side properties. Naturally, (+Case, +Agreementl languages will
have both. The [+Case] properties follow naturally from assumptions
about case dating back to Sapir (1921) and beyond. The [+Agreement]
properties, that rich agreement (sufficiently rich for subject and
object) licenses null anaphora and excludes NP movement and
pleonastics are the consequences of Hale and Jelinek's analyses of 0-
marking of clitics (see above).
3.1 On the Goals of Case/Agreement
The schema in (3) is a possible way of dividing this group of four
languages into four classes. There are two related questions suggested
by the classification. First, is it an interesting classification from
which other facts can be made to follow and, second, is t possible to
formalize the notions [±Casej and [±Agreement] in a non-trivial way
that provides (a) this four way opposition rather than some unintended
other classification; and (b) allows this distinction to be projected onto
a larger class of languages which still gives us an interesting
classification, i.e. does it account for more than four languages?
Naturally, we will begin by exploring whether this is an interesting
classification before considering ways to formalize the relevant
opposition.
We have induced a distinction of the four canonical tokens of
configurationality from which particular subclasses may be formed.
For example we may speak of the [+Agreement] languages to mean
Navajo and Warlpiri. We may refer to the [+Agreement, -Case] class of
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languages to mean Dogrib, Slave, Navajo, Hlxkaryana, etc.. We may ask
whether case/agreement induces the "correct" classification, whether
it groups languages together which should be grouped together. This
is answerable on many levels. First, note that it is an empirical
question deserving study whether languages pattern on the basis of
morphological typological unifority. Many grammatical traditions
have assumed that they do and quite apart from configurationality, it
makes sense to group languages on the basis of morphological types
for the purposes of exploring this independently interesting question.
Beyond that, however, this theory makes particular claims, it makes it
very easy to relate shared properties of the unrelated languages Navajo
(Athapaskan), Hixkaryana (Carib), Yagua (Peba-Yaguan) since these
languages are all [+Agreement, -Case]. It makes it very difficult to
relate shared properties of Yagua and Russian since Yagua is
[+Agreement, -Casej and Russian is [-Agreement, +Case]. It is
predicted from the case/agreement formulation that shared
properties of Yagua and Russian will either be accidental and
uninteresting or will tend to be good candidates for universal
properties of language. Further, if the class of [+Agreement, -Case]
languages have no general properties, or if, for example, half of the
[+Agreement, -Case] languages share properties with some subset of
the [-Agreement, +Case] languages, the case/agreement distinction is
spurious. The predictions of case/agreement are fairly clear (even
when informally presented): the presence of particular syntactic
properties of languages (we shall soon answer the question 'which
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properties') will be covariant with morphological richness of
agreement and case. The morphological case and agreement facts of
particular languages will make strong predictions about the language's
syntactic properties. In principle then, this is the skeleton of a very
powerful theory of configurational variance. An interesting question is
now salient. Even assuming that the four way classification in (3) is
correct [dividing these four languages into four classes), are the bases
used for the distinction the correct ones (e.g.. morphological case and
agreement)? The point being: might we be getting the right classes
for the wrong reasons? We will briefly explore this question now for
the following reason. By considering other possible bases such as the
presence of discontinuous constituents or extensive null anaphora, we
will be testing which bases are most promising for inducing a
productive distinction. If these putative alternative bases can
themselves be derived from the case/agreement distinction, we will
have independent motivation for case/agreement. To demonstrate the
reasoning, consider the effects of trying to derive the four way
distinction above from the property of having or lacking discontinuous
constituents. We gave an example in (1) of a discontinuous constituent
in Warlpiri, reprinted below in (3c):
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(4) a. kurdu-jarra-rlu ka-pala maliki wajilipi-nyi wit-larra-rlu
chlld-DL-ERG PRES-DL dog-ABS chase-NPST small-DL-ERG
'The two small children are chasing the dog.' (Warlpiri)
b. [NP The rock] crushed John.
c. *Th. crushed John wsk.
d. Taroo-wa [NP sono okane-oj dare-ni yatta ka?
Taroo the money-ACC who-DAT gave Q
Whom did Taroo give the money to?' (Japanese)
e. *Taroo-wa okane-o dare-ni sono(-o) yatta ka?
Taroo money-ACC who-DAT the-ACC gave Q
(Whom did Taroo give the money to?')
f. Mary bi-mA ashkll yiyiltts&
Mary 3-mother boy 3S-30 saw
'Mary's mother saw the boy' (Navajo)
g. kaxg ashkii bi-mA yiyiittsa
('Mary's mother saw the boy')
On the basis of discontinuous constituents (more properly the
distinctton [±discontinuous constituents] we get [+dis.con] Warlpiri
opposed to [-dis.con] English, Na'rajo and Japanese. Hence a
classification of non-configurationality might be Warlpiri on one hand
and English, Japanese and Navajo on the other. The basis for the
classification is that only Warlpiri permits discontinuous constituents
(at least of a particular type which we could presumably formalize).
This opposition (with Warlplri opposed to English, Japanese and
Navajo) is itself derivable from the case/agreement opposition in (46).
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We have a vocabulary to describe the class of languages [+Case,
+Agreement] which permit discontinuous constituents. Further, by
using case/agreement to define the class of languages which permit
discontinuous constituents, we are making a very strong empirical
claim about the morphological type of languages which have
discontinuous constituents, i.e. they are predicted to be [+AGR, +Case].
By its nature the case/agreement analysis is a much more
interesting theory than the non-configurational analyses we have
discussed thus far. In attempting to describe discontinuous
constituents in Warlpiri as being a function of the [+Case, +Agreement]
nature of Warlpiri, we have richly empowered the case/agreement
opposition. This is a very strong theory, far too strong to be
adequately tested with the four language in our small sample set.
There are two types of predictions. First, the weaker claim: all
languages which have rich morphological case and which have
agreement for the subject and direct object (the present intuitive
characterization of +Case, +Agreement) would have at least the option
of discontinuous constituents of the Warlpiri type. Secondly, the
stronger claim: languages which are not [+Case, +Agreement] (i.e.
[+Case, -Agreement], [-Agreement, +Case], [-Agreement, -Case]) cannot
have discontinuous constituents of the Warlpiri type.
One could always weaken the case/agreement distinction's
predictions by finding an alternative explanation of discontinuous
constituents which does not make reference to [+Case, +Agreement],
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but a very strong theory is possible using the case/agreement
opposition.
Why is this view stronger than the alternative? An analysis
which claimed that non-configurational languages have discontinuous
constituents and configurational languages do not makes no
predictions about discontinuous constituents. It is the defining
characteristic, the 'diagnostic' as it were. Any analysis based on
discontinuous constituents as a diagnostic would be circular with
respect to discontinuous constituents. Further, it is awkward to try to
derive the four-way case/agreement distinction from discontinuous
constituents. It can be claimed that languages with discontinuous
constituents have both rich morphological case and agreement for the
subject and direct object (thus defining the subclass [+Case,
+Agreement] in terms of discontinuous constituents) but the strongest
possible claim about languages lacking discontinuous constituents is
that they do not have both morphological case and agreement for the
direct object. Thus, a bivalent configurationality parameter based on
discontinuous constituents can derive the fact that discontiLuous
constituents appear in [+Case, +Agreenentl languages (if it is a fact)
but it cannot provide any interesting characterization of languages
without discontinuous constituents,. Such a theory does not provide a
link between configurational and non-configurational languages and
thus does not resolve the central issue: why configurational languages
are not non-configurational languages? The case/agreement
opposition can explicate this question in a superior manner.
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Note now that there are two distinct senses in which [+Case,
+Agreement] might be said to explain discontinuous constituents.
The weak sense, the typological sense, is that the
case/agreement opposition provides a vocabulary which can adequately
describe the class of languages having discontinuous constituents
[+Case, +Agreement] as well as the class of languages which do not
(the other three types). Even these two partitionings are separable
since the theory could characterize a domain of languages which never
have discontinuous constituents (say, non [+Case, +Agreement]
languages) but make no claim about the class of languages which do
have discontinuous constituents. The reverse is possible as well.
The strong sense in which case/agreement can explain
discontinuous constituents is by showing that discontinuous
constituents are themselves a result of language's having the
combination of rich case and rich agreement. Certainly one could
imagine such an analysis (a proposal of this kind is suggested in
Alexander, 1986 and is developed further here) but this is not the test
of whether the case/agreement distinction is correct, as may
erroneously be supposed.
Consider the logic of the classical non-configurationality
parameter. It is assumed that there is an opposition between
languages sharing a certain set of properties (such as lack of
pleonastics, discontinuous constituents, lack of NP movement, etc.)
and a set of languages which lack all of these properties (but which
may have some subset of them). Thus, non-configurationality is opaque
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with respect to the properties of configurational languages since the
non-configurationality parameter does not make predictions about
particular properties of configurational languages (say, lack of
pleonastics which, from the point of view of non-configurationality,
may or may not appear in configurational languages-a correct
prediction, by the way). In fact non-configurationality takes the
weakest possible stance with respect to configurationality. It claims
that configurational languages will lack as a complete set the
properties of non-configurational languages. Unfortunately, this is not
a prediction which could be proved false, even in principle, because if
a hypothetical language did have the complete set of properties of
non-configurational languages (lack of pleonastics, lack of NP
movement, etc.) then from the point of non-configurationality this
hypothetical configurational language would be non-configurational on
the basis of its having the diagnostics or superficial characteristics of
non-configurational properties. Thus, non-configurationality claims
two classes of languages, call them type A and type B. Non-
configurationality "predicts" that languages of type A have properties
P1 , P2, P3-*Pn and that languages of type B may have particular
properties such as Pj, P2, Pn-1, etc., but may not have all the
properties P1 to Pn. To falsify such a theory requires the existence of
a language of type B which does has properties PI to Pn, but if there
were such a type B language, the theory would be forced to say that
this type B language is a type A language , thus denying the premiss;
one could formalize the contradiction.
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Non-configurationality is a theory which cannot be proved false
and consequently an uninteresting theory. Non-configurationality is so
weak because it has no means of classification except the data that
characterizes the phenomena it describes. The improvement of non-
configurationality in Alexander (1986) was to repair this weakness by
providing an independent basis for the configurationality distinction
which relied on rich case and rich agreement, two properties having a
clear intuitive and empirical status. 2 This move expands classical non-
configurationality (which, as just shown makes no predictions
whatsoever) and makes very clear and strong predictions. If we
encounter a language without case (like Navajo) the case/agreement
distinction unambiguously predicts that that language will lack
discontinuous constituents of the Warlpiri type.3 If we find a language
without rich agreement (such as Japanese) the case/agreement
analysis predicts that it will also lack discontinuous constituents. This
is by many orders a stronger theory than classical non-
configurationality. Naturally, a theory of such power is easily falsified
and as such represents an improvement over classical non-
configurationality. This is the chief basis for distinguishing the
2 Logically this improvement did not crucially rely on case or agreement, any
independent basis wc-dd have saved the empirical status of configurationality, One
could have (in the spirit of Jelinek, 1984) used subject and object agreement as the
defining property of aon-configurational languages and attempted to derive the other
properties of non-configurational languages from it. This would have raised
descriptive problems (since the opposition is still binary) but it would have solved the
logical problem of circularity in defining the class of configurational and non-
configurational languages.
3 Ignoring for now examples like hammer a nail ia from English,
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case/agreement approach from classical non-configurationality and
this is one of the senses in which case/agreement is superior to non -
configurationality.4 It is only at this point that we might ask whether
the fact that [+Case, +Agreement] languages have discontinuous
constituents follows in some way from case/agreement. If so, then we
have found the strongest possible support for case/agreement, though
this is far beyond what is needed to show that case/agreement is a
more appealing theory to pursue than non-configurationality. Hence
we claim that it is erroneous to assume that case/agreement rises or
falls on the basis of its particular analysis of discontinuous constituents
(as opposed to its ability to predict/express the class of languages
which have discontinuous constituents). If case/agreement provided
the correct classes of languages with respect to the properties of non-
configurationality on the basis of some outlandish distinction such as
'language name begins with a glide and ends with a voiced stop' it still
makes correct predictions about which languages are non-
configurational. The analysis of why the non-configurational languages
4 Another we have mentioned is that the case/agreement distinction is not binary, an
independent problem for non-configurationality. A problem with defining the
properties of non-configurational languages is suggested by this. If non-
configurational languages are discoverable as such by having all the properties of non-
configurational languages (and, as is independently necessary, that some languages
may have subsets of the properties, such as Italian having null anaphora). Languages
like Navajo which have some of the properties of non-configurational languages (lack
of NP movement, lack of pleonastics, etc.) but not others (discontinuous constituents,
free word order) are problematic. It is generally assumed that Navajo is non-
configurational but the basis for this is not made explicit. The criterta of non-
configurationality are not clear and consequently there are proposals, such as Saxon
(1986), which oppose languages such as Dogrib and Navajo on the basis of
configurationality even though Navajo and Dogrib essentially do not differ on the basis
of the generally understood data of non-configurationality, that is,some version of the
superaicial characteristics of configurationality discussed in Hale (1982).
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have the properties of non-configurational languages is independent
from the question of the proper classification of the languages
themselves. Naturally we would expect that the correct typological
theory is at least related to the correct syntactic theory but we should
not conflate the evaluation of these two types of theories.
Case/Agreement makes claims about both types but as a typological
theory, independently, case/agreement is the best theory of non-
configurational variance in the literature to pursue because it avoids
the circularity in defining the configurational and non-configurational
classes inherent in lacking an independent basis for the distinction.
Using discontinuous constituents as a sample case for
exposition. we have argued that in principle case/agreement is a more
promising theory to pursue than non-configurationality.
Returning now to the main stream of the argument. We are
considering whether other bases might exist which could derive the
classification of the case/agreement distinction or whether another
basis might provide a more Interesting classification. Another
'superficial characteristics of non-configurationality' might be a
candidate for inducing a classification of languages with respect to
configurationality: extensive null anaphora. Consider the sentences in
(5):
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(5) a. At'tkd ashkll yiylittsA
girl boy 3S-30-saw
The girl saw the boy' (Navajo)
b. ngajulu-rlu ka- ma- ngku nyuntu-0 nya-nyi
I- ERG PRES-sgNOM-2sgACC you-ABS see-NPST
'I see you' (Warlpiri)
c. John likes that picture.
d. John-ga sushi-o tabeta
John-NOM sushsi-ACC ate
'John ate sushi' (Japanese)
(5') a. yiyiitts&
3S-30-saw
'He saw her' or (3rd saw 3rd)
b. ka- rna- ngku nya-nyi
PRES-IsgNOM-2sgACC see-NPST
'I see you' (Warlpiri)
c. *flkes.
('3rd likes 3rd')
d. *tabeta
ate ('3rd ate 3rd') (Japanese)
In (5') we see that it is possible to drop both the direct object
and the subject of the sentences in (5) in Navaho and Warlpirl but not
in Japanese and English5 . This would induce the class Navaho and
Warlpiri on one hand with English and Japanese on the other. A non-
configurationality view might define non-configurationality over null
5 This claim about Japanese might be too strong. In any event, our distinction, like the
standard analysis of rich agreement licensing null anaphora, will predict that
Japanese cannot have null anaphora. We simply inherit the problem (see Huang, 1982
and others) that Japanese is much freer with null anaphora than typological facts
would suggest.
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anaphora for subject and direct object. A more appealing formulation
is possibic however, in terms of the case/agreement distinction.
Navajo and Warlpiri are members of a well defined class of languages
with respect to case/agreement since they are the [+Agreement] set
while English and Japanese are the [-Agreement] set. Thus,
case/agreement equates free null anaphora with rich agreement,
precisely the characterization generally given. It is not surprising
from the point of view of case/agreement that languages with slightly
rich agreement (such as Italian) will show null anaphora in syntactic
positions which also trigger agreement:
(6) a. [unragazzojgarriv- a1
a boy arrive-3S
'A boy arrives'
b. e1 arriv-a1 [un ragazzoj1
arrive-3S a boy
'There arrives a boy'
c. et parl- aj
speak-3S
'He is speaking'
Italian is not in the [+Agreement] class of languages that we have
induced (reasons will be given shortly for this) but we see that rich
agreement in Italian for subjects does exactly what case/agreement
suggests rich agreement does for subjects and objects in Navajo and
Warlpiri. Thus, a hypothetical four-way distinction on the basis of
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[±extensive null anaphoral is derivable from case/agreement; the
reverse is not true.
Another candidate for defining configurationality, a "diagnostic of
non-configurationality", is free or scrambling type word order.
Consider the sentences in (6) again. (In 5", e-nodes simply indicate
location of the "moved element" in the sentences in 5, no claim about
their fornal status is implied.)
(5) a. At'66d ashkii yIyIttsa
girl boy 3S-30-saw
The girl saw the boy' (Navajo)
b. ka- ma- ngku nyuntu-0 nya-nyi
PRES-1sgNOM-2sgACC you-ABS see-NPST
'I see you' (Warlpiri)
c. John likes that picture.
d. John-ga sushi-o tabeta
John-NOM sushsi-ACC ate
'John ate sushi' (Japanese)
(5" a. ??ashkii i at'66"d ei yiyiit tsi
(The girl saw the boy')
b. nya-nyt1 ka- ma- ngku nyuntu-O ei
see-NPST PRES-1sgNOM-2sgACC you-ABS
'I see you' (Warlpiri)
c. * ej likes Johnj that picture.
d. sushl-oj John-ga ej tabeta
'John ate sushi'
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In (5") we see a characterization of free and fixed word order in
our sample set. Warlpiri and Japanese seem to permit very free word
order whereas Navajo and English have more fixed word order. Again,
one could imagine a configurationality parameter [±free word order]
distinguishing Warlpiri and Japanese from English and Navajo, but it is
possible in case/agreement to describe this difference as [+Case,
±Agreement] Warlpiri and Japanese as opposed to [-Case, ±Agreement]
Navajo and English. Although free word order is very much a matter of
interpretation and not a well-defined concept, insofar as there is an
intuitive notion, it is often correlated with the presence or absence of
rich morphological case (eg. Sapir, 1921, etc). The case/agreement
analysis expresses this correlation without further stipulation, it
simply falls out of the distinction in the properly trivial way.
Having just shown how case/agreement gets the distinctions
induced by two possible configurationality parameters [±fixed word
order] and [±extensive null anaphoral, we can step back and consider
the predictions made by case/agreement for these properties. Taking
fixed word order first, the prediction (insofar as this concept can be
tested) is that [+Case] languages will not have relatively fixed word
order (but see Icelandic, for example, which we will discuss) and that
languages with free(r) word order will be [+Casej. By contrast, fixed
word order will be characteristic of [-Casel languages, such as Chinese.
The same reasoning extends to [± extensive null anaphoral and its
relation to agreement. We have seen a potential counterexample In
languages like Italian where rich subject agreement seems to provide
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the option of extensive null anaphora (at least for subjects) but this is
not a troubling example since Italian shows that agreement is a good
candidate for explicating null anaphora. There could be a problem is
defining [iAgreement] in such a way that Italian is predicted to have
the correct set of properties with respect to the full range of data of
"configurational variance" (such as lack of NP movement, lack of
pleonastics, etc.) but in principle these problems are manageable.
Another possible problem comes from languages like Japanese which
do show a good deal of null anaphora without having typical agreement
(are, at least -Agreement). One might consider arguing that with
respect to agreement, Japanese is much like Italian except that
Japanese uses agreement of honorifics to license null anaphora (see
Kuno, 1975, for example)-we are not optimistic about this, however.
We do not intend to be dismissive of these types of problematic
cases, in fact it is a strength of the case/agreement view that with only
minimal formalization a number of apparent problems immediately
arise. This is characteristic of a strong theory. It is unrealistic to
expect any (strong) theory of a complex range of facts (as complicated
as null anaphora, free word order, etc.) to spring into being fully
articulated without a number of potential counterexamples. Such a
theory would presumably seem obvious. 6 The question then is which
type of theory is more likely to be profitably pursued, a
case/agreement type analysis with a very large number of predictions,
6 One surprising criticism of the case/agreement analysis in Alexander (1986) received
was that if it were correct, it would have been formulated already. Actually this
suggests the Intuitive plausibility and simplicity of the analysis.
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some of which, superficially at least, appear to be false, or a classical
non-configurational view which is, in principle, unfalsifiable and,
therefore, without superficial counterexamples. Of course, is is best to
pursue the more interesting theory which in this instance is the
case/agreement view.
A final meta-theoretical question concerns at which point there
must be a formalization of case/agreement. Naturally in order to "buy
into" case/agreement one would like to see a formalization which
induces an appropriate distinction, with the troubling cases like
Italian placed into categories with clear predictions. It is possible to
be overzealous on this point. The underlying logic of case/agreement
is that a non-bivalent parameter is needed for configurationality. We
take this to be demonstrated to some degree. Preliminary exploration
of four test cases, the four tokens generally manipulated by theories of
configurationality, suggest that Case and Agreement might be the
relevant differences which induce a correct distinction. It is not
obvious that the four way distinction of even the test cases is correct
or that Case and/or Agreement is/are appropriate to induce this
distinction. This is an empirical question and the particular
formulation of a non-bivalent parameter which we are exploring uses
Case and Agreement. One may argue that these notions need to be
made more formal so that clearer predictions can be made for the
troubling cases. Another approach, the approach which we feel
superior though not the approach we are actually adopting, is to
extend case/agreement to less troubling cases and to consider the
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analysis in terms of the 200 or 2000 languages which do not present
superficial counterexamples. In this way, one could be more exact in
describing the model cases from which the exceptions might then be
made to follow. In this way, when we come to the superficial
counterexamples, it is with a fuller understanding of what they are
counterexamples to and of the ways in which they differ from the
model cases. It seems to us that this is a superior method but it
requires a suspension of disbelief while the theory is being extended
to these additional cases. It is the queston of this suspension of
disbelief that the arguments for the logical superiority of
case/agreement over classical non-configurationality speak to. For the
most part in this work, we will extend case/agreement, leaving open
some questions of the formalization and seeking evidence for the
appropriate formalization of the claims we will make within the basic
theory, but we will also make suggestions (perhaps quite premature)
on the proper treatment of whatever troublesome cases may arise.
We have made some comments to motivate the case/agreement
approach over the classical views of non-configurationality, or, against
a bivalent configurationality parameter. We have shown that sub-
parameters of configurationality such as [textensive null anaphoral and
[ifree word order] can be derived from case/agreement. Because most
possible classifications of non-configurationality are contained within
case/agreement (i.e. several partitions of the relevant four language
types into subgroups are expressible by case/agreement, excluding
marked pairs such as English-Warlpiri and Japanese-Navajo which
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would need to be described with a disjunction), particular syntactic
analyses of non-configurational languages are replicateable within
case/agreement.
For example, consider Jelinek's analysis of adargument
languages. Recall that Jelinek assumed that languages with rich
agreement assigned thematic roles to nominal agreement clitics
rather than to NPs. Instead of using non-configurational or
adargument language as the term for this group we can classify it as
the [+Agreement, iCasel set. Thus, the term adargument languages,
or Jelinek's non-configurational class, is coextensive with the
case/agreement class we might term Agreement languages. Argument
languages would be thus [-Agreement] or non-Agreement languages.
We will occasionally use the terms argument and adargument
languages, following Jelinek, but we consider the adargument language
class to be the [+Agreement languages) for which we may occasionally
use a different term.
Another analysis which naturally fits into case/agreement is the
Case Phrase (KP) analysis of Saito (1982), Travis and LaMontaigne
(1986), etc. In this analysis, the case marker is the lexical head of a
category KP. The head K is a case assigner for an NP which it selects.
Traditional data which this analysis accounts for is a paradigm based
on the Japanese sentences we have been considering:
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(6) a. John-ga sushi-o tabeta.
b. John-ga sushi tabeta.
c. Sushi-o John-ga tabeta.
d. *Sushi John-ga tabeta.
The standard analysis of these facts, due to Saito (1982), is that
in (6a) the case markers -ga and -o assign case to the NPs John and
sushi. In (6b), the case marker -o does not assign case to the object
sushi but sushi is governed by the verb which is able to assign
accusative case. In (6c) the object sushi is fronted by may still receive
case from -o; it cannot receive case from the verb which no longer
governs it. In (6d) sushi may not receive case from -o, which does not
appear, nor can it receive case from the verb which does not govern it.
It is predicted that (6d) should be ungrammatical and certainly some
dialects of Japanese share the judgements above, although not all
Japanese dialects have the above intuitions (David Pesetsky, Mamoru
Saito:PC). Apparently the above effect is stronger in the American
Indian language Choctaw (Muskogean) (Aaron Broadwell: PC):
(7) a. John-at Bill-a habli-tok
John-NOM Bill-OBL kick-past
'John kicked Bill'
b. John-at Bill habli-tok.
c. Bill-a John-at habli-tok.
d. *Bill John-at habli-tok.
The KP analysis predicts a freer word order in languages which
have K as a lexical head since the NPs need not be adjacent to a verb
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or to I. This represents an indirect diminution of the classical GB
view that there is no interesting difference between languages with
overt case and those with non-overt case. The KP analysis manages to
introduce such a difference. This is similar to the claim that rich AGR
licenses null anaphora. In classical GB, it was claimed that there were
no intere.ting differences between overt agreement (with AGR) and
non-overt or extremely weak agreement (also with AGR). The
standard analysis of null anaphora is a departure from that view, again
somewhat indirectly. This is conceptually important for the
case/agreement analysis since a proponent of classical GB might argue
that the overtness of case and agreement in a language is a superficial
property which should not be the basis of the configurationality
distinction. 7 The KP analysis and the rich agreement analysis of pro-
drop both claim that the overtness of case and agreement are not
superficial properties and the case/agreement analysis only requires
assumptions about the importance of overtness which are
independently motivated by the KP analysis and the rich AGR --> null
anaphora analysis. Moreover, these theories raise the possibility,
explicitly claimed by case/Agreement, that a syntactic analysis may
refer crucially to overt morphological properties such as overt
agreement and case.
7 W have heard this criticism and we do not accept It, partially, for the reason given
here. Another reason to reject the claim that Case/Agreement refers to 'superficial
properties" Is suggested by Ken Wexler (PC) who points out that these "superficial
properties" are very accessible for the child learning the language, who can deduce
complicated properties (such as that referring to pleonastics, NP-movement, etc.) from
very basic properties such as agreement or case.
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3.2 Licensing Theory and Multiple Licensers
Adopting the KP analysis into case/Agreement also provides an
interesting analysis of a curious type of [+Case] language represented
by Icelandic: SVO case languages which do not have the free word
order of their SOV counterparts. 8 As noted, for example, by
Greenberg (1966) SOV languages almost always have case while SVO
languages rarely do. As Richard Kayne (PC) has pointed out, word
order appears to be freer in SOV case languages than in SVO case
languages and this may be derivable from the KP analysis. In both SOV
and SVO languages, case is (almost) always suffixal, hence appears to
the right of the NP it marks.9 Consequently, in SOV languages, a
suffixal K is in (canonical) head position and K would assign case to the
left, the supposed direction of case assignment in SOV languages. In
SVO, however, a suffixal K would not be In canonical head position and
if K assigned case to the left, case assignment would not be n the
direction of (canonical) government, rightward in SVO.
Taking a step toward formalization of case/agreement, assume
that every NP must be identified or licensed and that there are three
ways to license the category NP: call them case, agreement or, as a
default, government: 10
8 The following discussion of Icelandic is almost wholly due to the suggestion of
Richard Kayne, though he does not necessarily accept the analysis. I also benefitted
from discussions with Brian Sietsema.
9 It is not obvious why this might be and the predictions for languages with prefixal case
markers (if this is possible) will be clear from the discussion to foilow.
10 We will want to explore whether these terms have their usual Principles and
Parameters referents under this formulation of Case/Agreement. The null hypothesis
is that they do not.
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(8) (a.) Case Assignment
IP
KP r
NP K VP
I- I
(b) Agreement (following
VP
NP VP
SUBJ NP VP
KP V
NP K
u-i
Jelinek: 1984)
OBJ obj V
subj V
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(c) Government by (Adjacency to) an XO
IP
Spec, IP '
VP
NP V'
I I
OBJ V
These methods of licensing could be viewed as just sub-species
of government since all seem to require licensing by an local XO head
(perhaps the agreement case might not work in this fashion but we
may set this detail aside for now). We can associate the first licensing
method with [+Case], the second with [+Agreement] and the third
with [-Case, -Agreement]. All languages might have the option of using
government (adjacency) as a default (in this work we will see evidence
that this is accurate). The case/agreement distinction is thus a theory
of NP licensing relations A la Abney (1984) and Chomsky (1985). Seen
in this way, we may return to the Icelandic type cases. The basic
structure of Icelandic would be as foliows:
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(9)
IP
KP i'
NP K VP
V KP
NP K
If we assume that K is unable to properly license NP because K is
not in a (canonical) government position, it must be the case that
some other relation, government (adjacency), must license NP, just as
in English. Thus, though it has case and, as such, qualifies as a [+Case]
language with respect to the case/agreement analysis, independent
properties of the language (headedness) prevent Icelandic from
showing the freer word order of its SOV counterparts. This is because
K is not a licenser in Icelandic as it is in Japanese-being on the wrong
side. One may wonder why K exists in Icelandic at all since it appears
not to have a significant function in the present analysis. The question
can be turned on its head. The KP analysis, combined with the
licensing theory of case/agreement, assigns a very low order of
probability to languages of the Icelandic type (SVO case languages) and
correctly predicts that such languages would be very rare, as they are.
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Another distinguishing factor of SVO and SOV case languages
pointed out by Kayne (P.C.) is that SVO case languages generally have
case only on the right boundary of the NP while SOV languages
generally have a case spreading effect with case on individual words
within the NP (recall a conceptually similar effect in Warlpiri). Might
the KP analysis with the case/agreement licensing theory explicate
this difference? One might say that this is a result of K being dormant
as a licenser in SVO case languages. The idea being that K in SOV is
successful and can license NPs in toto (i.e. all of their component
parts). In SVO, K is still a lexical head selecting an NP. Licensing
(through government) of that NP is still accomplished by V. We thus
have an internal structure as follows:
(10)
VP
V KP
NP K
Art N'
Adj N'
N
bought the red book
The NP inside KP is governed by the verb and government
percolates down to the head. Formally K is still a lexical head and can
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invoke the minimality condition on government (see Chomsky,
1985a). If this view is correct, Icelandic must avoid a minimality
condition with every NP and the method used is for the K is "contract"
from its position as the governor of NP and move inside NP, essentially
getting out of the way of the verb's government of NP. Though highly
informal, the above proposal suggests that the case/agreement's
correlation of [+Case] with free word order does not necessarily face a
genuine counterexample in languages of the Icelandic type. Further,
the KP analysis combined with the case/agreement licensing theory
correctly predicts Greenberg's claim that rich case is consistent with
SOV but generally inconsistent with SVO.
Note that this analysis of Icelandic suggests that case/Agreement
is not a parameter. If C/A were a parameter, we should expect the
case marker (KO) to 'turn out' the free word order property, which
does not seem to occur. Rather, it seems that a KO in Icelandic is just
a feature which a language suggests which has only an indirect relation
to the property of free word order: in the Icelandic case, the KO
simply has no relation to that property due to other aspects of the
grammar.
This analysis of word order and case spreading in Icelandic also
suggests a similar analysis of discontinuous constituents in [+Case,
+Agreement] languages such as Warlpiri.11 The basic facts (Bresnan
and Simpson: 1983; Hale, 1981) are that elements of an NP (like the
11 I am grateful to Bill Croft for pointing out to me the Importance of these facts though
my analysis differs from his.
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head noun and the adjective below in 54) may be split but if they are
split, case must appear on both parts. (Hale, 1981; 1, 17):
(11) kurdu- larra- rlu ka- pala maliki wajilipi- nyi
child- DUAL- ERG PRES- DUAL dog chase- NONPAST
wita- Jar- tin
small- DUAL- ERG
'The two small children are chasing the dog.'
(11') maliki ka- pala wajilipi- nyi kudu flta Iara- ri
dog PRES- DUAL chase- NONPAST child small- DUAL- ERG
'The two small children are chasing the dog.'
If they appear together the case suffix may be dropped. This is
consistent with the analysis of Icelandic given above. Since Warlpiri is
[+Agreementj, argument NPs can be licensed by agreement clitics and
hence do not in principle need case to license them. If case is going
to license the NP, it must avoid the minimality violation of Icelandic
(here presumably invoked by the licensing agreement clitic NO) and so
contracts into NP, attaching to every element in the NP. Each
individual piece of the NP is now licensed, just as in Icelandic. In
Icelandic, however, the NP (KP) cannot be freely permuted since it
must be governed by the verb. In Warlpiri, however, the head NP can
be licensed at a relatively long distance by agreement and the
individual parts are free to "scramble" since they are licensed by case.
We may see a similar phenomena in Hixkaryana, though it is
[+-Agreement, -Case]. In Hixkaryana, as we shall argue in Chapter 4, it
Is (approximately) the case that direct objects not licensed by
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agreement must immediately precede the verb, suggesting that the
direct object is governed by the verb when there is no direct object
agreement. Thus there are two candidates for licensing: agreement or
government by the verb. It is possible to have a discontinuous direct
object, as in (12c) (Derbyshire: 1985, p.77):
(12) a. hakrya koso heno komo w- oxtxowni ha
peccary deer GROUP COLL I+IIIS-shot INTSFR
They shot peccary and some deer.'
b. w- oxtxowni ha, hakrya koso heno komo
I+IIIS- shot INTSFR peccary deer GROUP COLL
They shot peccary and some deer.'
c. hakrya w- oxtxowni ha, koso heno komo
peccary I+IIIS- shot INTSFR deer GROUP COLL
They shot peccary and some deer.'
In (12a) the entire (paratactic) direct object precedes the verb
(parataxis is the chief method of conjunction) and the direct object is
licensed by the verb. In (12b) the entire sequence is postposed and
may or may not be dislocated from the main intonational contour. If
the subject were third person, the direct object would have to be
dislocated, for reasons discussed in §5.1. In (12c) the head of the
direct object remains in position while the rest of the sequence is
postposed and dislocated. Presumably the postposed parts of the
direct object can be licensed by the head of the direct object which is
is itself licensed by percolation of government from the verb. This
appears to be the only discontinuous constituent in Hixkaryana and its
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appearance is severely limited. For example, a modifier like a genitive
object cannot be so postposed:
(13) a. Waraka kanawa-ri w-oxtxowni ha
Waraka canoe-POSSD 1+111-shot INTSFR
They shot Waraka's canoe.'
b. *kanawar w-oxtxowni ha, Waraka
canoe-POSSD I+III-shot INSFR Waraka
(They shot Waraka's canoe')
Thus discontinuous constituents and fixed word order in
Icelandic find a parallel construction in Hixkaryana. Each type shows
multiple licensing of elements inside an NP. In Icelandic and
Warlpiri, case licenses NPs but these languages may permit (or
require) another method of licensing as well. In Warlpiri agreement
can license nominals also. Warlpiri agreement licenses the nominals
which are already licensed by case. As with agreement languages
generally, the element licensed by agreement need not be adjacent to
the agreement morpieme and hence, combined with the licensing by
case, two methods of licensing combine to produce a scrambling type
word order in Warlpiri. A similar effect occurs in Icelandic except
that since the second licensing relation in Icelandic is government
(adjacency), the licensed nominal must be adjacent to the verb which
licenses it. Thus fixed word order. A similar case is then found in
Hixkaryana where government requires that tue nominal remain
adjacent to the verb but loosely bound arguments of the head nominal
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may be postposed to be licensed by agreement. Hence, Hixkaryana
shows a reflex of discontinuous constituents.
We thus have discussd three very different types of syntactic
phenomena in three very different types of languages, Warlpiri,
Icelandic and Hlxkaryana. The analyses are quite informal but they
provide support for the claim that discontinuous constituents will
generally be a phenomena of [+Case, +Agreement] languages. Since we
are really discussing licensing of nominals with licensing relations
drawn from a universal inventory, just like null anaphora in Italian,
languages will be able to show reduced versions of Warlpiri case-
spread discontinuous constituents. This is accomplished by using the
same strategy that Warlpiri uses: multiple licensing relations. If
languages were permitted to select the own licensing relations (highly
suspect, of course) then English, for example, could extensively use
case and Agreement and develop into a Warlpiri type language. What is
important to take from Hlxkaryana's 'weak discontinuous constituents'
and Italian or Japanese 'nearly extensive null anaphora' is that
case/agreement is designed to place them in the proper category for
configurational variance. It is not an interesting counterexample to
argue "case/ agreement predicts that [+Agreement] entails null
anaphora. Italian shows strong null anaphora. Italian is classed [-
Agreement] in the case/agreement analysis. Therefore the
case/agreement analysis misclassifies Italian." The reason this is a
weak argument is that it is possible to show that Italian and
Hlxkaryana and Navajo all permit null anaphora for, essentially, the
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same reason. Because Italian overlaps with Hixkaryana with one
property does not entail that it must be classified like Hixkaryana.
Classifying Italian with Hixkaryana would be problematic because
Hixkaryana has no NP-movement rules as Italian does, to take one
difference. There appears, at present, a factual requirement for
separating these two languages. The overlaps between Italian and the
[+Agreement languages] does raise the question of how the difference
between rich Agreement in the Italian sense and rich Agreement in
the Navajo/Warlpiri sense can explain the existence of NP movement
in Italian but not in Warlpiri/NavaJo. This is certainly an interesting
question but it is one which in diminished form has already been
answered in Hale (1983) and Jelinek (1984), and which we will
consider in the next section. The import of the "overlapping cases" at
this point is to constrain the options presented to the case/agreement
analysis. As long as the "overlaps" can be explained naturally by the
theory, the counterexamples do not have critical force. Further it is
natural to expect that such overlapping cases will exist since
case/agreement assumes three licensing relations: case, Agreement,
and government. Languages may differ to what extent they use these
primitive universals-it may be that some languages use all three for
some purposes Arguably English is one of these languages and
perhaps Warlpiri's V-final infinitivals provides evidence that it too uses
government (adjacency) while superficial consideration shows that it
uses case and agreement. case/agreement is meant to be a theory of
how these primitive licensing relations influence the types of syntactic
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structures available in a given language. Naturally it is more helpful to
concentrate on the non-overlapping cases initially but this does not
preclude preliminary speculation that cases such as discontinuous
constituents in Icelandic, Warlpiri and Hixkaryana might derive from a
confluence of licenuing methods.
3.3 Agreement Languages: A Sub-Class
In the section above, we outlined an alternative conception of
configurationality. This analysis has consequences for all languages
and it is clearly beyond the scope of a single work to explore all (or
many) of these consequences. This is not unique to case/Agreement;
Hale (1983), Jelinek (1984), Speas (1986), Saxon (1985) and others
have proposed configurationality distinctions with far reaching
consequences that were only explored for a limited number of
languages: generally one or two. A particular way to make progress is
to forestall broad cross-linguistic work in favor of highly detailed
consideration of a small class of languages until such a time that the
theory's predictions and exact statement has been wucked out in some
detail. With the case/agreement proposal, as discussed above, there
are different levels at which predictions are made. For example,
case/agreement proposes a class of languages [-Case, +Agreement]
having agreement for subject and direct object and little or no overt
case marking. This class of languages, call them the Agreement
languages, are predicted to have several properties as formulated
above: lack of pleonastics, lack of NP movement rules, relatively fixed
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word order, etc. Whether these predictions are supported by broad
consideration of the data, there is a more global prediction made by
case/agreement: languages of the [+Agreement, -Case] class should
behave as a natural class, having properties distinct from other classes
(e.g. [+Agreement, +Casej). It is this more global prediction which we
will consider in this section, arguing that a distinctive success of
case/agreement is in its ability to express claims about languages
which are [+Agreement, -Case]. That is to say, we will argue that there
are properties which are unique to the class [+Agreement, -Case] and,
hence, that any theory of language typology must encode the
case/agreement distinction to be able to describe these facts. This is
separate from the stronger claim that case/agreement is appropriate
to explain these particular properties, though we make that claim as
well.
We will chiefly focus our discussion on the class of languages
with a 'basic word order' in which the direct object precedes the
subject (VOS, OVS, and OSV).12 Most linguists are acquainted with
object before subject languages through Greenberg Universal 1 which
notes that they are exceedingly rare:
12 There are obvious problems with the term 'basic word order' and many researchers
have noted problems with the notion (for an interesting dlscussion of this, see Hale,
n.d.,) Some languages seem to have what has been termed 'pragmatic word order, which
seems separate from syntactic considerations. Waripiri might be an example of this.
We will only suggest here that Case/Agreement might explicate the question 'can all
languages have 'pragmatic word order'", It Is our intuition that a language like English
cannot have 'pragmatic word order because of the nature of its licensing relations,
whereas a language like Japanese, with 'non-local licensing', could, In principle have
'pragmatic word order', Case/Agreement might be used to argue that only certain
language types, licensing types, are consistent with this type of word order.
195
(14) Greenberg Univers1 (Greenberg, 1963; 77)
In declarative sentences with nominal subject and
object, the dominant order is almost always one in
which the subject precedes the object.
Though Greenberg does not actually exclude object before
subject languages, the fact that he assumes they are non-existence
leads him to frame his universals with unintended reference to them.
For example, consider Universal 41:
(15) Greenberg Universal 41 (Greenberg, 1963; 96)
If in a language the verb follows both the nominal
subject and the nominal object as the dominant
order, the language almost always has a case system.
This universal Is consistent with SOV languages and OSV
languages, but, as we will see, OSV languages lack case systems. Of
course, 'almost always' is weak enough to exclude the few OSV
languages, but Greenberg universals are, by default, excluding object
before subject languages. Hence, if such languages exist, universal
properties of them have yet to be discovered.
For the most part, object before subject languages have been
relegated to the pile of exceptions to generalizations that seem
basically correct, in this case the generalization that possible base
order are VSO, SOV, and SVO and not OSV, OVS, and VOS. This view
is taken by Edwin Williams (1981) who argues that it is a 'glaring
failure' of a theory of acquisition that it does not have as a consequence
that object before subject languages do not exist. Using
case/agreement analysis, we will argue that object before subject
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languages have interesting or universal properties and that it is
possible to explain their existence (and suggest their rarity) with
appeal only to independently motivated aspects of syntactic theory.
First, we will summarize the literature on object before subject
languages. Greenberg (1963) noted three possible examples: Siuslaw,
Coos and Coeur d'Alene (all of which are discussed in the Handbook of
American Indian Languages and, if their descriptions there are
accurate, are probably VOS with Coeur d'Alene (Reichard, 1934) being
described as strongly VOS. Kennan's work on VOS Malagasy has been
widely distributed; for example, it is discussed in Travis (1984).
Beginning with work by Desmond Derbyshire in 1961 there has been
some material on the maximally 20 object-initial languages in
Amazonia, with the major focus being on Hlxkaryana of which
Derbyshire has written two generally available grammars. Derbyshire
and Pullum have also published two volumes of the Handbook of
Amazonian Languages with the first volume (1986) discussing some
object-initial languages. Apart from this, work is scarce on the
properties of object before subject languages.
A striking observation about object-initial languages (OSV, OVS)
due to Pullum (1982) is that they appear to be restricted to Amazonia.
VOS languages, on the other hand, are much more widely distributed.
Derbyshire and Pullum list three possible VOS languages in Amazonia,
with others in Mexico, the United States and the Western Pacific, etc.
Overall, a reasonable estimate of the the number of object before
subject languages is about 60, with approximately 45 VOS, 9 OVS and
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6 OSV (here were are being slightly more conservative than
Derbyshire and Pullum); one hundred is a reasonable upward bound of
the number of object before subject languages.
Essentially there are two current views of object before subject
languages. Generalizing somewhat, linguists who describes these
languages have not presented detailed theoretical analyses which
might parallel work on null anaphora in Italian, for example.
Theoretical researchers, on the other hand, who explore questions
such as null anaphora, have not considered data from object before
subject languages, or for the most part, members of the class of "non-
configurational" languages. Naturally this is an outgrowth of the
tendency to study languages which are well described and,
unfortunately, not often very exotic.
The common view of object before subject languages, within
transformational generative grammar, is that they arise from a late (or
surface) relocation of the subject, or alternately, a partial or complete
relocation of the predicate. This view has not been articulated in the
literature; in an unpublished paper, Cline (c. 1987) argues for a
movement analysis of Hixkaryana, noting "since it is a theoretical
impossibility to have a D-Structure which is the mirror-image of
English, OVS order must be derived by movement rules" and arguing
for an SOV underlying order. Expression of this movement view is
rare, but it Is not misleading to call it the dominant view. Since
theoretical work on object before subject languages Is almost non-
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existent, a bias for a movement analysis, which has not been discussed
in the literature, still seems to be the dominant view.
Part of the support for an analysis which does not assume D-
Structure object before subject languages (and considers them surfacy
phenomena) is Pullum's observation about the geographical limits of
object before subject languages: he claims that they are confined to
Amazonia. This seems to mark object before subject languages,
particularly object-initial languages, as suspect. Typologically,
however, this is not a compelling argument. Australia seems to have
more than its share of canonically non-configurational languages,
Warlpiri type languages, but no one therefore doubts the phenomena of
canonical non-configurationality. Perhaps this suggests a parallel bias
that word order, unlike configurationality, is itself surfacy.
A surface relocation of subject analysis of object before subject
languages, while it might seem nebulous, actually makes two types of
very strong predictions which are not obviously supported by any data.
The first prediction is that object before subject languages are,
beneath their misleading surfaces, just like their well-behaved and
well-studied subject before object counterparts. This predicts that if,
for example, OVS languages are really SOV languages, save for a surface
rule, (as Cline, c. 1987 suggests) they ought to behave like SOV
languages. For example, they ought to have case systems as predicted
by Greenberg Universal 41 discussed above. Hlxkaryana lacks overt
case, certainly for subjects and direct objects, and other OSV
languages seem not to have case systems comparable to those of
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classic SOV case languages. Assuming that OVS languages are
underlying SOV predicts that both classes of languages should form
one class with respect to generalizations such as Greenberg Universal
41. This makes the wrong predictions. The only way to avoid the
falsification of this prediction is to claim that the surface relocation of
the subject affects case, but then grammatical case becomes a szirfacy
phenomenon: not inconsistent with classical Government and Binding
theory but inconsistent with the Travis and LaMontaigne, Saito KP-
analysis discussed above.
The second prediction made by a surface relocation view is two
part: (I.) if there are only surface object before subject languages, the
class of object before subject languages itself should not have any deep
or non-surfacy properties which are not themselves derivable from the
fact that these languages are underlying subject before object; and (it.)
the particular subcases of object before subject languages should also
not have any deep properties qua OVS, OSV or VOS, again except
insofar as these properties derive from the languages being underlying
subject before object languages.
To argue against what we have been calling 'the dominant view'
only requires the existence of a natural class object before subject
language, or a class OVS, for example, separable from the class SOV.
We will argue that object before subject languages do form natural
classes separate from subject before object languages and, further, will
show that the case/agreement analysis is the only framework
appropriate for stating the necessary generalizations.
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The first claim we will make was first stated in Alexander (1986;
p. 25):
(16) GeneralizatIon 1
If a language has a dominant word order with the
object preceding the subject, it has verbal agreement
for subject and object.
This is a striking generalization. We have a familiar group of
languages, the object before subject group, once thought not to exist
and generally considered to have no deep properties and yet, with the
exception of VOS Malagasy (Keenan:1984, etc.), these languages fall
into a precise morphological type with respect to agreement. These
languages always have direct object agreement. Well-studied subject
before object languages typically lack object agreement-hence, the
view that object before subject languages are underlyingly subject
before object languages cannot explain this fact and It is not obvious
that such a theory could even state It.
Parallel to Generalization 1, is another surprising morphological
fact about the class of object before subject languages, not as well-
studied as Generalization I but, given the state of the literature, a fairly
good candidate for a solid statistical generalization:
(17) Generalization 2
If a language has a dominant word order with the
object preceding the subject, it does not have a case
system.
As suggested, we would like to have more available data on object
before subject languages, but Generalization 2 seems sound given
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current knowledge, and with the caveat that case system means case
marking of some intuitive richness, approaching that of, for example,
Japanese. If we put together these two generalizations (1-2), we
derive the claim that object before subject languages have direct object
agreement and lack overt case. In most theories of syntax, or
theoretical typology, it is difficult to state this generalization in an
interesting way. In the case agreement analysis, we can express the
claim as that below;
(18) Thesis 1
If a language has a dominant word order in which
the direct object precedes the subject, that language
is a [+Agreement, -Case] language.
This move has some significance. By forming a natural class of
the object before subject languages, we have undermined the view that
such languages are formed by surface relocation of subject. By stating
this class in terms of case/agreement we have shown that the
vocabulary of that approach to non-configurationality and language
typology can express a generalization not easily expressed in other
approaches. Finally, recalling the discussion of how Hale's diagnostics
of non-configurationality can be made to follow from case/agreement,
we have a number of predictions about object before subject languages.
They are:
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(19) Predicted Properties of Object before Subject Languages
(by virtue of their being [+Agreement, -Case])
a. They have relatively fixed word order.
b. They lack pleonastics.
c. They lack NP movement rules.
d. They show free or frequent null anaphora.
e. They are not likely to have discontinuous constituents.
The predictions made for object before subject languages are
perfectly explicit. We would know a counterexample through only
cursory examination of the data of an object before subject language. A
theory which, in principle, is so easily falsifiable is precisely the type
of theory of language typology worthy of pursing. Whether
case/agreement makes the correct predictions across the full (and
extensive) range of data or not, this seems to be the type of theory of
language typology most likely to shed light on cross-linguistic variance.
We may now turn to the question: 'Are the predicted properties
of object before subject languages' actually found? The question is not
easily answered due to our general lack of knowledge of the properties
of these languages. We must examine many languages, though not
necessarily in great detail. To take one prediction, free null anaphora,
we can see from a superficial examination that this predictions seems
correct. In Hixkaryana (OVS), null anaphora is possible. So too for
Coeur d'Alene (VOS), Siuslaw (VOS), Coos (VOS), Makuchi (OSV) and
so forth. We could go through the same process for the claim of a lack
of pleonastics, and a lack of NP movement transformations (the most
complicated prediction to get ready data for).
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This is how we would analyze the predictions of the
Case/Agreement analysih. We mentioned above that there are levels of
predictions in this analysis. One level was as a vocabulary for stating
generalizations. It seems that case/agreement can express the
typological facts of object before subject languages in a maximally
simple manner: i.e. they are [-Case, +Agreement]. Another level we
could consider case/agreement is asa theory of non-configurationality,
using the predictions made by case/agreement with respect to the
properties of configurationality. Here, our proposal is more appealing
than previous formulations because the present theory is non-bivalent.
Case/Agreement allows us to distinguish Warlpiri [+Case, +Agreement]
from Navajo [-Case, +Agreement] and, hence, to distinguish Warlpiri
from all object before subject languages. For reasons mentioned in
detail in this chapter, case/agreement, unlike classical non-
configurationality or the variants in Jelinek (1984), Saxon (1985) and
Speas (1986), makes very specific predictions about how languages
will behave with respect to the properties of configurationality. We
can test these predictions in the obvious way. There is still another
level at which case/agreement can provide insights into language
typology, in a way not possible for configurationality. A simple
question is: "Can the case/agreement distinction explain why all object
before subject languages are [-Case, +Agreement]? We believe the
answer is 'yes'.
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Alexander (1986) proposes another generalization about
[+Agreement, -Case] languages which might permit us to predict that
object before subject languages are [-Case, +Agreementj languages.
(20) Generalization 3
If a language is [+Agreement, -Case], the dominant
word order is always such that if a line of association
is drawn from subject enclitic to subject and a line of
association is drawn from object enclitic to object,
these lines of association do not cross.
The claim is that overt NPs form chains with agreement clitics
(following Speas, 1986, and, perhaps, Jelinek, 1984) and that the
subject chain may not interrupt the object chain.
We may alternatively construe this as the claim that the Path
Containment Condition (Pesetsky, 1982) holds of agreement clitics
and overt NPs.
(21) Path Containment Condition (Pesetsky, 1982)
If two paths overlap, one must contain the other.
Consider a language such as Navajo which has SOV word order and
the object agreement morpheme preceding the subject agreement
morpheme which itself precedes the verb stem. We produce a
structure as follows:
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(22)
NP
NP V
AGR-0 V
AGR-S V
Consistent with Generalization 3 (or Path Containment) and the
order of agreement morphemes in Navajo, we know that the inner-
most NP must be the direct object and the higher NP must be the
subject. Thus, in this case, we have a mirror image effect with SO(V)
word order and OS(V) agreement morpheme order. Note that there is
another word order consistent with OS(V) agreement morpheme
order, as below:
(23)
NP
NP V
AGR-O V
AGR-S V
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Since linear direction does not matter for the purposes of
containment, we can get a subject-final word order. The subject path
starts lower in the tree and ends higher in the tree, containing the
direct object path. Thus, this order OVS is consistent with
Generalization 3. OVS word order is, of course, object before subject
word order.
We will assume, following Jelinek (1983) that thematic-roles are
assigned to agreement clitics in the [+Agreement, ±Casel languages.
Thus, NPs need not be proximate to their theta-assigners. Assume,
with Jelinek, that this is true for case marking as well. How do
agreement languages get their word order? From the conditions
described in GeneralIzation 3. Word order is a function of Path
Containment and Path Containment predicts that there will be
agreement languages with OSV agreement morpheme order which
will have SOV word order and those which have OVS word order. We
would then be able to maintain the claim that no there are no object
before subject base word orders, where by 'base word order' we mean
word order induced by theta-marking and case assignment. This also
explains the interesting fact that the [-Case, +Agreement] languages
are the only class of languages to have languages from all six possible
word orders {OVS, OSV, SOV, SVO, VSO, VOS)., For example, the
[+Case, -Agreement] languages have SOV and SVO members, but not
OVS or OSV members. By hypothesis, [+Case, +iAgreement] languages
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do not have base word orders, being 'scrambling type' languages, d la
Warlpiri.
The above discussion oversimplifies somewhat. In the next two
chapters we will see some evidence to suggest that overt NPs must be
proximate to governors and that, thus, the Path Containment analysis
of word order is not sufficient alone-and Generalization 3 is not
without exceptions. We will not explore the many consequences of
the Path Containment condition on word order in agreement
languages in this chapter, although in Chapter 5, we will discuss
Hixkaryana which seems to use Path Containment in the syntax to
regulate agreement morphemes and their binders.
Cleaning up some of the unresolved questions, we return briefly
to Greenberg Universal 41 stating that SOV languages almost always
have case systems. Throughout this work we have discussed SOV
case-less Navajo. A very large number (perhaps most) North American
Indian languages are SOV and lack case systems (say, again, in the
Japanese sense). This is easily described and explained by the
discussion so far. First, we can state a corollary to Greenberg
Universal 41:
(24) Corollary to Greenberg Universal 41
Exceptions to Greenberg Universal 41 are
[-Case, +Agreement]
Again, the vocabulary for this claim is made available by
case/agreement and the explanation for the fact at issue comes from
the assumptions (i.) that NPs do not receive thematic-roles in
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[+Agreement] languages; and (11.) that an SOV [+Agreement] language
is not equivalent to an SOV [-Agreement] language. Thus, C/A makes
an interesting prediction about a mystery raised by Greenberg
correlations. Greenberg shows that SOV languages behave as a class
with respect to being postpositional, to take one example. Given the
overwhelming tendency of languages to be SOV and OP, it is somewhat
surprising that there is a large class of exceptions to another
correlation of Greenberg's concerning SOV; that is, Greenberg claims
SOV entails a rich case system whereas Amerind languages are
systematic counterexamples. The case/agreement analysis argues that
while there is a natural class SOV (which has OP), the difference
between SOV [+Case, -Agreementi and SOV [-Case, +Agreement] is
genuinely significant as well.
To summarize the discussion of the case/agreement analysis. We
have proposed an alternative to the configurationality parameter and
its variants. We argue that languages differ in how they license the
category NP, whether by case assignment, agreement or adjacency
(government), or a combination of these methods. This led to a
classification of languages with the features [±Agreementj I±Casel. We
argued for some inherent advantages to this view compared to
alternative, bivalent configurationality parameters and gave examples
of how work would proceed in the exploration of this theory.
Case/Agreement is a strong theory, with rich inductive power, and,
given the nature of our knowledge of exotic languages, successful in
predicting the degree of cross-linguistic variance. Naturally, a great
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deal of research must be done to test the extremely large number of
predictions made by this analysis. This is not a unique property of
case/agreement. It was certainly true of classical non-
configurationality, which was often confined to a very small class of
languages such as Navajo and Warlpiri. For the remainder of this work,
we will focus on what might seem a very narrow problem, languages
which seem to have the option of assigning thematic-roles to
agreement morphemes or to overt NPs. The existence of such
languages superficially threaten to undermine the distinctions we have
drawn between Agreement languages and non-Agreement languages.
Beyond representing a challenge for a particular view of language
typology, however, these cases also provide a broad sampling of data
on cross-linguistic variance with a limited range of construction types
(prepositional phrases, noun phrases and subject and direct object
agreement). Analysis of this data will allow us to sharpen our claims
about the nature of NP licensing, the role of agreement and the cross-
linguistic variance of theta-role assignment. Further, we show that the
most appealing analysis of these middle cases (Hale, 1988 and Hale
and Baker, 1990), threatens the non-configurationality analysis of Hale
(1983) and Jelinek (1984) from which case/agreement borrows much.
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Chapter 4:
Treating the Class of Middle Cases
4.1 A Conflict Between Theories
In the last chapter, we discussed an alternative to the
"configurationality parameter". This was based partly on the
analysis in Jelinek (1984) and claimed that languages differed in the
way thematic-roles were assigned, with one class, the adargument
languages, assigning 0-roles to NO agreement morphemes, and the
other, the argument languages , assigning 0-roles to NPs. In the next
two chapters, we will be discussing "middle cases": languages which
seem to have options of assigning 0-roles to either NO agreement
morphemes or NPs.
Without calling specific attention to it, we have shown several
examples of languages with agreement or person/number inflection
across categories. Hixkaryana, for example, shows agreement
inflection on verbs, nouns and postpositions:
(1) a. rakoronomehe (Derbyshire, 1985; 191)
La-akoronoma-yaha
10-help- NONPAST
'He helps me.'
b. ramorl (Derbyshire, 1985; 5)
rng-amo0-ri
1- arm-POSSD
'my ar'
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c. rnhaaa
rn-hana
1-to
'to me'
(Derbyshire, 1985; 16)
Since the analysis of non-configurationality in Chapters 2-3 was
heavily dependent on agreement, it is natural to attempt to project
the argument/adargument distinction onto this agreement inflection
across categories. Although researchers in Principles and Parameters
typology have not done this, doing so provides a natural analysis of
the following data from English, an argument language, and Navajo,
an adargument language:
(2) a. with a rope (English, Indo-European)
b. tl'66t y-ee (Navajo, Athapaskan) (Hale, 1988; 4)
rope 3-with
'with a rope'
c. y-ee (ibid.)
3-with
'with him/her/it'
d. *tl'66 ee (Ken Hale: pc)
rope with
('with a rope')
We can use the argument/adargument language distinction to
explain these differences between Navajo and English. In English,
the preposition is not inflected and thematic-role assignment is to
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the NP objec. of the preposition (the rope). In Navajo, on the other
hand, thematic-role assignment is to the obligatory agreement clitic
(y-, 3rd person). The NP object of the postposition (tl'6d, 'rope')
not necessary for the discharge of the thematic-role, is optional (just
as subjects and direct objects are generally optional in adargument
languages). Thus, the internal structure of PPs in English and Navajo
mirrors the sentence level structure of these languages; no
elaboration of the argument/adargument language distinction is
necessary to account for PP in English and Navajo.
Consideration of other languages shows, however, that the
argument/adargument distinction is not as easily extended to
inflection across categories as English and Navajo suggest. There are
argument (configurational) languages in which agreement
morphemes, rather than NPs, act like arguments, and adargument
(non-configurational) languages where NPs are argument-like. Irish,
discussed in McCloskey and Hale (1985) and Hale (1988), provides an
example of the first type of case:
(3) a. leMdire (Hale, 1988; 3)
'with Mary'
b. 16L
with:3fs
'with her'
c. *l6j Mdire (Hale, 1988; 3)
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Irish, like Navajo, has inflected prepositions (16i), but, unlike
Navajo, the inflection on the Irish preposition must not cooccur with
a full NP (*16i Mdire). The Irish pattern is also found in Dogrib, an
Athapaskan relative of Navajo. (Data from Saxon, 1986;54, reprinted
in Hale, 1988; 4.)
(4) a. Johnny [y.-t'k pp] de&'o na- i- t'a
Johnny 3-with duck ADV-PERF-cut
'Johnny cut up the duck with it.'
b. Johnny [mbsbh t'A pp] det'o n&- i- ta
Johnny knife with duck ADV-PERF-cut
'Johnny cut up the duck with the knife.'
c. *Johnny [mbeh y-t'k pp] det'o nk- i- Ca
Johnny knife 3-with duck ADV-PERF-cut
('Johnny cut up the duck with the knife.')
Dogrib, like Irish, shows complementary distribution between
inflection on a lexical head and the NP object selected by that lexical
head (mbeh t'd or ye-t'd but *mbeh ye-t'd). Simply put: Irish and
Dogrib permit either an NP or an agreement morpheme but not both.
We have seen three distinct types of languages based on possible
adpositional phrase constructions; we shall see others.
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(5)
Types of PP Constructions
Type P NP P-infl (NP) orP-Inl
P NP
Lg. English Navajo Irish
Dogrib
Summarizing: English requires an overt NP in PP; Navajo
requires inflection on P with an optional NP; Dogrib and Irish permit
either an overt NP or inflection, both not both-they show
complementary distribution between the NP object of the adposition
(P-obj) and inflection on the adposition (P-infl). Note that for
Jelinek, who assumes a central distinction between languages which
0-mark NPs and languages which 0-mark agreement clitics, these
mixed systems are unexpected.
To account for this complementary distribution, Hale (1988)
suggests:
Let us consider...the behavior of adpositions in Irish and
Dogrib. In both of these languages, an inflected
adposition is incompatible with overt expression of the
object in canonical object position. This would follow
automatically if the inflection itself were the argument
[emp. added]. (p. 7)1
1 Note that the way that Hale states the hypothesis makes it seems quite similar
to Jelinek's approach in that both loosely assume argumental N0 s but Hale's
formulation, as we will see, is in conflict with Jelinek's argument/adargument
distinction.
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Hale's proposal is that inflection on P arises from incorporation
of a pronominal onto P by move-a. This incorporated pronoun, like
the NP it substitutes for, begins at D-structure in P-object position. It
is not possible to generate both an overt NP P-object and an
incorporateable pronoun in this position; hence complementary
distribution between the incorporated pronoun and the overt NP.
The two possible structures permitted in Irish or Dogrib follow
(ignoring the preposition/postposition difference):
(6)
PP PP
NP P NP P
I I I
N t'd N P
mbeh ti yei X.'
knife with 3- with
It is impossible to generate a form such as *mbeh ye-t'd (knife
3-with) in Dogrib since mbeh and ye would both have to appear in
the same position at D-structure. In a language like Navajo, which
does permit inflection on P to appear with an overt NP P-object (cf.
tl'66t y-ee, 'rope 3-with'), incorporation does not occur-leading to a
structure without a trace, as follows:
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(7)
PP
NP P
N P
1 1
tl'664 Y ee
rope 3 with
Hale's analysis claims that pronominal inflection morphemes
ye- in Dogrib and y- in Navajo are in different positions at D-
structure. The Dogrib inflection appears at D-structure in an NP
position and the Navajo inflection appears at D-structure as a
subconstituent the P to which it is attached.
An unstated consequence is that Hale's analysis forces Dogrib to
be a Jelinek-style configurational language, an argument language.
We would have assumed that Dogrib was an adargument language by
virtue of its "hyper-rich" agreement but Hale's analysis forces the
conclusion that some Dogrib agreement is not agreement after all.
Recall that adargument, or non-configurational, languages assign
theta-roles to No agreement clitics and argument, or configurational,
languages assign them to NPs. If ye- in Dogrib begins at D-structure
in an NP position, then a thematic-role is assigned to it in that NP
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position. So, thematic roles are assigned to NPs in Dogrib, and thus
Dogrib is argumental or configurational, at least in its PPs*2
Using the same logic, we can show that Dogrib is configurational
at the VP level as well. We find the same cooccurrence possibilities
for Dogrib direct objects that we observed for PPs:
(8) a. Cheko [kwik'i nk- i- zhl vp] cf. mbeh t'A
boy gun ADV-PERF-break knife with
'The kid broke the gun.'
b. Cheko [t i nA- yii- i- zhl VP cf. t i yei-t'h
boy ADV-30-PERF-break 3- with
'The kid broke it.'
c. *Cheko [kwik'i nk- y j- i- zhl VP] cf. *mbeh ye-t'h
boy gun ADV-30-PERF-break
('The kid broke the gun.')
We see complementary distribution between the direct object
(kwIk'I) and the direct object agreement marker (yi-). Once again, if
we assume that the object agreement morpheme appears at D-
structure in direct object position, we can account for the
complementary distribution between direct object inflection on the
verb and an overt direct object NP, but only with the consequence of
classifying Dogrib as configurational.
The implications of Hale's analysis are direct for
Case/Agreement. Since Jelinek's analysis has been largely adopted
by Case/Agreement, we make the arguments here based on Jelinek's
2 Alternatively we might say that Dogrib is configurational and the, evidence
for this comes from its PPs. See note 6.
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analysis. Presumably the conflict between theories is also
replicateable with the theory proposed by Speas (1986). As
discussed in Chapter 2, Saxon's (1985) analysis proposed exactly the
non-configurationality distinction induced by Hale's analysis, for
related reasons. 3
Though we have thus far concentrated on Hale's analysis as a
general theory of inflection on lexical heads, Hale's real interest is
fairly removed from the issues of configurationality we have raised
thus far-he is concerned in large part with government of the
subject in VSO languages. Further attention to the central issue of
Hale's article makes this and the conflict with Jelinek's analysis more
clear. In Hale's analysis, incorporation of an agreement element
leads to complementary distribution between an NP and that
agreement element since both cannot be generated in the same NP
position. There are subject/object asymmetries in incorporateablity,
however. For example, Dogrib, which we previously saw behaved
like Irish with respect to inflection on adpositions, does not show
complementary distribution between an overt subject and subject
inflection; that is, subjects and subject inflection can cooccur in
Dogrib. 4
3 At least, Saxon's partitioning of languages was the same. She assumed that
English and Dogrib were configurational while Navajo was non-
configurational. Given her argument, she would presumably classify Irish as
configurational as well, since it has the same properties she uses to argue for
Dogrib configurationality, 14. complementary distribution between inflection
and full NPs.
4 If note 2 is correct that complementary distribution in Dogrib PPs is
evidence that Dogrib is configurational, then we must assume that the
cooccurrence of subjects and subject inflection is evidence that Dogrib is non-
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(9) a. tlichec tli t'& mbehchi k'a'edli (Saxon, 1985; 66)
Dogrib dog by sled ADV:Iplr:IMP:slide
'We Dogribs pull sleds using dogs.'5
b. ?asi ni xtr6 nekwlghk k'enat'a
Q 2sg self 2sg:hair ADV:2sg:PERF:cut
'Did you cut your hair yourself?'
In Irish, however, there is complementary distribution
between subject inflection and an overt subject:
(10) a. cuiri-m
puts-1
'I put'
b. cuirean Eoghan
puts Owen
'Owen puts'
configurational. Either we reject the claim that particular constituents
provide evidence for configurationality (and embrace the view that PPs and
VPs can be configurational while IP is non-configurational), or we assume
that the Dogrib language learner encounters ambiguous evidence, or we
assume that since subject agreement is so common, that cooccurrence between
subject and subject inflection is special and gives no evidence to the language
learner on this point. In principle, evidence from language acquisition might
be revealing, comparing Dogrib with an unambiguous language from the
point of view of configurationality evidence such as English. This issue has
been raised in the analyses of Hungarian by E. Kiss (1981), who argues that
some categories in Hungarian are non-configurational and others
configurational, and Szabolcsi (1983), who argues that Hungarian NPs are
configurational, and Horvath (1986), who supports Szabolsci analysis and
claims that from Ie point of acquisition languages cannot have both
configurational and non-configurational constituents. If, as we suggest here,
agreement plays a role in defining a non-configurational language, it is not
hard to imagine that morphological clues might be sufficient to allow the
children to deduce the non-configurational constituents from the
configurational ones and we reject Horvath's suggestion that such a mixed
system is excluded in principle because of the acquisition problem.
5 Note that the third person NP flic/hcc triggers 1st person subject agreement,
thus demonstrating the type of non-agreement which Jelinek used to claim
that Warlpiri was an adargumental language.
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c. *cuiri-m m6
puts-I 1
('I put')
We see complementary distribution between Irish subjects and
subject inflection but not between Dogrib subjects and subject
inflection. With respect to adpositional phrases the languages
behave in an identical manner. A similar distribution can be seen in
the pairs OVS Hixkaryana and VSO Yagua. With non-third person
forms, Hixkaryana does not permit cooccurrence between a nominal
and an inflectional prefix, as below:
(11) a. ro-hana b. *uro hana c. *uro ro-hana
1-to 1 to 1 1-to
'to me' ('to me') ('to me')
In Yagua, there is complementary distributioin between
adpositional object agreement and a preceding overt adpositional
object.
(12) a. sa-viimd jumufiu
3-inside canoe
'inside the canoe'
b. jumuflu viimd
canoe inside
'inside the canoe'
c. *jumuffu sa-viimd
canoe 3-inside
('inside the canoe')
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Yagua shows the same complementary distribution between
subject inflection and an overt subject:
(13) a. sa-puuchu Anita
3-carries Anita
'He/she/it carries Anita.'
b. Pauro puuchu Anita
Paul carries Anita
'Paul carries Anita.'
c. *Pauro sa-puuchu Anita
Paul 3-carries Anita
('Paul carries Anita.')
In Hixkaryana, on the other hand, cooccurrence is possible
between direct object inflection and an overt direct object, even for
non-third person subjects but third person subjects can cooccur with
subject inflection (Derbyshire, 1985; p. 8-9).
(14) r-akoronomehe uro
10-help lsg
'S/he helps me'
We have two pairs of languages, Irish and Dogrib and Yagua
and Hixkaryana which both show complementary distribution
between P-object and P-object inflection with only one member of
each pair (Irish and Yagua) showing complementary distribution
between subjects and subject inflection. How can we account for the
difference? Hale notes in his discussion of Dogrib and Irish that
Dogrib is SVO and Irish is VSO. We may extend the argument to the
pair Hixkaryana (OVS) and Yagua (VSO). The VSO languages show
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complementary distribution for subjects/subject inflection
(incorporation for Hale) while the non-VSO cases show cooccurrence.
Hale suggests that incorporation is only permitted if the
landing site of the movement (the verb) properly governs the
movement site and argues that this is possible in VSO but not SVO
(or OSV). The VSO structure follows:
(15)
CP
Spec, CP 0'
C IP
V+ Spec, IP l'
I I
verb NP I VP
subject V V NP
I I
t object
Under Hale's analysis, in VSO the raised verb properly governs
subject position and incorporation is possible since the trace of
incorporation will be properly governed. This is not the case in SVO
since the verb does not properly govern the subject. The prediction
is clear, complementary distribution (incorporation) will only be
possible when the category incorporated is properly governed, i.e., in
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VSO languages. 6  In Hale's terms, given that Dogrib shows
complementary distribution between adpositional objects and
adpositional object inflection, it follows that Dogrib adpositional
objects are properly governed. Since, as we saw above, Dogrib has
the same complementary distribution with direct objects and direct
object agreement, we can deduce the conclusion that the Dogrib verb
properly governs its direct object, contra Jelinek.
So, for example, in Navajo postpositional phrases, which we
assimilated above to Navajo subject and object NPs, we argued that
the agreement morpheme (y-) received the thematic-role in
postpositional phrases containing an overt NP (tl'664 y-ee, knife 3-
with, 'with a knife'). The overt NP (tl'664) was assumed to be
(somewhat like) an adjunct. Since complementary distribution is not
found in Navajo, with Hale's analysis there is no reason to question
this conclusion.
In Dogrib, incorporation is possible of direct objects and
adpositional objects, since we observe complementary distribution.
Thus, in Dogrib, adpositional objects and direct objects are properly
governed, while in Navajo they are not governed at all. The
conclusion is that Dogrib is configurational and Navajo is non-
configurational, a fairly substantial difference between languages,
the only evidence for which is that Dogrib shows complementary
6 In principle we should extend the prediction to OSV but there are very few
such languages, they are not well studied, and, if our suggestion in Chapter 3
that all object before subject languages are adargument languages-except
perhaps Malagasy-it is not obvious that the locality effects of VSO languages
may be replicated in OSV languages.
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distribution between inflection and coreferential NPs while Navajo
permits cooccurrence. This evidence requires the conclusion that the
structure of Navajo and Dogrib PPs, and other categories, is radically
different. The conclusion is not excluded prima facie but there is
evidence to suggest that such a major difference between languages
should not hinge on the difference between cooccurrence and
complementary distribution.
The data are discussed in Saxon (1985) and in some detail in
Alexander (1989). The evidence comes from cases where Dogrib,
generally showing complementary distribution requires
cooccurrence, somewhat like Navajo:
(16) Dogrib Navajo
a. bemo cf. a. ye-t'A a. y-ee
3-mother 3-with 3-with
'her/his mother' 'with it' 'with it'
b. *Margaret mo b. mbeh t' b. *tl'664 ee
Margaret mother knife with rope with
('Margaret's mother') 'with a knife' ('with a rope')
c. Margaret bemo c. *mbeh ye-t'a c. tl'664 y-ee
Margaret 3:mother knife 3-with rope 3-with
'Margaret's mother' 'with a knife' 'with a rope'
The cases in (16a) show that all languages permit an inflected
postposition to stand alone. In (16b), we see the familiar Navaho
case where the postposition requires inflection and the familiar
Dogrib case (the middle case) where Dogrib permits an uninflected
postposition to appear with a full NP. The first case in (16b) shows
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that in certain cases Dogrib does not permit the uninflected
postposition to appear with an NP, i.e., here Dogrib behaves just like
the familiar Navajo cases. Consistent with this, the first case in (16c)
shows that with this type of genitive NP, the full NP can cooccur with
an inflected P (as in Navajo, see the third example in the column)
unlike the standard Dogrib examples, such as the second example in
the column. Thus, there are cases in which Dogrib behaves exactly
like Navajo with respect to cooccurrence of NPs and agreement
morphemes. Saxon also shows constructions, generally idiomatic
constructions (Ken Hale: pc), in which Navajo shows the Dogrib type
pattern. It seems strained to claim that languages which have
cooccurrence are non-configurational while languages with
complementary distribution are configurational when we see
examples of both in one language, as in Dogrib.
Hale's analysis as presented comes with the consequence that
languages which show complementary distribution of NPs and
agreement inflection must be so by virtue of having this agreement
inflection begin at D-structure in an NP position. This agreement
inflection receives a thematic-role in this NP position and, hence,
under Jelinek's conception of non-configurational languages as being
languages which assign 0-roles to agreement morphemes, a
complementary distribution language (such as Dogrib) is perforce a
configurational language.
Is this a negative consequence? We have already suggested
that facts from Dogrib (showing some cases of complementary
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distribution and some of cooccurrence) suggest thait Hale's distinction
is artificial. Ignoring these facts for now, we might view the
consequence as a reductio on the notion of (Jelinek's analysis of)
configurationality since it forces a class with English and Dogrib,
together in opposition to Navajo, a close relative of Dogrib. If there is
a real notion of non-configurationality, a major separation between
languages like English with relatively fixed word order and little null
anaphora and Warlpiri, a language with very free word order and
extremely common null anaphora, we might be surprised if
languages like Dogrib and Navajo, which share the properties of rich
null anaphora and relatively fixed word order, were not in separate
classes for the purposes of the distinction. In short, Navajo and
Dogrib are more alike, for the data of non-configurationality, that
Dogrib and English. Hale's analysis seems to force the grouping
Dogrib and English to the exclusion of Navajo. 7 We may view this as
an exposition of the specious nature of configurationality
generalizations (A la Jelinek) or as a problem for Hale's analysis. If
7 Note that we are not suggesting that this reveals a slippery slope of
configurationality such that non-configurational languages and
configurational languages are so close that languages on the margin such as
Navajo and Dogrib might be in different classes. We maintain that Dogrib and
Navaho are richly non-configurational from the point of view, at least, of
Hale's superficial characteristics on non-configurationality. In that view,
Navajo and Dogrib, though clearly distinct from Warlpiri, are clearly on the
non-configurationality part of the line. There may be languages, such as
Choctaw (Davies, 1986) which are on the line, but we do not believe that Dogrib
and Navajo approach this line-not that we necessarily approve of seeing
configurationality as having such fine gradations. [I am indebicd to Jack
Martin and Aaron Broadwell for discussions on Choctaw.]
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we want to maintain Jelinek's analysis, and accept Hale's, naturally
we must view the conflict between the two as undesirable.
A second concern is related to the facts about Dogrib mentioned
above at (16). Non-configurationality has generally been viewed as a
substantial distinction between languages: it purports to distinguish
English from Warlpiri, two quite different languages. The difference
between (i.) permitting cooccurrence of inflection and an NP or (ii.)
showing complementary distribution is a rather low level difference,
typologically speaking (in the sense that the different types of cases
are both found in individual languages, such as Navajo, and closely
related languages, such as Dogrib and Navajo, show a difference with
respect to cooccurrence possibilities). In Hixkaryana, for example,
first person P-inflection cannot cooccur with a first person pronoun
but third person P-inflection does cooccur with a third person NP:
(17) First Person P-Objects
a. n-oseryehyaha biryekomo [m-hana pp]
3S-is afraid boy 1- to
'The boy is afraid of me." (Derbyshire, 1985; 16)
b. *n-oseryehyaha bireyekomo [un m-hana pp] (ibid., p. 8)
3S-is afraid boy 1 1- to
('The boy is afraid of me.')
c. *n-oseryehyaha bireyekomo [umr hana pp] (jil.)
3 S-is afraid boy 1 to
('The boy is afraid of me.')
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Third Person P-Objects
d. [o-rn li yi-awo-hra pp] w-ahko (ibid.)
2-house 30-in- not 1-was
'I was not in your house.'
With first person objects of postpositions, inflection on P is
obligatory and the pronoun obligatorily absent. In (17d), however,
we do see cooccurrence between a third person NP (o min, your
house) and a third person inflection marker (y-). Thus, for third
person, Hixkaryana behaves just like Navajo but for first person
Hixkaryana behaves more like the standard cases from Dogrib. If
this difference, permitting cooccurrence of P-infl and P-obj, covaries
with configurationality as Hale's analysis suggests, we are forced to
the conclusion that Hixkaryana third person is non-configurational
and Hixkaryana first person is configurational. This seems unlikely-
perhaps even conceptually incoherent. 8
8 There is certainly an intuitive explanation for why Hixkaryana would show a
third person/non-third person distinction with cooccurrence. A first person
pronoun is redundant when appearing with first person inflection on a head
while third person NPs are never fully redundant appearing with third
person inflection (since the exact referent is provided by the NP), Even when
the "NP" is a third person pronoun, there is not full redundancy since
Hixkaryana, like many languages, shows great semantic distinctions (eg.
proximity, number, animacy) in its third person pronouns than in either its
non-third person pronouns or its third person inflection. Hence iokyamo.,
third person medial-deictic, animate, collective and monL third person
remote-deictic inanimate (singular or plural) both trigger at.- as subject
agreement. These third person pronouns are not fully redundant. On the
other hand, non-third person pronouns and non-third person agreement in
Hixkaryana only encode number so a first person pronoun urn,. is always
redundant. Nothing here suggests that such a difference in redundancy
should be related to configurationality.
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So, Hixkaryana shows different cooccurrence possibilities
depending on grammatical person. The difference Hale's analysis is
concerned with-complementary distribution vs. cooccurrence of
inflection and NPs-seems far less significant typologically than
configurationality. Viewed thus, it is awkward to assume an analysis
which has configurationality covariant with complementary
distribution of P-infl and P-object. Further, recall that Hale is
concerned with proper government as contributing to
incorporateability. For the Hixkaryana cases, showing
complementary distribution with non-third person forms only, Hale
must argue that Hixkaryana third person postpositional objects are
not properly governed, while first person postpositional arguments
are. This seems unlikely and casts doubt on Hale's analysis--though
the facts about incorporateability of subjects only being possible in
VSO are compelling support for Hale's theory and deserve analysis.
Considering the Hixkaryana data, from a typological point of view,
Hale's distinction seems suspicious. Looked at from a theoretical
point of view, the conclusions Hale's analysis forces for government
in Hixkaryana, seem undesirable-lst person pronouns which are
governed, 3rd person pronouns which are not.
We have two theories, Hale's analysis of inflection across
categories and Jelinek's hypothesis concerning theta-assignment and
configurationality. They are, as originally formulated, in direct
conflict. For most of the next two chapters we will consider this
conflict and its consequences in some detail. Both theories have
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strengths and weaknesses and their relation raises a number of
issues. Chiefly: Are the theories reconcilable, are either/both of them
correct and is it desirable to reconcile them?
Concretely, in this chapter we will examine inflection across
categories in a broader range of languages than considered by Hale,
1988. We will discuss Irish, Welsh, Breton (Celtic, Europe), Navajo,
Dogrib, Slave (Athapaskan, North America), Hixkaryana (Carib, South
America) and Yagua (Peba-Yaguan, South America). In the next
chapter we provide extensive discussions of Hixkaryana and Canela-
Krah6 (J6, South America). This will provide a broad foundation for
analyzing Hale's proposal. After motivating Hale's analysis, we will
move to a further investigation of the tension between Hale's and
Jelinek's analyses.
The view we will adopt is that Hale is incorrect to analyze
complementary distribution as being due to both the pronominal
element and the overt direct object being in the same D-structure
position, and hence involving incorporation (a structural analysis).
We discuss complementary distribution cases where it cannot be
argued that the pronominal and the NP occupy the same D-structure
position. We analyze complementary distribution in non-structural
terms involving options in thematic-role assignment, permitting
some languages to assign thematic roles to NPs or to agreement
morphemes. This analysis is independently motivated and does not
conflict with a Jelinek style analysis of configurationality-in fact, our
analysis provides support for such an analysis.
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4.2 Implications of Inflection Across Categories
We will be less than thorough in discussing the possible
implications of the line of inquiry in this chapter. This is because the
resolution of the issues addressed is not complete. Also the
implications involve questions far beyond what we are actually able
to answer here.
A simple example of this incompleteness concerns the manner
in which Hale's analysis disassociates the property of (i) being
person/number inflection which appears on a lexical head with the
property (ii) being an agreement morpheme. Alternative sources of
person/number inflection raise the possibility that agreement is less
common than one might have supposed before Hale's work--simply
by virtue of the arithmetical fact that at least some a g r e e m e n t
inflection must be reclassified as incorporated inflection. This is
clearly seen from a superficial examination of the identical Irish P-
object and subject cooccurrence possibilities: (data from McCloskey
and Hale, 1984; 513-514)
(18) a. or-m (19) a. cuiri-m
on-1 puts-I
'on me' 'I put'
b. ar Eoghan b. cuirean Eoghan
on Owen puts Owen
'on Owen' 'Owen puts'
c. *or-m m6 c. *cuiri-m m6
on-I 1 puts-i I
('on me') ('I put')
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The cooccurrence possibilities for NPs and inflection are the
same for Irish P-objects and Irish subjects. Hale argues that the
person/number inflection in (18a) arises from incorporation of -m
from the P-object NP position. When we extend this analysis to
(19a), and assume incorporation of the subject inflection (also -m),
we derive the result that Irish lacks subject agreement (but has
subject incorporation). Thus, not that all languages have subject
agreement. Although many languages seem, prima facie, to lack
subject agreement (Chinese, for example), one might have
entertained the possibility that (abstract) subject agreement was
universal (like abstract Case assignment). Hale's analysis suggests
otherwise and purports to provide a method for distinguishing real
agreement (as in Italian) from incorporation (as in Irish).9
Another non-obvious, and problematic, implication of Hale's
analysis is the suggestion of a continuum of configurationality. We
may construct the argument using Dogrib (Athapaskan) and Yagua
(Peba-Yaguan). In Hale's analysis, complementary distribution of NP
and inflection on a head suggests that theta-assignment from that
9 Another source of ambiguity between agreement and incorporation comes
from the possibility of abstract agreement in the theory. If we assume that in
English, there are abstract agreement morphemes (which surface as 0) for,
say, 2nd person present tense for 'You walk-O', then the theory might permit
abstract incorporation. For a given 0 morpheme, we might not be able to tell
whether it arises from abstract agreement or abstract incorporation. Though
this may seem farfetched, we show in §5.1 that we Hale must assume abstract
incorporation to account for the agreement facts of Hixkaryana subjects and
direct objects.
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head is to the NP position, which may be filled at D-structure with
either a incorporateable pronoun or a lexical NP. Such thematic-role
assignment to NP, under Jelinek's analysis, is a property of
configurational languages. For some XP and for some language,
complementary distribution of NP and inflection in that XP suggests
that that language is configurational. Note, though, that
complementary distribution within one XP does not imply
complementary distribution within all XPs. As shown by Saxon
(1986, 65-66) and Hale (1988), Dogrib does not permit cooccurrence
of a direct object and direct object inflection but does permit
cooccurrence of subjects and subject inflection:
(20) a. Cheko [kwiki nh- i- zhl VP] (Saxon, 1985; 59)
boy gun ADV-PERF-break
'The kid broke the gun.'
b. Cheko [na- y- i- zhl Vpl
boy ADV-30-PERF-break
'The kid broke it.'
c. *Cheko [kwik'i nA- y- i- zhi vPi
boy gun ADV-30-PERF-break
('The kid broke the gun.')
(21) a. tlichc di Ct' mbehchi k'gjs'edli (ibid; 66)
Dogrib dog by sled ADV:lpl:IMP:Slide
'We Dogribs pull sleds using dogs.'
b. ?asi jjj xkrt nekwlghk k'ens&t'a ? (ibid.)
Q 2sg self 2sg:hair ADV:2sg:PERF:cut
'Did you cut your hair yourself.'
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Dogrib also permits topic NPs to cooccur with inflection. We see
cooccurrence of topic (22b) with the following minimal pair involving
a non-topic direct object (22a; 16c above) and the same NP
functioning as a topic: 10
(22) a. *Cheko kwik'i nA- - i- zhl VP (ibid.; .>9)
boy gun ADV-30-PERF-break
('The kid broke the gun.')
b. Kwik'i, cheko nA- xi- i- zhi (ibid.; 65)
gun boy ADV- 3-PERF-break
'As for the gun, the kid broke it.'
Dogrib, under Hale's analysis, does not have complementary
distribution between the pairs (subject, subject inflection) or (topic,
topic inflection) and, thus, Dogrib has topic and subject agreement.
So there are some categories in which Dogrib lacks complementary
distribution and, perhaps, categories (IP/S, for example) in which
Dogrib is nonconfigurational.
Yagua, on the other hand, severely restricts the cooccurrence of
a subject NP with inflection on the verb. In Yagua subjects may
precede uninflected verbs (Pauro puuchu...) but may not precede
inflected verbs (*Pauro sa-puuchu...).
10 Hale presumably must assume base generation of the topic in the following
form since a movement analysis would move the topic from a D-structure
object position, suggesting the possibility of base generation of a direct object
clitic attached to V.
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(23) a. Paaro puuchu Anita (Everett, 1988; 1-2)
Paul carries Anita
'Paul carries Anita.'
b. sa-puuchu Anita
3S-carries Anita
'He/she/it carries Anita.'
c. a-puuchu Pauro-nik Anita
3S-carries Paul- 30 Anita
'Paul carries Anita.'
d. *taurn a-puuchu Anita
Paul 3S-carries Anita
('Paul carries Anita.')
This pattern can be observed across categories in Yagua, as
discussed later in this chapter. If we extend Hale's analysis to this
"positional complementary distribution", we can say that
complementary distribution exists for all XPs in Yagua. Hence, all
XPs are "configurational" in Yagua. This is not the case in Dogrib,
where subjects and topics can cooccur with inflection and, hence, for
the XPs dominating subjects and topics, Dogrib is non-configurational.
Is Dogrib less configurational than Yagua, and, conversely, is Dogrib
more configurational than Navajo, where there is never
complementary distribution of the relevant type?l1I And is the
S1We can approach the issue from the point of view of government theory.
Recall that Hale argues that incorporation is only possible when the
incorporated element is properly governed by a lexical head. Thus,
incorporation (configurationality) is confined to languages which have
government of NP, whereas agreement (non-configurationality) is associated
with no government of NPs, There are the class of configurational languages
(such as English, French, etc.) in which verbs do properly govern their direct
objects. It is arguable that some of these languages (eg. French, Italian; see
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complementary distribution/cooccurrence difference the sort of
evidence we would like to decide the question?
One could explore this relative configurationality (Dogrib <
Yagua < Navajo < Warlpiri) , but if (i.) there are data of non-
configurationality such as Hale's "superficial characteristics of non-
configurationality" [see Chapter 2J and (ii.) configurationality is
expressible along a continuum as a relative measure, we expect to
find a continuum effect for Hale's properties. With respect to the
diagnostics, however, Yagua, Dogrib and Navajo do not appreciably
differ, and pattern to the exclusion of English, on the one hand, and
Warlpiri, on the other. One might imagine that there could be other
tests for configurationality which could allow us to find the
distinctions suggested by (this way of viewing) Hale's theory but
such tests are not currently known and are not represented in the
literature.
It may be stretching Hale's analysis to find the prediction of
relative configurationality but there is a straightforward argument
for it. (1) Configurationality is viewed as a property of languages
(but see Hale, 1982, 1985 for an alternative); (2) Interpreted through
Jelinek's analysis, Hale's system makes configurationality predictable
from the properties of a single XP (showing complementary
distribution); (3) Languages differ in the number of XPs showing
complementary distribution. Does (1-3) suggest that the extent of
our discussion below) have incorporation of direct objects but far less clear
that they permit incorporation of prepositional objects, which should be
permitted under Hale's analysis.
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configurationality differs as a function of the number of XPs which
are demonstrably configurational under Hale's analysis?
There are a number of ways to understand Hale's analysis,
reducing or permitting the conflict with Jelinek's analysis, seeking
predictions for a continuum effect for configurationality, and so forth.
The literature on complementary distribution of the type we are
discussing is limited to Celtic and Athapaskan languages. Further
investigation of the data of inflection across categories will be helpful
in narrowing the possible ways of interpreting Hale's theory. For the
remainder of this chapter, we will discuss the basic data of a theory
of inflection across categories, focusing on languages which are
revealing for complementary distribution. In Chapter 5 we will
consider two languages which we argue suggest strongly that Hale's
analysis is incorrect and which seem to support Jelinek's analysis of
non -configurationality.
4.3 Inflection Across Categories
4.3.1 Argument Languages
We have already briefly discussed Irish, perhaps the best
known example of complementary distribution of arguments and
inflection. Taking an example from Irish (McCloskey and Hale,
1984):
(24) a. cuiri-m
puts-I
'I put'
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b. *cuiri-m md
puts-I 1
('I put')
c. cuireann Eoghan
puts Owen
'Owen puts'
Subject agreement may appear on the verb (cuiri-m) or an
overt NP may appear with a verb that is not inflected for person and
number (cuireann Eoghan) but an NP cannot appear with a verb
inflected for person and number (*cuiri-m mi). Irish also permits
inflection to appear on prepositions and with P we see the same
pattern:
(25) a. or-m
on-1
'on me'
b. *or-m m6
on-1 I
('on me')
c. ar Eoghan
on Owen
'on Owen'
Again we see either inflection on the head (or-m) or an NP (a r
Eoghan) but not both (*or-m mg).
McCloskey and Hale (1984) show that inflection on nominals
patterns like inflection on P and V, apart from the fact that the
inflection on N is not enclitic and appears before the 'head noun':
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(26) a. mo theach infl N
1 house
'my house'
b. *mo theach m6 *infl N NP
I house 1
('my house')
c. teach Eoghain N NP
house Owen (GEN)
'Owen's house'
With NPs, we see mo functioning like the inflection appearing
on P; either mo appears (mo theach) or an NP (theach Eoghain) but
not both (*mo theach Eoghain). It is arguably the case that the
differences between mo and the suffixal -m appearing on P is
independently explainable and that the best analysis treats mo as a
type of inflection, which incorporates into determiner position (D)
instead of N.12
Stump (1984) shows similar phenomena in another Celtic VSO
language, Breton (though see Stump, 1984, for some complications
not relevant here). 13 First, subjects:
(27) a. levriox a lenn-an (Stump, 1984; 291)
books PCL read- lsg
'I read books'
b. me a lenn levrio
1 PCL read books
'I read books'
12 This position is taken in Alexander, 1988b.
13 a is a preverbal particle; see Stump (1984) for details.
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c. *me a lenn- an levriod
1 PCL read-lsg books
('I read books')
As in Irish, we see either an inflected verb (lenn-an) or a
pronoun (me) occurring with an uninflected verb (me...Ienn) but not
both: (*me..lenn-an). The pattern is the same for inflected
prepositions:
(28) a. ul levr brezhonek a zo gantaft (Stump, 1984; 297)
a book Breton PCL is with-3sg
'He has a Breton book'
b. ul levr brezhonek a zo gant Yannig
a book Breton PCL is with Yannig
'Yannig has a Breton book'
c. *ul levr brezhonek a zo gantafi Yannig
a book Breton PCL is with-3sg Yannig
('Yannig has a Breton book')
In (28) we see either an inflected P (ganin, 'with:lsg') or an NP
with an uninflected P (gant Yannig, 'with Yannig') but not an NP with
an inflected P (*gantan Yannig).
As in Irish, the facts of inflected nominals are slightly more
complicated and show the inflection preceding the possessed N. For
example:
(29) a. tad Yannig (Stump, 1984; 344)
father Yannig
'Yannig's father.'
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b. e dad
3 father
'His father.'
c. *ei dad Yannig;
3 father Yannig
('Yannig's father.')
In (29a), Yannig modifies tad ('father') and there is no overt
genitive marking; word order is the only indication of the possessor
relation. In (29b) the "proclitic possessive pronoun" (Stump, 1984;
344) may also appear, causing a lenition mutation (tad to dad) in e
dad. It not possible to have both the proclitic possessive pronoun
and the overt NP possessor (*e dad Yannigi also out, of course, is *e
tad Yannig, without lenition).
Welsh, also discussed in McCloskey and Hale (1984), unlike its
Celtic relatives Irish and Breton, does permit a limited cooccurrence
between inflection and a pronoun-though a special type of pronoun.
Consider subject agreement first: (All Welsh data from McCloskey
and Hale, 1984; 517-519)
(30) a. gwel- ais ef
see+PST-lsg 3sg
'I saw him'
b. gwel- anti hwyk
'See+PRES-3ps 3plObj
'They see them' (in k)
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c. gwel- aia
see+PST+Isg
'I saw him'
( i ) ef
lsg 3sg
As we see from (30c) Welsh permits pronouns (such as i) in
subject position cooccurring with subject agreement inflection
(gwelais), unlike Breton or Irish. The cooccurrence possibilities are
the same for prepositions (31) and nominals (32):
(31) a. idd- i
to- 3Fsg
'to her'
c. idd-i
to-3Fsg
'to her'
hi
her
(32) a. eu hafal
3 pl apple
'their apple'
b. eu hafal hwy
3pl apple they
'their apple'
b. idd-o
to- 3Msg
'to him'
d. idd-o
to- 3Msg
'to him'
c. ei
3Msg
'his dog'
d. ei
3Msg
'his dog'
fe
him
gi
dog
gi ef
dog he
Note, first, that with nominals the inflection precedes the head
as in Breton and Irish; hence (ei gi ef, '3Msg dog he' vs *gi-ei ef
'dog-3Msg he') but (*i idd hi, '3Fsg to her' vs idd-i hi, 'to-3Fsg her').
In all three Celtic languages we have considered, genitive inflection
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does not appear in the post-head position expected from
consideration of other types of inflection.
From (30-32) we see that the pronouns which may cooccur
with inflection are optional. Interestingly the pronouns which
appear in the argument positions of the above constructions (30c-
d,31c-d, 32c-d) are not ordinary pronouns. As McCloskey and Hale
(1984; 519-520, 529 ftn17) point out, these '(Affixed) Auxiliary
Pronouns' only appear in the argument positions of heads which are
inflected with person-number morphology. When 'ordinary'
pronouns occur in direct object position, or the argument positions of
the above categories, the head category is uninflected for the person
number features of the pronoun (thus, when an ordinary pronoun
appears with a preposition the preposition is uninflected, and,
obviously, when the direct object pronoun appears, the verb is not
inflected for direct object agreement). 14 Also, as we expect, Affixed
Auxiliary Pronouns cannot appear with uninflected verbs. 1 5
In the Celtic languages considered, we find that agreement
inflection is in complementary distribution with the normal trigger of
that inflection (noting that in the Welsh cases the pronouns which
appear are not the ordinary pronouns). Celtic shows the basic
complementary distribution between inflection on a head and the NP
argument of that head.
14 These pronouns seem to be essentially resumptive.
15 Note that Welsh has pronouns which cooccur with inflection and pronouns
which show complementary distribution but obviously no researchers have
argued that there is a concomitant configurationality difference between the
types of pronouns.
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Before presenting Hale's analysis, we will now consider similar
phenomena in some adargument languages.
4.3.2 Rdargunent Languages 1: Athapaskan
In the preceding section we saw a limited contrast between
Welsh on the one hand and Celtic and Breton on the other as to
whether agreement morphology may appear with an overt
representation of the person/number-features that presumably
trigger that agreement. A stronger contrast can be seen in the
Athapaskan languages. Consider, for example, inflected postpositions
in Dogrib (Saxon:1986), Navajo (Hale:1987), and Slave (Saxon:1985):
(33) a. mbeh t'k Dogrib
knife with (Saxon, 1986; 54)
'with a knife'
b. ye-t'h
3-with
'with it'
c. *mbeh ye-t'a
knife 3-with
('with a knife')
In Dogrib, like Irish, the NP object may appear with an
uninflected postposition (mbeh t'd) or there may be an inflected
postposition (ye-td) but not both (*mbeh ye-tCd).
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Now consider Navajo:
(3 4) a. *tl66t ee
rope with
('with a rope')
Navajo
(Hale, 1988; 4)
b. y-ee
3-with
'with it'
c. tl'66t y-ee
rope 3-with
'with a rope'
In Navajo, the postposition is always inflected (*1'dd4 ee and
*ee) and the NP object is optional (y-ee or 1'66? y-ee).
(35) a. Mary gha
Mary for
'for Mary'
b. be-gha
3-for
'for her/him/it'
Slave
(Saxon, 1985; )
c. * Mary be-gha
Mary 3-for
('for Mary')
Slave patterns exactly like Dogrib with NP-uninflected P (Mary
gha) or inflected P with no NP (be-gha) but not both (*Mary be-gha).
One type of case is ungrammatical in all the Athapaskan
languages we are considering:
(36) a. *t'A
('with [e]')
b. *ee
('with el')
or * pro t'k
or* pro ee
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Dogrib
Navajo
c. *gha or * pro gha Slave
('for [e]')
There is no deep explanation for the ungrammaticality of (29a-
c). Trivially, they simply fail because they do not express the
required object of the postposition. This lack of a non-trivial
explanation does not extend to the cases with pro. We note that pro
cannot replace a regular NP even in those languages where NPs do
not appear with inflection: hence, Dogrib mbeh t'd ('with a rope') vs.
*pro t 'd ('with it'). So, though overt expression of NP is never
required, it is never possible to generate a pro adposition object in an
Athapaskan language. We may extend this analysis to all categories.
One could argue that pro does occur with inflected adpositions (pra
yet'd) but not with uninflected adpositions (prg_ t'd) because pro must
be identified, but why should pro be the only NP which can cooccur
with inflection unless the agreement element absorbs something that
the NP requires, such as Case or a 0-role-a conclusion leading to the
same result?
The contrast between Navajo and its Athapaskan relatives can
be expressed very simply. In Navajo, postpositions always bear
inflection and NP objects are optional. In Slave and Dogrib, on the
other hand, inflection is in complementary distribution with an overt
expression of the object of the postposition. In all three languages
the object of the postposition must be expressed in some form. 16
16 We might like to add that the expression of the P-object cannot be pro, but
adding the condition "with a phonetic matrix" is unsatisfactory since 0-
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4.3.3 Adargumeist Languages 2: Hixkargana
Hixkaryana, as suggested earlier, lies between Navajo and
Dogrib (or Slave). We have seen two groups of related languages in
which languages differ on whether the argument role may be
expressed solely by either agreement morphology or by NP
arguments. Hixkaryana (Carib) (Derbyshire:1985, see also
Alexander:1988) shows such a difference based on the grammatical
person of the argument. Consider, again, postpositions:
(37) a. ro-hana b. *uro ro-hana c. *uro hana
1-to 1 1-to 1 to
'to me' ('to me') ('to me')
(38) a. y-awo-hra (Derbyshire, 1985)
3-in- NEG
'not in it'
b. o-min y-awo-hra (Derbyshire, 1985; )
2-house 3-in- NEG
'not in your house'
In Hixkaryana, as in Navajo, all heads are inflected for
agreement with their arguments (subject agreement appears on
verbs) and it is not possible for a NP to 'substitute' for that inflection
(37c). Third person differs from the other persons, however, in that
3rd person NPs may cooccur with 3rd person inflection on nominals
or postpositions (38b) but pronoun forms of the other persons cannot
inflectional endings are permitted and, under Hale's and Jelinek's analyses,
they may serve as argumental N0 s.
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cooccur with inflection on the nominal or postposition (37b). Unlike
the Celtic and Athapaskan languages inflection on the verb differs
from inflection on other categories, and, in Hixkaryana, NPs of all
persons can cooccur with inflection on the verb:
(39) a. n-oseryehyaha birvekomo [pp (*Jrn) rn-hana]
3S-is afraid boy 1 1-to
'The boy is afraid of me' (Derbyshire, 1985)
b. r-akoronomehe .ro
10-help lsg
'He/she helps me' (ibid.)
Thus in (39a), 3rd person inflection on the verb cooccurs with
the subject NP (biryekomo) while in (39b) 1st person inflection on
the verb cooccurs with the 1st person pronoun (uro).
The above examples show that cross-linguistic differences in
cooccurrence restrictions between NPs and agreement inflection are
fairly low level from a typological point of view and do not have the
significance we would expect if such a difference had direct
consequences for the argument/adargument distinction (and see
similar arguments in Chapter 2 against a proposal of precisely this
type by Leslie Saxon, 1985).
4.4 Hale's Analysis and the facts of Yagua
Thus far, we have considered seven languages permitting
agreement inflection on P and other lexical heads. The core
opposition is between languages of the Navajo type, with inflected
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heads appearing with full NPs, and languages of the Dogrib/Irish
type in which inflected heads cannot cooccur with full NPs. There
are other differences as well. For example, Welsh permits a special
class of pronouns to cooccur with inflected heads, appearing to be a
middle case between Navajo and Dogrib/Irish. Further, Hixkaryana
patterned with Navajo for 3rd person and more like Irish/Dogrib for
non-third person forms. In Hixkaryana we also saw a cooccurrence
distinction between verbs (which always permit cooccurrence) and
non-verbs (which showed cooccurrence only with 3rd person forms).
This gives us some background for constructing a theory of inflection
on heads which illuminates the differences we have observed.
Reviewing Hale's (1988) analysis, he assumes that
complementary distribution of the Irish and Slave type derives from
the fact that the agreement inflection and the overt NP occupy the
same position at D-structure with incorporation of the inflection onto
the lexical head; under this analysis, Irish prepositions would have
the following structure.
(40)
PP PP
P NP P NP
with 31 with Mary
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Complementary distribution is a function of incorporation and
complementary distribution entails incorporation. What, however, if
the complementary distribution is not absolute, but only relative? In
the next section we will consider such a case.
4.4.1 Positional Complementary Distribution: Vagua
Thus far we have only discussed cases where the central issue
was whether or not NPs could appear with agreement inflection in an
absolute sense. These cases are not particularly difficult to analyze
since we have one fact (complementary distribution) which is
analyzed by one explanation (incorporation). Since incorporation is
not independently verifiable as distinct from agreement (i.e., there is
no way to show the source of the inflection as being agreement or
incorporation) the analysis we have have is not particularly removed
from the facts. The more we move from the standard Irish type
cases the more opportunities we will have to find interesting test
cases for Hale's analysis. In this section we will consider a less
common case where the restriction on cooccurrence is position
relative rather than absolute.
A rich example of this type of complementary distribution is
the Amazonian VSO language Yagua (Peba-Yaguan) discussed in
Payne (1985, and elsewhere) with similar analyses in Alexander
(1989) and Everett (1988).17 Consider first the nominal inflection
paradigm:
17 Yagua is the only extant member of the Peba-Yaguan family. It is spoken
by approximately 300 speakers in Northeastern Peru.
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(41) a. Pedro junoond
Pedro mother
'Pedro's mother'
b. sa-junoond
3-mother
'his/her/it's mother'
c. sa-junoond Pedro
3-mother Pedro
'Pedro's mother'
d. *Pedro sa-junoond
('Pedro's mother')
The pattern is that an N or NP may precede an uninflected
head (Pedro junoond) or an NP may follow an inflected head (sa -
junoond Pedro) but an NP cannot precede an inflected head (*Pedro
sa-junoond). This pattern is represented across all categories in
Yagua, for example with adpositions:
(42) a. jumuflu viimd
canoe inside
'inside the canoe'
b. sa-viimd
3-canoe
inside him/her/it'
c. sa-viimd jumufiu
3-inside canoe
'inside the canoe'
d. *jumuflu sa-viimd
('inside the canoe')
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As with nominal inflection, an NP may precede an uninflected
head (jumuiiu viimd) or an NP may follow an inflected head (sa-
viima jumuiu) but an NP cannot precede an inflected head (*jumutiu
sa-viimd). Although complicated by the appearance of object
agreement, we can see the same pattern for subjects and subject
agreement:
(43) a. Pedro puuchu Anita
Paul carry Anita
'Paul carries Anita.'
b. sa-puuchu Anita
3- carry Anita
'He/she/it carries Anita.'
c. sai-puuchu Pauroi-niik Anitak
3S-carry Paul- 30 Anita
'Paul carries Anita.'
d. *Pauroi sai-puuchu(niik) Anitak
(Paul carries Anita.')
Once again, an NP may precede an uninflected head (Pauro
puuchu...) or an NP may follow an inflected head (sa-puuchu Pauro...)
but an NP cannot precede an inflected head (*Pauro sa-puuchu..).
Finally, though still more complicated, the same basic pattern obtains
for direct objects and direct object inflection:
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(44) a. Pauro puuchu-nii
Paul carry- 30
'Paul carries him/her/it.'
b. sa-puuchu-nii
c. Pauro puuchu Anita
d. sa-puuchu Anita
e. sa-puuchu-nii Anita
f. sa-puuchu Paur.-nii Anita
g.*Ba-puuchu Paurm Anita
h. *ia-puuchu-nii Paum Anita
The status of the subject does not affect the availability of
direct object agreement but we have used pairs (a-b) (c-d) (e-f)
which show both subject forms. In the first pair we see the verb
followed by an inflection marker with no overt direct object
(puuchu-nii). In the second pair (c-d), the direct object inflection is
not present and an overt NP follows the verb (puuchu Anita). In the
third pair (e-f) the direct object marker appears preceding the direct
object (puuchu-nii Anita and puuchu Pauro-nii Anita) though a
postverbal subject may intervene between the verb and its direct
object. The above fact suggests, somewhat surprisingly, that the
constituent is nii-Anita rather than puuchu-nii since the sequence
puuchu-nii can be interrupted by a subject while the sequence nii-
Anita can not be interrupted. This fact will be suggestive when we
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analyze Yagua. In (g-h) we see that the inflection element, though
optional when the verb precedes the direct object (puuchu-nii Anita
vs. puuchu Anita), is obligatory when the subject intervenes between
the direct object and the verb (*puuchu-nii Pauro Anita and *puuchu
Pauro Anita).
4.4.2 Implications of Yagua
The Yagua facts are very interesting test cases for any theory
of inflection on heads. Though the facts are surprising and somewhat
convoluted, they seem intuitively reasonable and we would not be
surprised to find other languages which have elaborated a pattern
similar to Yagua's. For the present discussion, of Hale's analysis of
complementary distribution in Irish and Dogrib, the Yagua facts are
telling. We have in Yagua a type of complementary distribution-
relative complementary distribution-between inflection and NPs.
The facts seem related to those of Irish and Dogrib and we would be
pleased if our theory of inflection in Irish and Dogrib could extend to
Yagua in a natural manner.
This is not possible because of the way that Hale's analysis is
structured. Recall that Hale's analysis of complementary distribution
relies on the inflection and NP appearing in the D-structure NP
position. For adpositions, Hale's analysis can only generate two cases
in Yagua:
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PP PP
NP P NP P
jumufnu U viims *Sj vilm
In Hale's analysis, the P-object position can support either an
NP (such as jumuiu) or an incorporated pronoun (such as sa-) but
not both, as in Irish. Yagua requires, however, that both appear, and
in a particular configuration.
Yagua is not, strictly speaking, a counterexample to Hale's
analysis since Hale's analysis covers complementary distribution
cases and Yagua is not, again strictly speaking, a complementary
distribution case. Intuitively, we may feel that Yagua should be
analyzed by the same theory which analyzes Dogrib, Irish and Navajo
but Hale's analysis is not falsified by a case such as Yagua. In fact,
this suggests a problem with Hale's analysis since it is difficult or
impossible to imagine a counterexample to Hale's analysis. Hale's
analysis correlates two properties (i.) complementary distribution
entails incorporation and lack of complementary distribution, or
cooccurrence, entails agreement, or or non-incorporation. Crucially,
there is no objective fact of the matter which allows one to decide
whether a particular piece of inflection derives from incorporation or
agreement, apart from the facts about complementary distribution
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(45)a. b.
with which Hale correlates incorporation. Thus there is no
independent evidence to verify whether incorporation or agreement
has occurred. Hale's theory posits both (agreement for Navajo and
incorporation for Dogrib). In principle a counterexample for Hale
would be for Navajo to have agreement (instead of incorporation)
and yet to show complementary distribution. But if Navajo did show
complementary distribution, in Hale's system, perforce Navajo lacks
agreement and, instead, has incorporation. Hence, Hale's analysis is
unfalsifiable and untestable.
This is not to say Hale's view is wrong; it does have intuitive
plausibility. What the above should suggest, however, is that if we
find a theory of Irish/Navajo/Dogrib which is testable and which
passes these tests, we should prefer this alternative to Hale's theory.
Or, if we found a theory which was as weak as Hale's but which
extended to Yagua as well as Irish/Navajo/Dogrib, then we should
prefer that theory. If we found a testable alternative which also
extended to Yagua (and, say, which resolved the conflicts between
Hale's and Jelinek's theories) we would be better off still. In the next
section we will attempt that.
4.5 A Reuised Incorporation Analysis
With Yagua we have an interesting test case for the analysis of
inflection appearing on lexical heads, but as mentioned Yagua also
points up a conceptual difficulty with the analysis of Irish and
Navajo. The central correlations of Hale's incorporation analysis are,
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with respect to inflection on heads and full NPs (i.) complementary
distribution entails incorporation and (ii.) cooccurrence entails
agreement. As noted above, apart from these correlations, there is
no objective fact of the matter to suggest that agreement or
incorporation has occurred. In principle, however, there might be
tests to distinguish incorporation from agreement.
Recall that in Hixkaryana, 3rd person NPs cooccur with
inflection on a postposition but non-third person forms do not. As
discussed in Alexander (1988) and §5.1, this entails in Hale's system
that non-third person forms are incorporated while third person
forms trigger agreement. This could be an instance where we might
test whether incorporated forms could be distinguished from
agreement forms. In the following chart, compare the pronoun form
with the form of the inflection which appears on the postposition:18
18 Actually the forms may be a level more complicated than suggested below.
The pronoun kiyw. (I+11) is made up of ii (I+11) and -in (singular) but ki is
also the first person subject marker in intransitives with w- being the first
person subject marker for copulas. Hence kiwsra could be d+t+ra (all three
of which are one form of the first person, respectively, intransitive S +
copular S + direct object). Moving to the other form, gemora, we argue below
that a- is the objective II person, -m is singular, but mg. seems related to gdL
and a- or gaw;, the II person subject forms. Hence, amsuro might be analyzed as
a+ma+za or 2object+2subject+singular (1 object).
258
(46)
Person
I
I I
III nondeictic
III near-deictic
Pronoun
Ldivnidual
uro
kiwro
o moro
noro
mosoni
III medial-deictic mokro
III remote-deictic moki
PP infl morpheme
ro-
kiwyamo
omnyamo
nyamoro
moxamo
mokyamo
mokyamo
0-
y- 19
In the data above, for non-third person forms, there is a clear
relationship between the forms of the pronoun and the object
agreement morphemes. This might suggest that the incorporation
agreement split predicted by Hale's analysis is evident in
Hixkaryana.
The problematic case is uro where the pronoun form is ro-, the
second syllable instead of the first as in the other cases. Notice
though that for the pronouns in the singular form, -ro appears as the
final syllable in five of the seven forms, and that -yamo (plural
suffix) appears with all plural forms. The form -ro appears in the
19 Actually the forms may be more complicated than suggested below. The
pronoun kiwro (I+II) might be analyzed as being made up of ki (I+II) and -r o
(singular) but ki is also the first person subject marker in intransitives with
w - being the first person subject marker for copular sentences and r o - the
first person marker for objects and possessors. Hence k1wro could be k+w+r o
(all three of which are one form of the first person, respectively, intransitive
S + copular S + direct object), Moving to the other form omoro, mo- seems
related to the set of II person subject forms (ml-, o-, and ow-) and omoro could
be analyzed as o+mo+ro or 2object+2subject+singular/lobject. I thank David
Pesetsky for calling my attention to the morphological form of Hixkaryana
pronouns.
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plural only with III nondeictic, with -yamo- appearing as an infix.
We might interpret -ro as something like a singular marker for
pronouns and the form uro might be a late alteration of the simple
ro-. Thus perhaps ro was the original first person pronoun and the
agreement marker derived from it. We cannot give a detailed
analysis of these facts but they are at least suggestive. Hale's
analysis assumes that in Hixkaryana third person forms trigger
agreement while non-third person inflection is formed by
incorporation. It is interesting then that the non-third person forms
look like reduced forms of the corresponding pronouns while the
third person form does not. Of course many languages have
agreement markers which look like pronouns and there are often
gaps in the paradigm where a particular agreement marker does not
look like its corresponding pronoun. If the analysis could be
augmented, the Hixkaryana pattern seems supportive of Hale's
analysis (and the analysis of Hixkaryana agreement/incorporation in
Alexander, 1988).
Thus, in principle there could be ways to distinguish inflection
deriving from agreement from inflection deriving from incorporation.
Hixkaryana suggests that such study might be rewarding but
Hixkaryana is extremely rare in the combination of (i.) having a
distinction in person on cooccunence possibilities; and (ii.) showing a
parallel difference in the relation between pronoun and inflection
morpheme form. So, though one could imagine being able to directly
test Hale's correlation of cooccurrence possibilities with the
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agreement/incorporation distinction, cases even as clear as
Hixkaryana are not to be commonly expected.
This leaves us in the position, induced by practical concerns, of
not being able to distinguish incorporation from agreement. Because
of this, Hale's correlations listed above (complementary distribution
with incorporation, cooccurrence with agreement) cannot be directly
tested.
Earlier in this chapter we discussed the extension of the
argument language/adargument language distinction to Navajo. We
noted that the Navajo paradigm below could be explained by appeal
to Jelinek's hypothesis that adargument languages assign thematic-
roles to agreement morphemes rather than to NPs:
(47) a. t1'66t y-ee (Navajo, Athapaskan) (Hale, 1988; 4)
rope 3-with
'with a rope'
b. y-ee (ibid.)
3-with
'with him/her/it'
c. *tl'66t ee (Ken Hale: pc)
rope with
('with a rope')
In Navajo, the agreement morpheme (y- in the examples
above) is obligatory and the NP (46dd? above) is optional. We can
account for the three examples in (47) through Jelinek's proposal but
there is a case that Jelinek cannot account for.
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(48) *y- ee t166t (Ken Hale: P.C.)
3-with rope
('with a rope')
In (48) we have an unacceptable case where the object of the
adposition follows the adposition. Within Jelinek's analysis there is
no reason to expect this form to be unacceptable. Recall that Jelinek
proposed thematic-role assignment to agreement clitics to account
for Warlpiri free word order. As discussed in chapter 2, there are
fixed word order effects in hyper-rich agreement languages. We
assume that agreement clitics are the obligatory arguments and are
assigned thematic-roles (and perhaps Case if Jelinek is correct) from
the lexical head, whereas NPs receive their thematic-roles by virtue
of being coindexed with theta-marked agreement clitics. In Chapter
3 we briefly discussed the claim that the Path Containment Condition
might regulate the relationship between agreement clitics and NPs
but there is no PCC-theoretic explanation for the data in (48) either.
We know, however, that agreement clitics are prefixal in
Navajo. If they receive thematic-roles, we know that thematic-role
assignment is right to left, as in a head-final language. If we assume
that Navajo is head-final and assigns thematic-roles to the left, we
can account for the data in (48). We cannot fully analyze Navajo
with Jelinek's assumptions unless we add the condition that Navajo is
head final, which could in the unmarked case follow from the fact (or
determine the fact) that Navajo assigns its thematic-roles to the left.
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This raises the question whether all languages which assign
thematic-roles to the left are head final. In our brief discussion of
Kpelle (following Travis, 1987) in Chapter 1, we required the
assumption that that language assigned thematic-roles to the left but
assigned Case to the right. This accounted for the fact that subjects
and direct object appeared before the verb while the indirect object
PP followed the verb. In principle, then, there could be a language
just like Navajo, assigning thematic-roles to the left (like an OV type
language) but having the lexical head preceding its NP object (i.e.,
being head-initial or VO type)..
VSO Yagua seems to fit this description. Reviewing the facts of
Yagua, for the simple cases of subject, objects of postpositions and
genitive possessors, an NP may precede an uninflected head or follow
an inflected head but an NP may not precede an inflected head:
(49) a. sa-junoond a'. sa-viimd sa-X
3-mother 3-inside
'his mother' 'inside it'
b. -junoond ProL b'. -viimd juumufiu sa-X NP
3-mother Pedro 3-inside canoe
'Pedro's mother 'inside the canoe'
c. Pedro junoond c' jumufiu viimd NP X
d. *edro &-junoond d'. *i ia-viimu *NP sa-X
('Pedro's mother') ('inside the canoe')
Concentrating on just the cases where an agreement clitic
appears (forms a, c-d and a', c'-d'), the pattern is very similar to
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Navajo. Yagua is VSO (and perhaps underlying SVO see below), and
hence a VO type language, a head-initial language, which should
assign thematic-roles to the right. Note however that clitics are
prefixal in Yagua, which, if we are to analyze Yagua in Jelinek's
terms, would entail that thematic-roles are assigned to the left.
Making the assumption, then, that Yagua is head-initial-natural for a
VO language-but that thematic-roles are assigned to the left-natural
for an adargumental language with prefixal clitics-we can explain
the data above. In (49a) the agreement clitic (sa-) receives a
thematic-role from the head which selects it. In (49b) the thematic-
role is assigned to the agreement clitic (as in 49a) but there is an
optional adjunct NP as in Navajo. This adjunct NP must follow the
lexical head since Yagua is head-initial. In (49d), we see that a non-
theta-marked NP cannot precede the lexical head-we know that it is
non-theta-marked because the inflection receives the 0-role. This
example is parallel to the example from Navajo discused above (*y -
ee tlddU, '3-with rope', where the optional NP appears on the 'wrong'
side). Thus the stipulation that adargument languages have a
headedness parameter separate from its 0-marking directionality
parameter (suggested for Kpelle by Travis, 1987, and motivated
above for Navajo) accounts for ungrammatical example in (49d)
*Pedro sa-junoond. This leaves us the final case (49c) where there is
no agreement clitic and where the NP precedes the head which
selects it. Can we provide an analysis of these facts?
264
We may motivate the analysis of this case with reference to
Dogrib. Recall that in Dogrib, unlike Navajo, there is the option of
having an agreement clitic or an overt NP. Both the agreement clitic
and the NP were on the same side of the lexical head:
(50) a. Johnny [y.-t' pp] det'o nA- i- t'a
Johnny 3-with duck ADV-PERF-cut
'Johnny cut up the duck with it.'
b. Johnny [mbeh. t'k pp] det'o nh- i- t'a
Johnny knife with duck ADV-PERF-cut
'Johnny cut up the duck with the knife.'
c. *Johnny [mbhehyrt'k pp] det'o nh- i- t'a
Johnny knife 3-with duck ADV-PERF-cut
('Johnny cut up the duck with the knife.')
Yagua seems to have the Dogrib option of satisfying the
selectional properties of lexical heads with either agreemeni
morphemes or full NPs. Like Dogrib, when thematic-roles are
assigned to NPs, the NP appears on the side of the head to which
thematic-roles are assigned. This is natural, of course, since the
alternative would require that thematic-role assignment could be
one direction for agreement morphemes and another for NPs. This is
in principle possible but the most restrictive theory would reject this
possibility until clear data forces the conclusion.
Reviewing the present analysis of Yagua XP structure. We have
assumed that thematic-roles may be assigned to either agreement
morphemes or NPs (as in Dogrib) but that when thematic-roles are
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assigned to agreement morphemes and an NP appears, its position
must be consistent with a separate head-parameter (as in Navajo)
which may specify a direction different from the direction of
thematic-role assignment, much like in Kpelle.
The assumption that thematic-roles are assigned to agreement
morphemes in Yagua is very helpful in understanding how a child
would come to learn Yagua. To see the problem, assume that
thematic-roles are not assigned to agreement morphemes in Yagua.
The child must deduce the direction of thematic-role assignment.
What is the data which the child may use? A piece of data the child
might consider is the fact that the language is VSO or SVO. This
would suggest, without contradictory evidence, that 0-role
assignment would be to the right. Direct evidence of 0-role
assignment to NP is difficult for the child to find since NPs may
appear before or after a lexical head (sa-viima jumuflu, '3-inside
canoe' or jumufu viimd, 'canoe inside') or not at all (sa-viima).
There are thus two types of data which the child might use to
determine thematic-role assignment to NP with one (the general
pattern of the language as VO), suggesting rightward 0-role
assignment and the other (the distribution of NPs) suggesting that 0-
role assignment may be by turns leftward or rightward. This piece
of data would also lead to the incorrect conclusion that NPs may be
freely ordered in Yagua (cf. *jujmunfu sa-viimd, canoe 3-inside). The
assumption that 0-roles are always assigned to NPs suggests
problems for the child learning Yagua.
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The analysis we are suggesting does not raise the acquisition
problems discussed above. The child may learn the leftward
direction of 0-role assignment from the fact that agreement
morphemes are prefixal. The crucial piece of data would be a form
like (sa-viimd, 3-inside, inside it) where the thematic-role is
assigned to the prefixal agreement clitic to the left. Thus 0-role
assignment is non-problematic for the child. Data for the fact that
the language is head initial (VO-type) could come from a number of
sources, as shown by Payne (1986), such as the fact that auxiliaries
precede the main verb and that sentence particles like negation and
question words are sentence initial (reasoning k la Greenberg, 1966).
More direct evidence is the existence of forms such as sa -viimd
jumunu where a presumably non-0-marked adjunct NP follows the
lexical head.2 0
A very similar pattern of data can be seen in another
(unrelated and geographically very separate) Amazonian VSO
language, Guajajara (Harrison:1986). Harrison notes that Guajajara
presents problems for simple theories of directionality (such as
20 We should note of course that the adjuncts discussed here are not adjuncts
in the familiar sense. If Jelinek is correct, the optional NPs in Navajo,
Warlpiri and the post-head Yagua NPs are adjuncts but they are part of a theta-
chain which is i!elf argumental (deriving from a subcategorized thematic-
role). This has the implication that we need not expect a Yagua adjunct which
inherits a subcategorized thematic-role to behave like an English adjunct
which does not receive a subcategorized thematic role. It seems to us that this
point has been often misunderstood. Jelinek-type adjuncts have a clear
argumental status, they are resumuptive on familiar grammatical functions
such as subject and object, but they do not beer these grammatical functions
themselves. From the point of view of theta-theory, there is a large difference
between Jelinek--type adjuncts and adjuncts in the English sense-so much so
that using the same term for them is probably misleading.
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Greenberg, 1966) since it is VSO but has postpositions (VO but OP)
and genitives precede their nominals, an OV property rather than a
VO property. 21 Examples follow with the postposition in (51) and the
genitive-noun order in (52):
(51) yrjua-pupo
mortar-i
'in the mortar'
(52) i-kyhaw
3-hammock
'his/her hammock'
On the other hand, Guajajara has other properties of a VO
language, for example inflected auxiliaries follow the main verb and
in comparative constructions the order is the VO consistent
adjective- marker- standard:
(53) a. a-ha putar ihe nehe kury
lsg-go want:FUT I FUT now
'I want to go now' (Harrison, 1986; 410)
b. 0-uhuau werau i-zuwi a2e
3-big more 3-than 3
'He is bigger than him. (ibid., 412)
Like Yagua, however, Guajajara has prefixal agreement
markers (which Harrison, 1986, 412, points out is a VO
characteristic):
(54) a. w-esak
21 There are also implications for K-theory and the category neutral base
hypothesis, see Stowell, 1981, and Fanner, 1984.
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3-see
'He saw it'
b. he-r-esak
Isg-3 -see
'He saw me' (Harrison, 1986, 412)
In our analysis, we derive the interesting result that the
prefixing character of the VSO languages (generally a VO pattern) is
what causes the unexpected 0 V properties. The agreement
morphemes are prefixal and thus 0-marking is leftward to the
agreement morphemes. In the complementary distribution cases
theta-marking (still leftward) is to the full NP in the absence of the
agreement clitic. Thus, in an adargument language, having a VO
property (prefixal inflectional and derivational affixes) leads directly
to the OV properties of having postpositions and the order genitive-
nominal. We find this a very encouraging result since it makes
sense of two languages (Yagua and Guajajara) which as Harrison
(1986) and Payne (1986) point out, are counterexamples to previous
theories of typology.
Thus as we are claiming for Yagua, Guajajara has 0-role
assignment to the left while being head initial. Categories with
agreement clitics behave like OV language categories while categories
without agreement act like VO language categories. Agreement
clitics receive 0-roles and this provides evidence to the child that
such categories are OV-like but the basic pattern of the language as
VO is not changed for those categories without agreement
morphemes. The underlying specification of the languages is head-
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final and the child modifies this conclusion only for those categories
which have prefixal agreement morphemes, the categories for which
easily comprehended data are available; that data being the position
of the agreement clitics themselves.
We thus have the beginnings of an analysis of Yagua within a
modified Jelinek-style analysis which is independently motivated
and predictable from Navajo, Dogrib and Guajajara.
Returning now to our alternative analysis of Yagua, in terms of
leftward theta-role assignment and right-headedness. The facts we
must explain are as follows: (1) some nominal must be in prehead
position; (2) if that nominal is an agreement clitic, another nominal
may appear, but only in posthead position. Assume that the
complementary distribution is between the overt NP appearing in
prehead and posthead position. The agreement marker may (as in
Navajo) or may not be base generated inside the head X0 .22
(55)
P
AGR P orI I
sa- vlImUa viimU0
As we know, if the first option is chosen, an NP may only
appear after the head where as if the second option is taken, the NP
22 Not theoretical significance is attached to the category label AGR; that is we
are not implying that it is a structural position.
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may only appear before the head. Taking the first option, assume
that we attempted to generate an NP in prehead position as follows:
(56)
P' -PP
NP P
AGR P
I I
Jumun'iu so- vl1md
The NP (jumufu) must be licensed in some way. If it is
coindexed with sa- (parallel to Navajo), it is licensed but its position
is fixed as postverbal. Since the object is not licensed by the verb
through theta-marking, it is an adjunct and since Yagua is head-
initial, this adjunct must appear after the head in conformance with
the licensing condition on adjuncts. 23 Given this, and supposing that
this is the D-structure, the NP must raise, yielding the structure
below:
(57)
23 Note that the NP Jumunu is coindexed with the X0 sa- but its antecedent (sa-)
does not c-command it-in fact, were sa- to c-command the NP, a Condition C
violation would result,
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PP
P O N P
NP P
AGR1  Pl i I I
t se- viimi Jumufiu
In this postverbal position, the adjunct NP is licensed. it
receives its thematic-role from the clitic by virtue of coindexing
(motivated for Navajo).
Another way for the NP to appear is if sa - is not present,
beginning with the second option discussed above and reprinted
below:
(58)
P
viimQ
In this case, the head must have an argument and there is no
clitic to discharge the thematic role. To save the structure, we again
generate an NP, as below:
(59)
NP P
I |
Jumufiu vIimd
272
In this case, the head licenses the NP by theta-marking just as
it would license sa-, to the left.
We could not start with (58) and place the NP in the adjunct
position as immediately below because the head could not discharge
its thematic-role:
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(60)
PP
P' NP
P
viim0, jumunu
This accounts for the impossibility of *viimd jumuiu; we have
also accounted for (i.) *jumuiu sa-viimd which fails because the
adjunct NP is not licensed in its adjunct position; and (ii.) *viimd
which is excluded because the head does not discharge its e-role. We
can correctly generate the 3 grammatical cases: (i.) sa-viimdl, with sa-
licensed by the head 'a la Jelinek; (ii.) jumuiu viimd with jumuiu
being licensed by leftward theta-role assignment; and (iii.) sa-viimd
jumuiu with leftward theta-assignment licensing sa- and jumuiu
being licensed to the right as an adjunct.
Turning now to the direct object cases, consider the --JRR.JVing
data (Data from Everett, 1988; 1, and Payne, 1985):
(61) a. Pauro puuchu-nii V-nii
Paul carry- 30
'Paul carries him/her'
b. Pauro puuchu Anita V NP
Paul carry Anita
'Paul carries Anita'
c. sa-puuchu-nii Anita V-nii NP
3S-carry- 30 Anita
'he/she carries Anita'
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e. Ia-puuchu PauL-nii Anita V NPsubj-nii NPobj
3S-carry Paul- 30 Anita
'Paul carries Anita'
f. *sapuuchu Paurm Anita *V NPsubj NPobj
g. *a-puuchu-niI Pauro Anita *V-nii NPsubj NPobj
3S-carry- 30 Paul- 30 Anita
('Paul carries Anita')
Taking the facts separately, in general the agreement clitic and
the NP are optional, though at least one may appear. The clitic is
obligatory if the verb is separated from the direct object by
intervening material, such as the subject. Finally, the agreement
clitics show two properties unlike the other pieces of inflection we
have seen in Yagua: (i.) they are suffixal; and (ii.) they need not
attach to the lexical head (i.e. they may appear on any category
preceding the direct object).
Taking these last two facts, might it be possible to reduce them
to one fact consistent with the other examples we have discussed in
Yagua? Consider the two possible structures of (61c) sa-puuchu-nii
Anita:.
(62)
(a) VP
V NP
V AGR Anita
1 Ii
sa-puuchu nii
(b) * VP
V NP
V AGR NP
I I I
sa-puuchu nii Anita
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Given that the direct object clitic precedes the direct object, it
could in principle attach to either the constituent immediately
preceding the direct object or to the direct object itself. This later
option (62b) is presumably blocked for several reasons, first by the
binding theory since the object clitic adjoined to the object NP would
bind the direct object R-expression (a Condition-C violation); second,
because adjoining an XO clitic to an NP would violate the condition on
structure preservation (see Chomsky, 1985a); and, finally by the i-
within-i condition since the two elements are coindexed as the
representation in (62b) shows,. Assuming then any of these accounts
explain why the direct object clitic cannot attach to the direct object
itself, it follows that the direct object clitic must attach to the
category immediately preceding the direct object, including the verb,
the subject or some other category.
The two unique facts about the direct object clitic listed above
(that iL is suffixal and attaches to any category) can be reduced to the
claim that the direct object clitic must precede the direct object. We
can reduce this further by asking why the direct object can appear
on the same side of the verb as the direct object clitic, separating the
direct object cases from the other cases already discussed where the
clitic was on the opposite side of the head than the adjunct.
We can provide a satisfactory answer to why (i.) direct object
clitics are suffixal; and (ii.) direct objects can appear on the same side
of the head as their associated agreement markers by consideration
of the facts of Yagua subjects:
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(63) a. Pauro puuchu Anita
Paul carry Anita
'Paul carries Anita.'
b. sa-puuchu(-nii) Anita
3S-carry 30 Anita
'He/she carries Anita.'
c. sa-puuchu Pauro-nii Anita
'Paul carries Anita.'
d. *Pauro sa-puuchu(-nii) Anita
('Paul carries Anita.')
e. *puuchu(-nii) Anita
('e carries Anita.')
Like the postpositional cases, exactly one nominal must precede
the verb. This nominal may be either the agreement marker (sa-)
above or an overt NP. If an agreement marker appears, then the NP
may follow the verb, and support the direct object clitic.
Recall the structure we assumed for adpositional phrases in
Yagua, reprinted below:
(64)
PP
P NP
NP P
AGR1  P
I I
tsO- viimu~ Jumufiu
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We required two NP positions because of the possibility of a
prehead or posthead NP appearing. With direct objects, we also get
two nominal elements. If we assumed the subject cases were parallel
to the adposition cases we would have to generate the following
farfetched structure:
(65)
V-
V" NP
AGR Anita
V' NP nii
AGR V Pouro
I I
sa puuchu
It seems rather unlikely that such a VP should be permittud in
the grammar, An alternative is to assume, as has been argued for
many VSO !anguages (e.g., Sproat, 1983), that verb movement occurs
to derive the VSO word order. This leads to a much simplified
structure which solves the problems with the subject and direct
object cases. Assume the following structure:
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CvIV+1
AGR V+1
se- puuchu
IP
Spec, IP l'
NP. Infl VP
t V NP
AGR Vt
Pauro -nii Anita
-j IL -J
We assume verb raising to C (from V to I to C) to generate the
VSO order and to get the subject in the government domain of the
verb (see, for example, Sproat, 1983). We want the postverbal
subject to be licensed in the same way as the postadpositional NP. If
we assume movement, we do not have to assume that the direct
object clitic is a suffix since whether it is a prefix or a suffix, verb
raising does not (appear to be able to) take the direct object
agreement marker along. We have independently motivated the fact
that the direct object clitic appears on the constituent preceding the
direct object (since it cannot attach to the direct object itself). So, we
can then assume that the direct object clitic begins as a prefix like
the other agreement markers in Yagua. Under the analysis the direct
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(66)
object cases are totally regular in their behavior as compared to the
inflection which appears on the other heads in the language.
Going over this again. The underlying structure is SVO, as
follows:
(67)
CP
Spec C'
C IP
Spec I'
Pouro I VP
V NP
I Ipuuchu Anita
The verb will raise to I (INFL) to get tense. The V+I complex
may remain in I and license the subject by leftward theta-marking
as in any other constituent, or else they may license an agreement
marker (sa-). If the thematic-role is assigned to sa-, then the subject
may not be 'censed from the right, as we expect. This forces raising
of the V+I complex to C, where it can license the subject to the
right. 24 The only complication being that the subject does not appear
as a right constituent in VP, presumably because / has merged with
24 We have been unspecific in specifying the internal structure of the V+I
complex. It is unlikely that anything will hinge on thyis.
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Infl. Thus, the subject occupies a position in IP, which is natural
since its licensing category is V+I. There are two possible structures:
(68a)
CP
Spec C.
C
V+t"
AGR V
I I
so- puuchu
IP
Spec
Pouro
"ME
CP
Spec C'
C IP
I I8I'
e l
V+j NP VP
AGR V PIuro
I I
so- puuchut
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VP
V
I
(68b)
NP
I
Anito
NP
kni to
The form in (68b), perhaps surprisingly, is the structure that
makes the subject cases seem more like the postposition cases since
the NP adjunct subject shares a maximal projection with the licensing
head. Alternately one could assume the structure in (68a) which has
the V+I raising to C. Adopting this analysis would force us to assume
that the licensing relation between the head and the adjunct is not
headedness but another relation, perhaps Case. Structure (68b)
requires no added assumptions and it is the form we will assume to
be correct.
4.6 A Hale-type Analysis of Yagua
How might Hale analyze Yagua. We will focus just on the
postpositional phrase cases, which should give us an indication of
how a Hale-style analysis might work.Unlike the cases Hale considers
in Yagua both an agreement morpheme nnd an overt NP may appear
in Yagua but the appearance of the agreement marker limits the
positional possibilities of the NP. It would be insufficient to adopt an
analysis which places the agreement marker (sa-) in the same
position as the overt NP at D-structure, such as the position
preceding the lexical head:
(69)
PP
NP P
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This structure would allow us to generate either jumuhiu viimdi
or sa-viimi and would avoid the ungrammatical *jumuiu sa-viimd
but could not generate the acceptable sa-viimd jumuiu. Given that
there are two nominals in Yagua, Hale must assume two nominal
position which are coindexed. Coindexing is required to rule out a
form such as that in (70):
(70) *sai-viimnl jumufluk
3- inside canoe
('inside it, inside the canoe')
In our analysis, we can rule out (70) by the claim that the
adjunct is theta-dependent on the clitic (a claim built into our
Jelinek-style way of thinking about non-configurational languages).
For Hale, however, generating two nominal positions which are
coindexed is simply ad hoc it seems to us since his analysis provides
no explanation of why these positions should be linked. Conceding
then that Hale can generate these two coindexed positions, how
would he handle the postpositional phrase examples?
We know the second position can contain an NP which is
coindexed with an agreement clitic and that the reverse is not true.
Thus in a structure like sa-viimd jumuniu, sa- and jumuiu are
coindexed. The NP jumufu is an R-expression and so cannot be
bound. The agreement marker is pronominal (whether a pronoun or
an anaphor we cannot say) and can be bound. The grammaticality of
sa-viimd jumuiu shows that it is not a violation of Condition C of the
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Binding Theory and thus jumuniu is not c-commanded by sa-. This
fact determines the following D-structure configuration:
(71)
PP
P' NP
NPP jumuniu
I I I 0
sa viime
If we assume that such a structure is accurate, we can develop
an analysis along the lines of Hale's analysis by assuming that these
two positions can contain the full range of nominals complements, 0,
agreement markers or NPs, as follows:
(72)
PP
P NP
NP P so
II jumunu
Jumuiu
This theory seems to overgenerate a great deal but Binding
Theory will filter out all but one ungrammatical cases. Case by case:
(73) sa-viim6 jumuftu
3-inside canoe
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This case is acceptable and the theory generates it since it is
possible to generate any two NPs and there is no Binding theory
effect.
(74) *jumuflu viimd sa
canoe inside 3
This case is unacceptable but may be excluded as a Condition C
violation since sa- would c-command and bind jumunu.
(75) *jumuflu viimu jumuflu
canoe inside canoe
This unacceptable case is also a Condition C violation since the
second NP binds the first.
A case which cannot be excluded by Binding theory follows:
(76) *sa-viimd sa or sa-viimdi-sa
3-inside 3
Our only recourse here is to say that sa is inherently a prefixal
clitic and cannot survive as a single word. This would extend to
jumufu viimd sa or jumufu viima-sa discussed above as a Condition
C violation.
Is this theory acceptable? This proposal is not out of the
question but it does tend to take much of the interest out of Hale's
proposal. If we can only save Hale's theory for Yagua by Condition
C we may wonder what it is about Yagua that Hale's analysis can
explain. The only way to get complementary distribution for the
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prehead position and appearance of a posthead NP is to freely
generate NPs in both positions, relying on Binding Theory to sort out
the incorrect cases. Though this analysis generates the correct cases,
it does it in an almost underhanded way since it does not address the
central question it raises: is it really possible to freely generate
multiple NPs which are associated with only one position in the
theta-grid of a head, leaving Binding Theory to exclude the
unacceptable cases? The answer to this question must be 'no-for a
reason familiar from theta-theory: there is no reason to generate
more NPs than can be accommodated by the argument structure. Of
course, apart from elegance and intuition, there is no reason not to
freely generate multiple NPs, letting th e Binding Theory sort out the
ungrammatical cases. What then is at issue between our analysis
and Hale's?
4.7 Two Alternative Views
We must make two assumptions in our analysis. First, we must
assume that NPs which are not directly licensed by the head (by, say,
0-marking) must be licensed as adjuncts by that head. This is not
surprising. Even if the agreement morpheme can provide Case and
thematic-roles to the NP by transference, the head still controls the
elements which enter into its maximal projection XP and the NP not
directly licensed by the head must still have its appearance
registered by the head. This condition might be true of all languages
permitting NPs and agreement morphemes (including Navajo and
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Warlpiri, for example) or it may be language specific (including, for
example, Yagua and perhaps Hixkaryana). In any event it is
reasonable to expect that at least some languages have such a
requirement. We assume Yagua is one such language.
The second assumption we have made in our analysis is that a
single language may assign thematic-roles to NPs or to agreement
clitics. Though perhaps less parsimonious than the conclusion that a
language could assign to NPs or agreement clitics but not both, we
should not be surprised if this assumption is correct. This
assumption is quite natural if we believe the following: (1) Jelinek is
correct in assuming thematic-role assignment to agreement
morphemes and NPs as adjuncts in some languages (which seems
strongly supported by Navajo); (2) Hale's superficial characteristics of
non-configurationality are the major data of non-configurationality;
(3) Navajo and Dogrib do not differ with respect to the superficial
characteristics; (4) Dogrib cannot be analyzed as always assigning
thematic-roles to agreement clitics. Believing the four claims above
leads us to propose an analysis which maximizes the similarities
between Navajo and Dogrib. Since we cannot claim that Dogrib
always assigns thematic-roles to agreement clitics, we assume that
the complementary distribution facts suggest that Dogrib has the
option of thematic role assignment to clitics, perhaps even that it is
the favored strategy.
We may contrast our system with Hale's directly. We believe
that Jelinek is essentially correct in the claim that agreement
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elements receive thematic-roles and that this explains the relevant
superficial characteristics of non-configurationality. We believe, as
in Alexander (1986), that languages with agreement for subject and
direct object are almost always non-configurational in the sense of
Navajo {having extensive null anaphora, lacking pleonastics and
lacking NP movement transformations). We believe Irish to be
configurational on the basis of its being [-Agreement, -Case] in the
sense of the case/agreement distinction in chapter 3. We
consequently believe that Irish cannot assign thematic-roles to NP
(or, at least, that is a marked strategy for Irish) and hence that the
similarities between Irish and Dogrib claimed by Hale are merely
accidental. As for the advantages of our proposal, we believe first
that it makes sense of the typological curiosities of Yagua and
Guajajara discussed in Payne (1986) and Harrison (1986) by
explaining why agreement marked categories behave like OV
language categories while non-agreement marked categories behave
like VO language categories. We believe our analysis is
independently motivated by Dogrib, Navajo and Kpelle and we
believe that we can account easily for how a child might come to
learn the originally surprising agreement facts of Yagua: from
prefixal agreement clitics, they learn leftward theta-marking and
from the VO character of the language as VSO, they learn that the
language is head-initial and hence that it licenses adjunct NPs to the
right. Finally, we believe that our general approach
(case/agreement) strongly predicts languages of the Yagua type,
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since adjunct NPs are predicted by our theory in general (following
Jelinek) and Travis' (1987) independently motivated claim that the
direction of theta-marking may be different from the direction of
licensing of adjuncts [that is that there are separate headedness and
theta-marking directional parameters].
Hale analysis by contrast has two apparent strengths. First, it
is able to capture the similarities between Irish and Dogrib. As we
have shown, researchers committed to Jelinek's theory of non-
configurationality cannot find this attractive, except at the cost of
classifying Dogrib and Irish as equally (non-)configurational, a move
with unattractive consequences. Secondly, Hale's analysis appears
able to explain why VSO languages can have complementary
distribution between subject inflection and overt subjects while non-
VSO cannot. From the point of view of a Jelinek or case/agreement
analysis of non-configurationality which treats NPs as adjuncts, it
would be surprising if the same government relations for NPs
obtained in both configurational languages such as Irish and in non-
configurational languages such as Yagua. In §5.2, however, we show
that this apparent advantage of Hale's analysis is illusory. We show
a language which is not VSO but which has complementary
distribution between subjects and subject inflection, and we show for
this language that it cannot have the same locality condition on
zubject incorporation as Irish.
Reviewing the weaknesses of Hale's system; first Hale's theory
is essentially circular in that it correlates complementary distribution
289
with incorporation but the only evidence for incorporation is the
complementary distribution itself. The same argument goes through
with respect to agreement. Secondly, Hale's analysis does not
predict the existence of languages like Yagua since the
complementary distribution of an NP and an agreement morpheme
does not suggest that the NP is free to surface elsewhere. Third,
Hale's analysis excludes an analysis of non-configurationality which
treats agreement markers as argumental and NPs, when they appear,
as adjuncts. This is not to say that this analysis is necessarily true
(we have shown arguments against such a view in this work) but
proponents of Hale's analysis must provide an alternative view of
non-configurationality which can explain the superficial
characteristics of Hale (1982).
4.8 Multiple Nominals in Italian and Hopi
Having proposed a theory of multiple nominals in Yagua, we
now consider two other languages which also permit multiple
generation of nominals and, in particular, we consider whether the
analyses of these languages can be extended to Yagua in place of our
analysis.
A analysis along the lines we suggested as a Hale-type analysis
of Yagua may be motivated by consideration of the structure of Hopi
(Uto-Aztecan) as analyzed by LaVerne Jeanne (1978).
First, Hopi shows the NP/inflection cooccurrence pattern
previously demonstrated for Hixkaryana, with cooccurrence with
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third person forms and complementary distribution with non-third
person forms:
(77) a. taaqa-t poko-?at mooki
man-OBL dog-3 die
'The man's dog died.'
b. *taaqa-t po2ko mooki
man-OBL dog die
('The man's dog died.')
c. po?ko-?at mooki
dog- 3 die
'His dog died.'
(78) a. witi taaqa-t
woman man-OBL
(Jeanne, 1978; 105)
(Ken Hale: p.c.)
(Ken Hale: p.c.)
7a-mim timalayta
3-with work
'The woman is working with him.' (Jeanne, 1978; 104)
b. *wi2ti ni-y
woman me-OBL
?ini-mim timala?yta
1- with work
('The woman is working with me.')
c. witi ?ini-mim timala?yta
woman 1- with work
'The woman is working with me.'
(Ken Hale: p.c.)
(Ken Hale: p.c.)
In (77), all third person examples, the inflection on the
adposition is obligatory (?a-mim vs. *mim) and the NP is optional, as
in Navajo. In (78), however, we see that, again, the inflection on the
adposition is obligatory (ini-mim vs. *m im) but the NP is
obligatorily absent (*ni-y ini-mim vs. ?ini-mim). Thus, Hopi
inflection shows the same sensitivity to person found in the
Hixkaryana cases and, in fact, these cases like exactly like Warlpiri's
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with an inflected adposition (?a-mim) appearing with a third person
nominal (taaqa-t, man).
Across categories, Hopi has a different construction more
similar to a topic-comment structure which initially seems
reminiscent of the Yagua sa-viimd jumuniu type construction, for
example, in (79), the overt direct object NP appears in a sort of topic
position:
(79) mi? tivo?vai, ni? pji- 1 tiwi?yla
that boy, I him-OBL know:sg
'That boy, I know him.' (Jeanne, 1978; 319)
In (64), there is object number agreement between the verb
(tiwi~yta, singular, vs. tiwimifyta, non-singular) and the direct object
position is filled with a case marked pronoun, while the case-less
"overt NP" appears in what Jeanne assumes to be a Spec or Topic
position, with a structure as follows:
(65)
S"1
SpecS
Comp
mi? tiyo?ya
that boy
S
NP VP
KP
I
ni? p-t
I him-OBL
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V
I
twi?yta
know
In this case, we have to have the option of generating a
pronoun in the subcategorized direct object position and a full NP in
aSpec position. We nihtO wonder why this is not possible in Yagua,
with the following structure for a sentence.
(80)
PP
P" Spec, PP
NP P
I I
so- viimi Jumu6u
The post-head NP (jumuriu) would bchave like the topic NP in
(80) in Hopi. In Hopi, the direct object pronoun acts like a real
argument, it receives case, and the NP in SPEC is not case marked. As
in Yagua, it is not possible to generate an overt NP in the direct
object position and in the SPEC position, hence (*mi? riyo?ya, ni? mi?
tiyoya-t tiwilyta, that boy, I know that boy) just as *jumunu viim4
jumunu is unacceptable in Yagua-and this does suggest that
reference to Condition C of the Binding Theory might not be
unnatural for Yagua. Can we show that Jeanne's analysis of Hopi
does not extend to Yagua?
First, the details of Jeanne's case is not particularly clear. For
example the two types of constructions we have considered, the case
with a left-dislocated direct object and the postposition construction,
are different from one another. In the left-dislocated example, the
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overt full NP (the boy) is not case marked and the oblique case
marker appears on a pronoun. In the postposition example, the
overt NP is case marked and the "pronoun" appears, non-case
marked, as a clitic on the postposition itself. This construction is
parallel to the corresponding case in Navajo and Hixkaryana, which
we analyzed with the assumption of thematic-role assignment to the
agreement clitic. The left dislocated example is presumably parallel
to the English construction of the same form "That boy, I like him" or,
to take Jelinek's example "He, the doctor, tells me, the patient, what
to do." In this example, we assume that the pronouns are the overt
arguments and the full NPs are adjuncts. The Yagua cases do not
have the force of left dislocation examples (see Payne, 1986, and
Everett, 1988) and thus seem distinct from the Hopi cases.
The underlying issue is still salient, is there a reason why we
can't assume multiple generation of NPs to account for Yagua-
abstracting over the difference between the left-dislocation
interpretations in Hopi which do not appear in Yagua. We may still
rely on the arguments given against Hale's analysis above, and point
to the strength of our analysis, but there is an analysis of Italian
which raises the multiple nominal point in a stronger form than Hopi
does.
The analysis, due to Brandi and Cordin (1988), discusses two
Northern Italian dialects and shows how these dialects differ from
standard Italian. In these dialects, spoken in Trentino and
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Fiorentino, the standard null subject effects of Italian seem to be
missing. Hence: Brandi and Cordin (1988, 111-112)
(81) a. Parli
'(You) speak'
b. *Parli
c. Tu parli
'You speak.'
d. Te parli
'You speak.'
cf. Tu parles
'You speak.'
Standard Italian (SI)
Trentino (T), Fiorentino (F)
(F)
(T)
(French) *Parles
'(You) speak.'
The pronouns in (c-d) above have the characteristics of clitic
pronouns, being unaccented and required to appear adjacent to the
verb. The clitics have the property of appearing with regular
pronouns and oven NPs. (ibid., 113)
(82) a. Te tu parli
You you speak
'You speak.'
b. Ti te parli
You you speak
'You speak'
c. Mario e parla
Mario he speaks
'Mario speaks.'
d. El Mario el parla
the Mario he speaks
'Mario speaks.'
(F)
(T)
(F)
(T)
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cf. *Jean il parles (French)
John he speaks
('John speaks')
In this case, the two dialects do not behave like French, where
an NP cannot cooccur with a subject clitic pronoun without a left
dislocation intonation contour. It is possible to show, very clearly for
Fiorentino, that the sentences above are not left-dislocation
examples, which have a very different form in Fiorentino: (ibid.,
114)
(83) a, Te, e tu parti troppo
You, TOPIC you speak too much
'As for you, you speak too much.'
b. La Maria, e la parla troppo
The Mary, TOPIC she speaks too much
'As for Mary, she speaks too much.'
Another distinction between French and the two Italian
dialects is in the possibility of free subject inversion. As noted in
Chomsky (1981), Burzio (1986), and Rizzi (1982), non-null subject
languages only permit subject inversion with ergative verbs and
indefinite NPs, while null subject languages dro not show these
restrictions. As noted by Brandi and Cordin, the facts for English,
French and standard Italian follow:
(84) a. Sono venute delle ragazze.
b. There arrived sonc girls.
c. 11 est venu des filles.
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(85) a. d ventua Maria.
b. *There arrived Mary.
c. *11 est venu Maria.
(86) a, Hanno telefonato delle ragazze.
b. *Tmere telephoned some girls.
c. *U a telephon6 des filles.
The two Italian dialects do permit free subject inversion.
(87) a. Gl' venuto delle ragazze. (F)
b. E vegnd qualche putela. (T)
(88) a. Gl'6 venuto la Maria. (F)
b. E vegn6 la Maria. (T)
(89) a. GI'ha telefonato delle ragazze. (F)
b. Ha telefond qualche putela. (T)
Brandi and Cordin propose the following structure for
sentences of Tfentino and Fiorentino:
(90)
I-
NP r
VP
la Maria la pali
The clitic pronoun la is a "spelling out of AGR". As with other
Italian dialects, the subject NP can be p ro, generating the
grammnafical "pro la parla". Might we be able to extend this analysis
to Yagua?
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Again, it appears that the answer is 'no'. If we assume that a
clitic such sa- ('third person') is a spelling out of the features of
Yagua AGR, we would be led to expect that it would be obligatory,
like its Trentino and Fiorentino counterparts. In fact, we can show
(1) that sa- is not obligatory and that (2) Yagua does not seem to
have pro with the following familiar data.
(91) a. jumuinu viimd
canoe inside
'inside the canoe.'
b. *pro viima
;nside
('inside it.')
We know that it is possible to generate the sequence NP P in
Yagua without sa-, or a spelling out of AGR-in fact, such a spelling
out would lead to an ungrammatical string (*'jumuhiu sa-viimU).
Further, we know that it is not possible to substitute pro for the
lexical subject in (91a). if there were a pro in Yagua, if Yagua were a
null-subject language in the Italian sense, we would expect (91b) to
be grammatical, paralleling Par/i in Standard Italian. An alternative
would be to assume that pro is limited to cases where a clitic appears
but this is not true of standard Italian and could only be stipulated
for Yagua. Such a condition is also only trivially true of pro in the
two Italian dialects since the clitics are obligatory. It does not seem
possible to extend the analysis of the Northern Italian dialects to
Yagua in any straightforward manner.
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It might be possible, however, to extend the analysis of these
dialects to Navajo type languages where the agreement clitic is
obligatory but this would only add the unwarranted positing of p r o
in Navajo which seems not particularly helpful as discussed in
Chapter 1. We have accounted for the Navajo facts already with the
stipulation of theta-assignment to agreement clitics. The Brandi-
Cordin data essentially state this as "a spelling out of AGR". In a
language with pro, it is appropriate to think of agreement clitics as
AGR, but for languages without pro, from a theta-theoretic point of
view, it seems to make more sense to assume thematic-role
assignment to the agreement clitics. Though this may seem to miss
possible generalizations between Navajo and the Northern Italian
dialects, it does make sense of the typological data from non-
configurationality.
4.9 Conclusions
We began this study with an exploration of word order. We
suggested there that two of the largest contributing factors to word
order were case marking and theta-assignment. With the issue of
configurationality, however, we faced a challenge to the theory of
word order which we were developing because of the existence of
non-configurational languages. Jelinek suggested there were two
types of languages: those which assigned theta-roles to agreement
markers and those which did not but this claim faced two difficult
problems related to the work of Ken Hale (1989). Hale called
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attention to mixed cases, like Dogrib and Irish, which did not show
the two way distinction predicted by Jelinek. Further, Hale's analysis
of these languages led to the result that all such middle cases were
configurational since his system based generated agreement
morphemes and full NPs in the same positions to which they were
presumably assigned their theta-roles. Hence, Jelinek's analysis
could not be true if Hale's was correct.
In this chapter, we have argued against Hale's analysis and
proposed that some of Jelinek's distinction can be kept: we argue that
there are languages which assign thematic-roles to clitics and that
this was essentially the defining characteristic of a type of
grammatical system called non-configurational-a system largely
defined by Hale's (1982) superficial characteristics of
configurationality.
In the next chapter we attempt to do three things, First we
will consider the apparently quite complicated facts of lHixkaryana
'portmanteau' agreement which was analyzed in Alexander (1988) as
supporting Hale's incorporation/agreement distinction, We now
argue that Hale's analysis cannot account for the facts of llixkaryana.
Secondly we will consider Canela-Krah6, an Amazonian SOV language
with complementary distribution of subject NPs and subject
inflection (a property which Hale's assumed to be limited to VSO).
We will argue that CanelaKrah6 undermines perhaps the most
attractive aspect of Hale's theory, the claim that such complementary
distribution is limited to VSO because of the special relation between
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verbs and subjects in VSO. Finally, we will review the material here,
focusing on the questions 'what if anything is non-configurationality'
and 'what is the relation between Irish agreement and Dogrib
agreement'.
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Chapter 5
Incorporation and Locality
5.1 Path Containment in Hlxkaryana
In this section, we discuss an analysis of apparent 'portmanteau'
agreement in Hixkaryana (Carib) derived from our own Alexander
(1988) and based on Hale's analysis of incorporation and agreement.
We will argue that the original Alexander (1988) arguments mistakenly
claimed that these facts supported Hale's analysis.
Portmanteau agreement is agreement which uses a single
morpheme to simultaneously reference the person of the subject and
of the direct object. Portmanteau agreement is to be contrasted with
simple subject agreement, as in Spanish (la), or subject and object
agreement as in Warlpiri (1b):
(1) a. Yo habl-o Spanish (Indo-European, Romance)
'I speak-1s'
'I speak'
b. ka- ma-ngku nya-nyi Warlpiri (Pama-Nyungan)
'PRES-2S- 10 see-NONPAST
'I see you'
c. w- enyhoretxehkan Hixkaryana (Carib)
'1S30- finished making
'I finished making it'
Portmanteau agreement presents problems for analyses such as
that in Chomsky (1989) in which agreement is a structural relation
between syntactic positions (between subject and AGR and between
object and AGR-0). We will argue that a maximally simple account of
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Hixkaryana agreement assumes that Hixkaryana verbs agree with a
single nominal (i.e., does not manifest portmanteau agreement) and
that the Path Containment Condition of Pesetsky (1982) discussed in
Chapter 3 accounts for which nominal argument triggers agreement.
Consider the agreement morpheme mi- which Derbyshire
(1979, 1985) assumes to be IISIO, IISIIIO in transitive clauses and IIS
in intransitives and copular clauses. We would claim that mi- is IS
and that IS triggers agreement when acting on 10 or 1IIO:
Derbyshire's portmanteau paradigm follows in (2) while our proposed
paradigm follows in (3):1
(2) Portmanteau Person Marking Prefixes (Derbyshire: 1985)
Obj I+II II I III Intrans Subj Copula Subi
Subj
I+IIt- t-
III-- Mki-, o-, w- mn-, ni-
requires reflexive form
(3) Subject and Object Agreement Clitics
Subject forms Object forms
Is: kti- 1o: ro-
2s: mi- 2o: o-
3s: nt- 3o: g-
1+2s: t-- 1+2o: kt-
See note 3 for a discussion of the I+III subject agreement which is omitted here.
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Support for our claim that there are distinct subject and object
sets of agreement prefixes comes from the fact that the proposed
object set in (3) is identical to the agreement prefixes used to mark
nominals:
(4) Person marking of nominals
rowani (my chest) ro-owa-ni
oyowani (your chest) o-owa-ni
Waraka yowani (Waraka's chest) y-owa-ni
kowani (our [Inc1] chests-) ki-owa-ni
This correlation would be surprising if Hixkaryana had true
portmanteau agreement and we will assume that Hixkaryana
agreement is always with a particular nominal. Consequently, we will
need to posit some method of selecting which argument will be the
trigger of agreement. We will assume the following as an accurate
statement of the facts any analysis of agreement must explain, derived
essentially from Derbyshire's paradigm in (5):
(5) Hixkaryana Agreement (Initial Formulation)
a. Where subject is I, II, or I+II assign subject agreement
else if object is I, II, or 1+11 assign object agreement
b. else (3-3 Agreement)
Assign y- if direct object precedes verb.
or Assign n- if subject precedes verb.
else Assign ni- elsewhere. 2
2 The two rules for allomorphs of n(i) are needed because of a class of cases where
deletion of both 3Subject and 30bJect agreement markers occurs before a verb-stem-
initial consonant. In such cases, there is an apparent epenthesis (or reinsertion) of n- if
the subject is the NP immediately preceding the verb (to avoid ambiguity since such a
preceding NP could be the object and verbal agreement cannot distinguish in this case);
see Derbyshire, 1985, and Alexander, 1985a.
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A rule which simply stated the facts above would presumably be
far too difficult for the child to learn. We will attempt to reduce (5) to
(6):
(6) Hixkaryana Agreement (Second Version)
A verb agrees with the closest subject or object.
Notice that though (5) is particularly complicated, a great deal of
the complexity comes from the fact that 3rd person is deficient in its
agreement. Subject agreement is clearly dominant over object
agreement when both of the arguments is I, II or I+II. If III subject
were dominant over non-III objects, the rule would be much more
simple. Certainly 3rd person is often deficient in its expression in the
agreement paradigm in the world's language but these deficiencies
rarely lead to complexity in the agreement paradigm of the Hixkaryana
type. Might be there be a difference between III and non-III
arguments from which the agreement complexities follow? We believe
that independently motivated differences in incorporatability of III and
non-III arguments is the basis of the agreement pattern. In Hale's
analysis coocurrence of inflection with an NP will be evidence that
incorporation of the inflection did not occur. Recall the facts of
inflected postpositions in Hixkaryana?
(7) a. n-oseryehyaha biryekomo (*uro) ro-hana
3s-is afraid boy I 1- to
The boy is afraid of me'
b. [(*omoro) o-min I y-awo-hra w-ahko
you 2-house 3- in- neg is- was
'I was not in your house'
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In (7a), we see that a first person pronoun cannot cooccur with
inflection on the verb (this true for I, II, and I+II) but in (7b) the third
person 'your house' can cooccur with inflection on the postposition
'not-in'. Thus, following Hale we assume that syntactic incorporation
occurs for non-3rd person and agreement occurs for third person.
Tentatively assume that this incorporation is constant across
categories, N, P and V for example (see, on this point, McCloskey and
Hale, 1984). Thus, when a 10 occurs with a IIIS, the 10 will
incorporate while the IIIS will remain in situ, as in structure below.
[Note the adargument language structure we are assuming for now]: 3
(8)
VP
VP NP
NP VP N
N AGR V
noro
ti roj III
I
In a case where one pronoun incorporates and another does not
(i.e. is third person) as above, we predict correctly that the
incorporating pronoun will be closer to the verb and hence trigger
3 Hxkaryana has a 1+111 form which I have suppressed to this point. In this case there
is a III subject clitic (ni) and the 1st person pronoun amna appears immediately
preceding the verb. even when there is an overt direct object. It seems reasonable to
assume that incorporation occurs here since the subejct pronoun amna appears in a
position where a normal subject pronoun or full NP is impossible, between the direct
object and the verb. One might have proposed that only one element was allowed to
incorporate into but I+III shows the overt appearance of two pronominal elements in
V. We will discuss this in more detail with reference to Panare.
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agreement. This accounts for the apparent dominance of I, II and I+II
(the incorporating pronouns) over III (the non-incorporating
pronouns).
Consider now the case where both object and subject are
incorporating (are I, II, I+II). As we have seen, in this case,
agreement is always with the subject. Do we need to state subject
dominance over object as a primitive fact about Hixkaryana or are we
able to explain this? Consider the possible structures:
(9) (a)
VP
NP
NP VPN
N 10 V t
t j GR VIIIS
(b)
VP
VP NP
NP N
N IS . V t-
t jAGR V
IOtNO
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In (9a) the subject pronoun incorporates first, followed by the
direct object clitic. The subject pronoun would be closer therefore,
and trigger agreement. The reverse order of adjunction (9b) would
result in object agreement. The structure in (9a) is to be preferred
since incorporated subjects always trigger agreement even in the
presence of an incorporated object. Is there are principled way to
accept (9a) but exclude (9b)? In fact, Pesetsky's (1982) Path
Containment Condition derives this result.
(10) Path Containment Condition
If two paths overlap, one must contain the other.
In (9a) the path from the incorporated direct object pronoun to
the direct object position (containing a trace) lies along the path from
the incorporated subject pronoun to the subject position. The subject
and object paths overlap, but the subject path contains all of the object
path, consistent with PCC. This is not the case in (9b) where the
object path and the subject paths overlap but neither path contains the
other. The subject path, for example, only contains one link of the
object path. Thus, the PCC properly distinguishes cases (9a-b). In
cases where both subject and object are incorporating pronouns, PCC
correctly predicts subject agreement. Thus, subject dominance over
object need not be independently specified.
Finally, consider the cases of agreement where neither
argument has an incorporated pronoun (the 3-3 agreement cases). We
assume that the position immediately preceding the verb is somehow
special, and closer to the verb than other NPs, perhaps as a function of
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this position being the Specifier of the category VP.
Spec of VP will be closer than subjects adjoined to VP (as below):4
(11)
VP
VP NP
NP VP
t. Spec V
NP AGR V
The direct object moves into Spec of VP and triggers agreement.
When there is no direct object, the subject may occupy Spec of VP and
trigger agreement. The only remaining case is where there is no NP
is Spec of VP and no pronoun adjoined to V, hence no trigger of
agreement. Here AGR lacks an index and agreement surfaces as third
person subject agreement which is presumably the default case
universally.
To summarize, inflected adpositions and nominals in Hixkaryana
suggest an asymmetry whereby non-III pronouns incorporate into
heads while III pronouns do not. If we generalize this to verbs, we
predict that incorporated pronouns when they surface with non-
incorporated arguments will be nearer to the verb (or AGR) and,
4 Once again I+III subject is suggestive. The order OSV is blocked unless the S is the
incorporated pronominal amna. Thus, no NP may occupy a 'real position' between
direct object and verb, suggesting that both direct object and subject 'compete' for the
verb preceding position which we have assumed to be Spec. It might be more reasonable
to start the direct object in Spec of VP. I have not done this because I am assuming
Jelinek's analysis of rich agreement languages and because when the direct object is
null, I do not want an empty category associated with the null direct object to block the
subject's appearance in Spec.
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Thus, objects in
hence, trigger agreement. In cases where both subject and object
incorporate to the verb, the Path Containment Condition will correctly
predict that the subject must incorporate first and hence be nearer to
V (or AGR) and trigger agreement. Where neither subject nor object
has an incorporated pronoun (3-3 agreement), agreement is with the
element in Spec, which will be the direct object if it is non-null or in
the absence of a direct object, the subject. When neither element is in
Spec of VP, AGR fails to receive an index and predictably surfaces as
third person subject agreement, the universal default.
Naturally the claim that Path Containment applies to clitics and
their binders has many predictions for movement. Movement does
provide support for the claim that PCC applies as we have suggested as
discussed in Chapter 3. A case which does not rely on PCC suggests
that the rule in (12) might be overly broad and may reduce to (12'):
(12) Hixkaryana Agreement (Second Version)
A verb agrees with the closest subject or object.
(12') Hixkaryana Agreement (Final Version)
A verb agrees with the closet nominal
The data come from copular clauses where the adjuncts must
postpose if the subject fronts.
(13) a. n-ehxakoni toto y-amotho arkaxah 0-wawo
3subj -was man 3-hand of thing-vomited 3-in
The man's hand was in the vomit'
b. toto y-amotho n-ehxakoni, arkaxah 0-wawo
man 3-hand of 3subj-was thing-vomited 3-in
The man's hand was in the vomit'
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In (13a) arguments are in their usual position. In (13b) the
subject has been fronted and postpositional phrase has been
dislocated. For the sake of the argument, make the assumption that
the subject cannot move to Spec of VP in copular constructions and,
thus, moves to a position higher in the tree than its normal position. 5
(14)
VP
VP PP
XP VP
DP V
VP C t.
Spec VP t
Agr. V
1
In its normal position the subject appears closer to the verb than
an adjunct (such as an indirect object) but if the subject fronts to a
higher position in the structure the adjunct will be closer to the verb
than the subject which if (12') is correct will lead to agreement with
the adjunct. Instead the adjunct dislocates to a position higher than
the subject, in which case the subject is closer to the verb and triggers
5 A point we have assumed throughout becomes salient at this point. We must assume
deletion if adjunct traces is possible following Lasnik and Saito (1984). In (13) the only
indices remaining after deletion are those of the agreement clitic, the subject and the
adjunct. None of the traces survive deletion, which would lead to a PCC violation.
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agreement. If this analysis is correct, (12) would be redundant and we
could reduce it to (12').
In conclusion, in Alexander (1988) we believed that Hale's
analysis of incorporation of inflection and our extension of the Path
Containment Condition to agreement prefixes provided a superior
analysis of Hixkaryana 'portmanteau' agreement but there is an
assumption in the above analysis which is untenable. In Hixkaryana 1st
and 2nd person pronouns can not cooccur with coreferential
agreement inflection, suggesting incorporation in Hale's system. But
Derbyshire (1985, p. 8) reports that 1st and 2nd person pronouns can
cooccur with subject (as in 15 below) and direct object Inflection:
(15) uro hakarha w-amaxe. Mawarve hakarha n-amekoni.
I in-turn 1S-fell. Mawarye in-turn 3S-felled
'Let me now take me turn at felling (trees). Manwarye
in turn was felling trees. (Derbyshire, 1985; 253)
We were aware of this fact in Alexander (1988) but made the
assumption that the evidence of incorporation in PPs and NPs should
give rise to the assumption that incorporation occurred across
categories. We did not appreciate that this assumption led to a totally
ad hoc analysis. Hale's system correlates complementary distribution
with incorporation and cooccurrence with agreement and Hixkaryana
NP arguments (of all persons) can cooccur with inflection on the verb,
hence Hixkaryana verbs show agreement with their NP arguments.
But the analysis of Alexander (1988) which supports Hale's analysis
can only derive the result by assuming incorporation onto V; hence
that incorporation would have to be abstract. Positing such abstract
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incorporation means that Hale cannot even maintain the correlation
between cooccurence and agreement since coocurrence could arise by
this abstract incorporation. Hence we reject the analysis is Alexander
(1988) though the relative success of the analysis is suggestive. 6
5.2 Subject Complementary Distribution in Canela-Krah6 7
Thus far we have discussed complementary distribution in two
types of XPs: (1) categories where the head selected the argument
inflected for; i.e., where simple head-complement relations obtained
such as prepositions and their objects; and (2) between subject and
subject agreement inflection in VSO languages where by hypothesis
the verb properly governs the subject. This seemed natural since we
were assuming that complementary distribution arises from head
movement and we would expect that the movement would have to be
subject to the Empty Category Principle. In this section we will
discuss a different type of subject/subject agreement complementary
distribution in which, arguably, the subject is governed.
The language we will discuss is Canela-Krah6 (an SOV Je
language of Amazonia) discussed in Popjes and Popjes (1986).8 In
6 It is possible that Hixkaryana permits cooccurrence in rare marked circumstances.
Examples of cooccurence are extremely rare. We are not yet acquainted with the facts.
If cooccurence can be shown to be limited to a marked set of circumstances, it may be
possible to save the Alexander (1988) analysis. Even so we are left with the fact that in
Hale's system the only evidence for incorporation is the complementary distribution
with which is correlated and we really have no objective basis for claiming that
incorporation has occurred in Hixkaryana.
7 The discussion of Canela-Krah6 has benefitted considerably by discussions with
Moni Dressler and Brian Sietsema. I must acknowledge particular thanks to Neal Blatt
who, perhaps unfortunately, has been tireless in his discussions of it.
8 Canela-Krah6 is a Je language of Brazil. Other Je languages are Timbira, Apinaje,
Xerente, Xavante and Kajapo. There are approximately 2000 speakers of Canela-Krah6
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Canela-Krah6 transitive clauses, if there is a subject NP it appears in
first position and is followed by a uninflected tense morpheme. If
there is no NP, the tense morpheme appears in first position with a
prefixal subject agreement proclitic.
(16) a. wapo te i-xec
knife PAST 1-cut
The knife cut me'
b. it-te hfihkir
1-PAST 3+buy
'I bought it'
The same complementary distribution between agreement and
NPs appears with direct objects which may be represented as a verbal
prefix (as in 17a) or as an NP:
(17) a. hfimre apu a-cakw~
man CONT 2-beat
'The man is beating you'
b. hilmre te rop cakwf'n
man PAST dog beat
The man beat the dog.'9
in three separate groups separated by, at most, 200 miles with minimal social contact
between the Canela villages (separated from each other by 30 miles) and the Kraho
village, 200 miles southwest of the Canela villages. The phylum-level classifications of
South-American languages are not clear (see Derbyshire and Pull: 1986). Greenberg
(1960) assumes a Ge-Pano-Carib family which would include Canela-Krah6 with the
Carib languages which include Hixkaryana, Apurifa, Apalai and other commonly
mentioned Amazonian languages as well as the Panoan languages which includes
Pirahd, a fairly well known Amazonian languages. Greenberg's classification is,
however, probably overly optimistic.
9 Note the difference between cakwin and cakwT. Verbs in Canela-Krah6 have long
forms and short forms with the long form(cakwin) appearing, generally, with the
(recent) past tense (as above) or when the verb stem is non-final in the verb phrase. See
PopJes and PopJes (1986, §23) for details.
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The tense morpheme need not appear in literal 2nd position
since, for example, a multi-part NP (as well as wh-words followed by
subjects) can precede the tense morpheme:
(18) htimre ata te rop cakwi'n
man that PAST dog beat
That man beat the dog.'
In intransitives the subject clitic is still in complementary
distribution with a subject NP but the subject clitic attaches to the
verb and not to the tense morpheme, which must appear in first
position:
(19) a. i-crer (long form--see note below)
1-sing
'I sang' (long form determines past)
b. pe ca cre (short form)
DISTANT PAST 2 sing (ca= ind. pron.)
You sang (long ago)'
Another type of construction (or voice), called the pseudo-
transitive by Popjes and Popjes (1986), involves merger of the
transitive and intransitive forms we have previously discussed. The
person prefix of the subject still may appear on the tense morpheme
but the agreement prefix on the verb also refers to the person of the
subject and the semantic direct object is demoted to an oblique
argument:
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(20) a. a-te po kam a-catoc (a = clitic pron)
2-PAST deer at 2-shoot
You shot (at) the deer.'
b. ca ha po kam a-cat6c (ca = ind. pron).
2 FUT deer at 2-shoot
You will shoot (at) the deer.'
c. i-te a-mi 1-cator
1-PAST 2-to 1 -arrive
'I found you (arrived to you)'
Note that in (20b) the independent pronoun ca- is in
complementary distribution with the subject clitic on the tense
morpheme but a subject clitic (a-) coreferential with ca- can appear on
the verb. The fact that the direct object must be demoted to oblique
suggests (as was suggested in Chapters 1-2) that in adargument
languages government by a lexical head is insufficient to license
nuclear terms. If government were sufficient to license a direct
object, we might expect a language with forms as follows:
(21) a. * a-te po a-cat6c
2-PAST deer 2-shoot
You shot the deer.'
b. * ca ha po a-cat6c
2 FUT deer 2-shoot
'You will shoot the deer'
This is not to say that such languages cannot exist but rather that
sentences of the form above would constitute evidence that
government was a licensing relationship in that language.
The facts of Canela-Krah6 seem initially to be very supportive of
Hale's analysis in particular and Principles and Parameters in general.
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In Principles and Parameters, it is assumed that tense has a part in
licensing subjects, by Case assignment. Of course, tense is not a
lexical category in English and is considered deficient in many
respects, one of which is that it cannot property govern subject
position (see for example, Chomsky, 1981; 1985a, and others). This
fact about tense will become significant in our discussion of Canela-
Kraho and we will briefly focus on it. Such a lack of proper
government by tense was the basis for generalization of the that-trace
effect (Chomsky and Lasnik, 1977) to the Empty Category Principle.
Consider the following classic contrast in G.B.:
(22) a. Whoi do you think [S' ti that [S Mark TENSE likes ti?
b. *Whoi do you think [S' ti that [S ti TENSE likes Mark ti?
The simple fact is that extraction from a subordinate clause
headed by a that is possible from direct object position but not from
subject position. The explanation centers on one claim (that the that
blocks antecedent government of a trace in the subordinate clause by
the trace in Comp) and two asymmetries: the first being that NPs must
be governed but empty categories must be properly governed; and the
second that verbs properly govern (their direct objects) while tense
does not properly govern (the subject). Hence, in (22a) the trace in
object position is properly governed by the verb and the subject is
governed by tense, predicting the sentence would be grammatical. In
(22b), however, the direct object is governed by the verb (and
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properly governed) but the trace in subject position is governed but
not properly governed, as is required by the Empty Category Principle.
and consequently (1b) is ungrammatical.
Interestingly, it was observed by Pearlmutter (1971) that null-
subject languages such as Italian systematically lacked the that-trace
effect:
(23) Chii credi [S' ti che [S ti verri
Who you-believe that will-come
Luigi Rizzi (1986) made an interesting claim that since null
subject languages also generally had the property of permitting
postverbal subjects (as in 3) that we could not distinguish the
representation in (2) from the representation in (2'):10
(24) a le brigate rosse hanno telefonato
the brigade red have phoned
b. ej hanno telefonato [NP le brigate rosseli
ec have phoned the brigade red
(23') Chii credi [S' ti che IS [VP verr. ti
Who you-believe that will-come
If the representation of (23') was the correct structure, as Rizzi
claimed, we could assume that the postverbal subject trace is properly
governed by the verb. Rizzi went on to claim that all wh-movement in
Italian originated in postverbal position and that, in fact, structures
like (23=22b) are as ungrammatical in Italian as they are in English.
10 Note that a strong argument for non-configurationality is provided by non-
configurational languages which lack free inversion such as, presumably, Navajo. It is
unlikely that such a process could be motivated for Canela-Krah6.
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Th1is interesting proposal was convincingly supported by Brandi and
Cordin (1989) who show that in the Trenuno and Florentino dialects
of Italian, unlike Standard Italian, preverbal subjects trigger
agreement while postverbal subjects do not and further that moved
wh-words do not trigger agreement in Trentino and Fiorentino as they
do In standard Italian. This supports the claim that only wh-extraction
from postverbali poslion Is possible in these Italian dialects and by
extension in standard Italian.
Given this background, we now return to Canela-Kraho. All of
the assumptions made about Italian and English were predicated on
the assumption that tense is not a proper governor. One might
wonder however whether a lexical tense marker such as appears in
Canela-Krah6 might be a proper governor. The Hale would be able to
make the claim that subject incorporation (complementary
distribution) is possible in two types of circumstances: VSO because
the verb properly governs the subject and languages like Canela-Krah6
in which a lexical tense is a proper governor. Such an analysis would
be very appealing and perhaps be strong enough to override the
objections to Hale's analysis suggested in Chapter 4. Is tense a proper
governor in Canela-Krah?
The crucial facts, as the discussion of English and Italian might
have suggested, will concern wh-movement. We have briefly seen two
facxts about Canela-Krahb. The first is that there is complementary
distribution between NPs and agreement on lexical heads and, less
obviously, every NP must be immediately followed by a lexical head-an
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adjacency requirement that might suggest Case assignment for reasons
familiar from §1.1. In intransitive sentences we have seen the order
subject-tense-direct object-verb, as below:
(24) a. hfimre apu a-cakwf
man CONT 2-beat
The man is beating you' (Popjes and Popjes, 1986; 10)
b. h'imre te rop cakwfn
man PAST dog beat
The man beat the dog.' (Ibid.: 11)
Consider a hypothetical case such as the following:
(25) Capi rop te a-xar
Capi dog PAST 2-bite
'Capi's dog bit you.' (ibid.; 169,156)
If we were to form a subject wh-question such as 'whose dog bit
you', we expect to derive the following form:
(26) *UUm j6 rop] ti
who POSSN dog
'Whose dog bit you?'
te a-xar
PAST 2-bite
(ibid.; 156)
In fact the wh-extractions always appear with an extra element:
(27) a. ji'm j6 rop te ma
who POSSN dog PAST mi
Whose dog bit you?' (ibid.)
a-xar
2-bite
mi§ ita ton
who PAST mi DEM do/make
'Who made/did this?' (ibid., 158)
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b. jlimi ti te
This unexpected element md has many uses in Canela-Krah6,
notably as the indirect object marker and as a general postposition.
Note that in (27a-b) md does not appear in subject position (before
tense) but, in fact, appears to be in indirect object position (after
tense).
Another interesting use of mA is as a tense marker with stative
predicates, The past tense marker (te) which we have seen several
ines marks habitual state while mA marks temporary state.
(28) a. I-te hfpa
1-HAB 3+fear
'I live afraid of it.'
b. i-mA a-kin
1-TEMP 2-like
'I like you (for now).'
Note crucially that object-wh extraction does not result in md at
all:11
(29) jfmi ca ha tj kri
what 2 FUT eat
'What willlyou eat?' (Popjes and Popjes, 1986; 154)
1 Obviously one would like to know whether md appears in adjunct. extractions. A
partial answer Is given In the text though It may be too optimistic. Briefly Canela-
Krahb uses two postpositions rt and md which have broad and contrastive uses,
Adjuncts such as directionals often have a surprising form such as J' rt rt'where to,
specific' andJd kam md, 'where to. general' and the contrasting amnpa na 'why', wmpo
naU md 'emphatic why' and amrpo nia ri 'emphatic why', There are several such
contrasting cases (see Popjes and Popjes, 1986, 155-157) which we are not yet able to
analyze. Popjes and Popjes do not discuss these Issues In any detail; fr~ example, the
simply assume that a subject wht-word and md form a discontinuous constituent , a
position we believe misses an interesting insight.
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MA also appears with adjunct wh-word words (marking objects
which already bear a postposition identifying the NP as oblique) but it
does not remain in situ. For example:
(30) Ui kam milj Capi ti mo
where to mi Capi go
Where is Capi going'
In (30a-b) the wh-phrase is completely fronted over the subject
(i.e. mi does not remain in "indirect object position" after Capi in
30a).
We have seen three types of wh-extractions: of subjects where
mi appears in a position that is demonstrably not subject position
(subjects appear before tense but md appears after tense); of objects
where md never appears; and of obliques where md moves to Comp
with the oblique which already contains a postposition. This
constellation of facts might suggest a subject/object asymmetry and
that is the approach that we will take.
First we will assume that subjects actually start a D-
structure to the right of tense, probably inside the VP as below:
(31) a. wapo te i-xec
knife PAST 1-cut
'The knife cut me'
b. [IP e [I' te wapo i-xecJJ
c. [IP wapoi [I' te ti i-xecJ
There is an argument for this structure. The first is that it is
the position of subjects in transitive clauses and we have already noted
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that every nominal in Canela-Krah6 must be adjacent to a lexical head.
In intransitive clauses, the direct object appears adjacent to the verb
and the subject must therefore relocate.
In transitive clauses it appears that the subject can be licensed
by the verb and when the verb licenses the subject, the subject does
not appear preceding tense. We also saw in the psuedo-transitive that
a "demoted" direct object could not be licensed by a verb:
(32) a. a-te po kam a-cat6c
2-PAST deer at 2-shoot
You shot (at) the deer.'
b. *a-te po a-cat6c
2-PAST deer 2-shoot
('You shot the deer.')
We argued earlier that this showed that if the verb did not
license the demoted direct object it must be licensed by an oblique
maker (such as kam.) Assume that the same is the case for an
intransitive subject which is not licensed by the verb, as in a transitive
clause:
(33) a. hfimre te rop cakwfn
man PAST dog beat
The man beat the dog.'
b. *te hfimre rop cakwin
('The man beat the dog.')
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In transitive clauses such as (32) will have the structure below:
(32') b. lip e 1l' te hihmre rop cakwfn
c. Ijp humrei [I te ti rop cakwf'ni
Consider a wh-extraction case from subject position; the obvious
derivation follows:
(34) a. jim J6 rop te mA a-xar
who POSSN dog PAST mA 2-bite
Whose dog bit you?'
b. [CP e [C'(II[IP [1' te wh a-xarl
c. ICP e IC' [IP wth [I' te ti a-xarjj
d. [CP whi [C' I I [IP t 1 l' te tt ma ia ton]]
Even with the assumption that the verb cannot license the
preverbal trace, for the familiar reason that heads seem to be able to
only license one nominal in Canela-KrahO, this derivation does not
provide an account of the appearance of mA however since the trace in
preverbal position must be able to be licensed by its antecedent in
subject position since this is the structure for all intransitive clauses.
We might focus on the extraction of the wh-word from subject position
to the adjacent Comp but it seems unlikely that antecedent
government would fail to license the subject trace. We may, however,
analyze these facts if we assume, following RIzz4 (1986) and Branch and
Cordln (1989) that movement from subject position to Comp Is not
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possible in Canela-Kraho for the same reason that it is excluded In
Italian. 12 We will make that assumption and exclude the derivation
above.
Given the assumption that there is no short-extraction from
Canela-KrahO S-Structure subject posiUon, the appropriate derivation
would be as follows:
(97) a. jfim JO rop te mA a-xar
who POSSN dog PAST mA 2-bite
'Whose dog bit you?'
b. ICP e IC' [ I liP [i' te wh a-xarl]
c. [CP whi [C' [ I LIP e I' te t1 mA ita ton]) 1 3
The wh-word begins in D-structure subject position, where it is
presumably assigned a thematic-role, and moves directly to Comp
leaving a trace which cannot be properly governed. or, presumably,
licensed in any way. A dummy postposition (md) is then inserted to
properly govern the trace. Alternately the wh word antecedent
governs its trace and the postposition simply licenses the trace,
perhaps by Case assignment or just to meet the Canela-KrahO
requirement that nominals be followed by lexical heads.
12 Having said this, it is not entirely clear why short-ertraction is excluded In Italian.
We prefer not to appeal to Jaeggli's (1984) analysIs favored by Branch and Cordin since
this would force positing a pro in Canela-KahO; Luigi Rizzi 's suggests that rich AGR
triggers a m irnmality effect on antecedent government (MIT lectures, 1986). Following
this It might be that the lexical tense is sufficient to trigger a mnimaility effect without
being sufficient to License the trace-analogously to rich AGR in Rizzi's view.
13 Note that we assume that the Extended Projection Principle (Chorsky, 1982) is
satisfied In this structure since the clause does have a subject and our analysts of
Navajo suggests that a subject may appear only as a constituent of V-as an agreement
clitic.
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We find this a very natural analysis of Canela-Krah6 subject
extraction. There could be alternatives, of course, but we believe that
this is a promising account of the facts. Our analysis has one crucial
feature: it requires the assumption that tense is not a proper governor.
Returning then to Hale's analysis, what is the nature of the
relationship between an incorporated subject and the head which is
its host. The relationship cannot be proper government because that
relation is not necessary in Canela-Krah6 and it cannot be government
since in English (and, by hypothesis, in all languages) tense is a
governor of the subject. Case-marking too can presumably be excluded
as not sufficient and not necessary (unless we want to assume that
subjects in VSO are case marked by the verb, which makes some odd
predictions for tenseless clauses). Another possibility is that subject
incorporation can be licensed if the host is in a position (say CO) from
which it can c-command the trace of the incorporation but presumably
Verb-Second languages such as German produce the correct
configuration without getting the incorporation. If this analysis of
Canela-Krah6 is correct then Hale's analysis cannot adequately
characterize the conditions under which subject incorporation occurs.
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5.3 Conclusions: On Non-Configurationality
Why do languages put words in a particular order and what is
grammatical agreement? The answers are perhaps related.
Agreement has at least two crucial manifestations which though
separable are related. Agreement is a licensing relation both in the
broad sense that in languages like Italian it licenses pro because pro is
recoverable and identified by agreement and in the narrower sense
that it is able to discharge thematic-roles in particular types of
languages. Agreement has a profound effect, we believe, in languages
where it is particularly rich, where agreement represents both
subjects and direct objects. In those languages, the answer where
does word order come from has several intertwined answers. One
answer might be that overt NPs when they appear must be in
particular configurations with respect to other NP/clitic chains. This
is a proposal from Alexander (1986) which purports to explain why
languages with unusual word orders (OVS, OSV, VOS) overwhelmingly
tend to have subject and direct object agreement and why languages
with subject and object agreement seem to have the broadest mix of
types of word order (i.e., why [+Agreement, -Case] has OVS, OSV, VOS,
VSO, SOV and SVO exemplars). Another answer, suggested by Navajo
and Yagua, is that word order is derivative of headedness. NPs when
they appear in [+Agreement, -Case] languages are adjuncts (of a sort)
and consequently their relative position in the phrase must be
specified by the headedness parameter which obtains in the language.
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Another possibility is that word order in these languages comes from
the fact NPs are theta-dependent on their coreferential agreement
morphemes and that theta-transfer is a local relation. There may be
other answers and it may be that none of the suggestions are accurate.
An obvious question concerns how these two senses of the
licensing relation of agreement relate. Why is Italian or Irish not
Hixkaryana or Navajo. To paraphrase Hale's discussion of Warlpiri, the
question is important and vexed. The answer we are forced to is that
subject agreement licenses null anaphora but the addition of object
agreement does more than double the available empty categories. It
seems rather to dramatically effect the grammatical system of the
language, what might once have been termed the "grammatical
method". A language with subject agreement and rich case seems to
us to behave very much like a language without subject agreement that
has rich case apart from null anaphora while a language with subject
agreement and no case seems to us to behave like a language with no
subject agreement and no case, again except with respect to null
anaphora. A language with subject and object agreement, we claim, is
a different type of language altogether, showing null anaphora of
course but lacking also NP movement transformations and having a
much rich morphological structure. This is presumably the intuition
behind Saxon's and Speas' claims that our [+Agreement] languages
were morphologically projected while our [-Agreement] (including
Italian and English) were syntactically projected. We share the
intuition but we cannot answer the question 'why does direct object
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agreement have such an effect on the entire grammatical system'
(presuming, of course, that it does). Obviously one could speculate
that there are types of languages where morphology is the locus of
grammatical relations and that there are languages where syntax is the
locus and one could claim that these two systems overlap or imitate
one another but we believe that this is no more appealing (at the
present state of knowledge) than the deus ex machina of grammatical
method or the genius of the language.
In this work we have attempted, essentially at every turn, to
suggest that there is a difference between Irish and Dogrib and that
this Is a consequence of the cumulative effect of agreement. The
Dogrib/Irish difference, we believe, is not as dramatic as classical non-
configurationality. That notion we reject first because it erases the
quite striking differences between Warlpiri and Navajo and second
because we have argued that case is case, and, essentially, agreement
is agreement and government is government-all familiar relations.
Languages select from these relations and the results are largely
predictable, except again from the emergent property of
accumulation, of specialization in one of these relations to the
exclusion of the others.
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